Tan Koon Swan v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chua F A J
• Judgment Date: 16 October 1986
• Neutral Citation: [1986] SGCA 12
• Docket Number: Criminal Appeal No 16
• Date: 16 October 1986
• Year: 1986
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: M Karthigesu (Cooma, Lau & Loh & M Karthigesu)
• Citation: [1986] SGCA 12
• Defendant Counsel: Glenn Knight (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Relevant considerations,Principles,Review of sentence on appeal,Sentencing,Criminal Procedure and Sentencing,Criminal breach of trust,ss 109 & 406 Penal Code (Cap 224)

This is an appeal against the sentence imposed by Lai Kew Chai J on a plea of guilty by the appellant to a charge of abetting a director of a public listed company, Pan Electric Industries (Pan-El), who was also a director of other companies which are subsidiaries of Pan El in the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust. The charge related to breach of trust in respect of $144,852.88 which was the interest due to a stockbroking company in connection with the acquisition of three million Grand United Holdings Ltd (GUH) shares for $4,778,895 by a Pan El subsidiary Orchard Hotel (S).

The sentence imposed on the appellant was one of two years` imprisonment and a fine of $500,000; the maximum sentence permissible under the law was one of three years` imprisonment and, so far as the fine is concerned, unlimited.

First, it is appropriate to state the principles upon which this court, as an appellate court, should act when considering an appeal as to the sentence imposed by a trial court. It is axiomatic that each case depends on its own facts. It is also an elementary principle that an appellate court can and will interfere if the sentence imposed was not justified by law. Mr Knight has referred us to a passage in Archbold, which we accept, setting out the principles upon which an appellate court acts.

One principle is that the court can interfere if it is satisfied that the sentencing judge has made the wrong decision as to the proper factual basis for sentence. In relation to this principle, it has not been shown to our satisfaction by Mr Karthigesu, who has related in detail the facts which were put before Lai Kew Chai J that he imposed the sentence on a basis other than the proper factual basis. It is to be observed that the facts set out in the statement of facts which was read out to the learned judge were unequivocably accepted by the appellant.

Another principle is that the court can interfere where it is satisfied that there has been an error on the part of the trial judge in appreciating the material placed before him. The judgment of the trial judge sets out fully, and in our opinion, accurately, the background facts which led to the charge against the appellant, which was a misuse of Pan El funds in circumstances which amounted to criminal breach of trust. The funds were used to create an artificial price for the shares of GUH. It was accepted by the learned judge that it was done for the personal benefit of the appellant.

It...