Teo Ghim Heng v PP

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeSundaresh Menon CJ,Judith Prakash JCA,Steven Chong JCA,Belinda Ang Saw Ean JAD,Chao Hick Tin SJ
Judgment Date23 February 2022
CourtCourt of Appeal (Singapore)
Docket NumberCriminal Appeal No 36 of 2020
Teo Ghim Heng
and
Public Prosecutor

[2022] SGCA 10

Sundaresh Menon CJ, Judith Prakash JCA, Steven Chong JCA, Belinda Ang Saw Ean JAD and Chao Hick Tin SJ

Criminal Appeal No 36 of 2020

Court of Appeal

Constitutional Law — Constitution — Separation of powers — Whether ss 299 and 300(a) Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) violated principle of separation of powers embodied in Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) by allowing Public Prosecutor to determine offender's sentence — Sections 299 and 300(a) Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) — Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint)

Constitutional Law — Equality before the law — Whether ss 299 and 300(a) Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) violated Art 12(1) Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) — Article 12(1) Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) — Sections 299 and 300(a) Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed)

Criminal Law — Offences — Murder — Special exceptions — Diminished responsibility — Appellant killing his wife and daughter — Appellant claiming that he suffered from major depressive disorder which caused him to kill his wife and daughter — Whether appellant suffered from major depressive disorder — Whether defence of diminished responsibility made out — Section 300(a) Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed)

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) On the question of diminished responsibility, the appellant's ability to satisfy the diminished responsibility defence was contingent on his ability to prove that he had been suffering from moderate MDD at the time of his alleged offences: at [28].

(2) An appellate court would be slow to criticise a trial court's findings on expert evidence without good reason: at [37].

(3) In assessing and weighing expert medical evidence in general, it was necessary for the court to examine the underlying evidence and the analytical process by which the experts' conclusions had been reached. Where the expert's medical opinion was based, whether in whole or in part, on an accused person's self-reported symptoms, the court was required to carefully assess the accused person's self-reported symptoms in light of additional information from people who would ordinarily interact with him or her. However, an accused person's self-reported account could assume greater importance in the court's assessment of symptoms which were not easily observable: at [38] to [40].

(4) Evidence of an individual's personality and character traits could be relevant in determining the importance of corroborative evidence to the court's assessment of a medical diagnosis, especially where the less observable symptoms were concerned. But vague allusions to personality traits would not suffice to justify the absence of corroborative evidence; the accused would have to demonstrate the existence of those traits with specific reference to the expert and factual evidence: at [41].

(5) In the present case, it was appropriate to evaluate the Judge's findings on the expert evidence within the framework of the diagnostic criteria for MDD as set out in the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association Publishing, 5th Ed, 2013) (“DSM-V”): at [42].

(6) Criterion A of the DSM-V criteria was not made out as the appellant had failed to satisfy at least five of the symptoms set out thereunder: at [91].

(7) The requirements of distress and impairment in functioning under Criterion B of the DSM-V criteria ought to be read conjunctively. A conjunctive reading was supported by: (a) the text of the DSM-V; (b) psychiatrists' clinical practice; and (c) the description of a “Depressive Episode” in another diagnostic manual, namely, the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (World Health Organisation, 2nd Ed, 10th Revision, 2004) published by the World Health Organisation. As the appellant had not exhibited impairment in functioning, Criterion B of the DSM-V criteria was also not made out: at [98], [102] and [108].

(8) The appellant thus failed to qualify for a diagnosis of MDD, and accordingly the appeal against the Judge's finding that he was not suffering from MDD was dismissed: at [109] and [111].

(9) Both the separation of powers challenge and the Art 12 challenge proceeded from the premise that the first limb of ss 299 and 300(a) were identical. However, this premise was incorrect. Although the act and the intention which had to be established in respect of these provisions were indeed identical, liability under s 300(a) was subject to the additional qualification that the accused did not satisfy any of the specific exceptions to murder: at [117] and [118].

(10) Since the first limb of ss 299 and 300(a) were not identical, there was no practical distinction between the Prosecution's discretion when making charging decisions in choosing between ss 299 and 300(a) offences, and the Prosecution's discretion in choosing between offences which had different elements and attracted different punishments. Sections 299 and 300(a) did not effectively allow the Prosecution to choose the sentence to be imposed on the offender, and therefore did not violate the separation of powers by infringing on judicial power: at [123], [125] and [132].

