TEL v TEM
Court | Family Court (Singapore) |
Judge | Yarni Loi |
Judgment Date | 30 June 2015 |
Neutral Citation | [2015] SGFC 86 |
Citation | [2015] SGFC 86 |
Docket Number | Divorce No. 602465 of 2003, Summons No. 650060 of 2014, Summons No. 650016 of 2015 |
Hearing Date | 28 April 2015 |
Plaintiff Counsel | Ms Carrie Gill (Harry Elias Partnership) |
Defendant Counsel | Ms Josephine Choo and Mr Wilbur Lim (Wong Partnership) |
Subject Matter | Catch words: Family Law - Consent Order - Maintenance for child,Maintenance for former wife - Variation |
Published date | 14 July 2015 |
This is my judgment in respect of two applications, Summons No. 650016 of 2015 filed by the Petitioner (ex-wife) (“
Both applications relate to a consent order which parties entered into in 2004 at the time of divorce (on ancillary matters) that the Respondent pay $2,900 towards the maintenance of their child who was born on 9 July 2001 and is now about 14 years of age (“
Finally, in or around 2014, after about 7 years, the Petitioner has come to Court for redress. However, instead of taking out an enforcement application for arrears under section 71 of the Women’s Charter, she has launched a 3-part Summons application seeking the following orders: first, that the Consent Maintenance Order “has been varied” by that parties in 2007 such that $1000 was to be set aside in a trust account every month; second, that the Respondent specifically perform his obligations to set up a trust account as promised; and third, that the consent order that the Respondent pay $2,900 be reinstated moving forward.1
Petitioner’s counsel submits that this 3-part Summons application is necessary because the Petitioner will be time-barred from claiming arrears beyond 3 years in a section 71 enforcement action. Petitioner’s counsel argues that this will be unfair to the Petitioner.
On his part, the Respondent now disputes that he had agreed to set aside $1000 in a trust account for the Child. Further, the Respondent has filed an application for a downward variation of the maintenance order to $1,000.
Having considered the matter carefully, I will make no order on the Petitioner’s Application as I find the application misconceived. I will also substantively dismiss the Respondent’s Application, save for his application to reduce monthly maintenance for the ex-wife from $100 to $1.
Brief background factsThe Respondent is a partner in an international accounting firm and is based in Beijing, China. The Petitioner contends that he earns an estimated US$300,000 per year (US$25,000 per month). She provided no supporting evidence. The Respondent has also not furnished any evidence on his income, assets or expenses. The Respondent has lived abroad (primarily in China) for the last 12 years and returns to Singapore about twice a year to visit his parents. He has a new family with his current wife with whom he was having a relationship at the time divorce proceedings were underway between the Petitioner and the Respondent. He has not provided details of this new family nor how much it costs to maintain the new family.
The Petitioner currently works in xxx. She lives with the Child in a rented apartment in Bukit Timah near xxx School which is the school the Child attends. The Respondent believes her monthly income would be no less than S$15,000.
Parties married on 26 September 1996 and started living apart by 2002. The Petitioner commenced divorce proceedings on 25 July 2003. On or about 19 May 2004, parties entered into the following consent order regarding ancillary matters:
The entire order will be referred to as “Consent Order”. Paragraph 5(2) of the Consent Order shall be referred to as “Consent Maintenance Order”.
Parties obtained the Certificate of Making Decree Nisi Absolute (Divorce) on 21 June 2004.
For about 3 years after the Consent Order, the Respondent made prompt payment of the maintenance ordered for the Child and Petitioner. However, subsequently, starting sometime in or around April 2007, the Respondent emailed the Petitioner and informed her that instead of remitting $2,900 to the Petitioner for the Child’s maintenance, he would remit $1,500 ($100 for the Petitioner and $1,400 for the Child) and deposit the balance $1,500 into a trust account he would set up for the Child. Subsequently in August 2007, the amount he paid into the trust account was reduced to $1,000, while he remitted $2,000 directly to the Petitioner ($100 for the Petitioner and $1,900 for the Child).
The Petitioner says that she required the full sum of $2,900 as maintenance for the Child as she had to also provide the Child with accommodation and pay for other ad hoc expenses. However, when the Respondent suggested that he set aside part of the maintenance amount as the Child’s savings, she did not object as she disliked acrimony and felt she could make up the shortfall. However, subsequently, when she asked the Respondent for details and documentary records regarding the trust or account he said he had set up for the Child, he did not respond. She sent email queries to the Respondent in April 2007, August 2007, February 2010, July 2010 and March/April 2014.
The Respondent on the other hand argues that parties had agreed in April 2007 that the Respondent could reduce the monthly maintenance for their Child from $2,900 to $1,400 per month, as he could not afford it. A couple of months later, in or around August 2007, the Plaintiff changed her mind and revised the monthly maintenance to $1,900 instead. In his affidavits, he argues that the amount of $1,000 that was meant to be set aside was not meant to cover the Child’s expenses, but as a form of savings, only “if he could” afford it as he was in financial difficulty at that time. However, the caveat “if he could” is not reflected in the contemporaneous documentary evidence that parties’ provided.
Parties declined to apply to cross-examine each other and the sketchy documentary e-mail evidence produced in Court, with relevant portions reproduced below, is inconclusive as to the terms of what was agreed (if any) between the parties2:
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