(11) As to the Art 12 challenge, the question of contravening Art 12 only arose in a situation where persons who were in all material respects situated similarly were nonetheless treated differently. As the offences under ss 299 and 300(a) of the PC were not identical, such a situation simply did not arise here. Consequently, the appellant's appeal was dismissed in its totality: at [138] and [140].

Case(s) referred to

Deaton v AG [1963] IR 170 (refd)

Hinds v R [1977] AC 195 (refd)

Ilechukwu Uchechukwu Chukwudi v PP [2021] 1 SLR 67 (folld)

Kanagaratnam Nicholas Jens v PP [2019] 5 SLR 887 (folld)

Lim Meng Suang v AG [2015] 1 SLR 26 (folld)

Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v PP [2012] 4 SLR 947 (refd)

Mohammed Muktar Ali v R [1992] 2 AC 93 (refd)

Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v PP [2019] 2 SLR 216 (folld)

Ong Pang Siew v PP [2011] 1 SLR 606 (folld)

Palling v Corfield (1970) 123 CLR 52 (refd)

PP v P Mageswaran [2019] 1 SLR 1253 (refd)

PP v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489; [1998] 2 SLR 410 (folld)

Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan v PP [2017] 1 SLR 173 (folld)

Saeng-Un Udom v PP [2001] 2 SLR(R) 1; [2001] 3 SLR 1 (folld)

Sakthivel Punithavathi v PP [2007] 2 SLR(R) 983; [2007] 2 SLR 983 (refd)

Saravanan Chandaram v PP [2020] 2 SLR 95 (folld)

State of South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 (refd)

Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v AG [2021] 1 SLR 809 (refd)

Facts

The appellant killed his wife and his daughter by strangling each of them with a bath towel in the master bedroom of his flat. He was subsequently arrested and charged with the murder of his wife Pei Shan and his daughter Zi Ning under s 300(a) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“PC”).

Before the High Court, the appellant accepted that the elements of the offence of murder under s 300(a) of the PC had been satisfied in relation to the charges against him, but relied on two exceptions to murder under s 300 of the PC: Exception 1 (provocation) and Exception 7 (diminished responsibility). On diminished responsibility, the appellant argued that he had been suffering from an abnormality of mind arising from moderate major depressive disorder (“MDD”), which substantially impaired his responsibility for his acts of killing Pei Shan and Zi Ning. The appellant further challenged the constitutionality of ss 299 and 300(a) of the PC on the grounds that they: (a) offended the separation of powers doctrine by permitting the Prosecution to encroach into the judiciary's sentencing powers (“the separation of powers challenge”); and (b) violated Art 12(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) as there was no intelligible differentia between offences or offenders charged under these provisions (“the Art 12 challenge”).

The High Court judge (“the Judge”) rejected the appellant's defences of diminished responsibility and provocation, and also dismissed the appellant's constitutional challenges. The appellant was convicted of the charges of murder under s 300(a) of the PC and sentenced to the mandatory death penalty. On appeal, the appellant abandoned the defence of provocation. The sole issues before the Court of Appeal (“the Court”) were as follows: (a) whether the defence of diminished responsibility was made out; and (b) whether ss 299 and 300(a) of the PC were unconstitutional on the basis that they offended the separation of powers doctrine and/or contravened Art 12(1) of the Constitution.

Legislation referred to

Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 12 (consd);

Art 12(1)

Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) ss 299, 300(a) (consd);

ss 300, 323, 325, 406, 408

Eugene Singarajah Thuraisingam, Johannes Hadi, Suang Wijaya, Koh Wen Rui GenghisandNg Clare Sophia (Eugene Thuraisingam LLP) for the appellant;

Winston Man, Dillon KokandNg Jun Chong(Attorney-General's Chambers) for the respondent.

23 February 2022

Judgment reserved.

Judith Prakash JCA (delivering the judgment of the court):

Introduction

1 This is an appeal by Teo Ghim Heng (the “appellant”) who was convicted in the High Court of the murder of his wife, Choong Pei Shan (“Pei Shan”), and his daughter, Teo Zi Ning (“Zi Ning”). In convicting the appellant, the court found that he had not made out the defences of diminished responsibility and grave and sudden provocation which he had put out. The High Court judge (the “Judge”) further rejected the appellant's argument that the statutory provisions under which he was charged were...

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