Tan Ching Shuon, Kelvin v Azli Bin Omar and another (NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Limited, Intervener)

• Judge: Patrick Tay Wei Sheng
• Judgment Date: 24 May 2021
• Neutral Citation: [2021] SGDC 71
• Citation: [2021] SGDC 71
• Court: District Court (Singapore)
• Published date: 04 June 2021
• Docket Number: District Court Suit No 1396 of 2017, Assessment of Damages No 647 of 2018
• Plaintiff Counsel: Bay Thiam Hock Stanley (Oracle Law Corporation)
• Defendant Counsel: Second Defendant in person,Chua Tong Nung Edwin (Lawrence Chua Practice LLC)
• Subject Matter: Damages,Measure of damages,Personal injuries cases,Special damages,Medical expenses,Medishield Life Fund paid for medical expenses,Whether rule against double recovery precluded plaintiff from recovering medical expenses,Plaintiff's employer paid for medical expenses
• Hearing Date: 08 January 2020,26 March 2021,20 February 2020,26 February 2021

Deputy Registrar Patrick Tay Wei Sheng:

The plaintiff suffered personal injury in an accident caused by the defendants. Much of the medical expenses he incurred did not involve direct expenditure on his part. Instead, these expenses were paid by four entities: Singapore Press Holdings Ltd (“SPH”), Shenton Insurance Pte Ltd (“Shenton”), AIA Singapore Private Limited (“AIA”), and the Medishield Life Fund administered by the Central Provident Fund Board and the Ministry of Health (“Medishield”). Still, the plaintiff seeks to recover these expenses from the defendants as damages, even as he undertakes to reimburse Medishield and AIA insofar as the law requires him to do so.

Interlocutory judgment was entered against the second defendant in default of her appearance. Thereafter, the insurers of the defendants’ vehicle, NTUC Income Insurance Co-Operative Limited, who are liable to satisfy any judgment in respect of personal injury entered against the defendants pursuant to the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed), intervened in these proceedings. The plaintiff and the intervener then attended at the assessment of damages on 8 January 2020. The second defendant did not attend this hearing.

On 20 February 2020, the plaintiff and the intervener attended before me for the delivery of my judgment. The second defendant also attended for the first time in these proceedings and stated that she was an undischarged bankrupt. I stayed these proceedings and directed the parties to seek clarification from the Official Assignee (“OA”) on the status of these proceedings and to update the court thereafter.

On 21 January 2021, the plaintiff and the intervener replied to confirm that the OA had no objections to the bringing of these proceedings against the second defendant. This was even as the second defendant would have required the prior sanction of the OA to defend these proceedings. On 26 February and 26 March 2021, parties made submissions on and satisfied the court that final judgment could be entered against the second defendant. I thus deliver my judgment.

General damages

I begin with the general damages for personal injury: damages for pain and suffering and damages for loss of earning capacity. The submissions of the plaintiff and of the intervener are aligned as to the quantum of these damages. The second defendant did not make any submissions on the quantum of these damages. I find that the submissions of the plaintiff and the intervener are reasonable and assess damages accordingly.

For pain and suffering, I assess damages as follow: Neck injury: $5,000; Rotator cuff injury: $3,000; and Back injury (disc prolapse): $12,000.

For loss of earning capacity, I assess damages at $5,000.

This gives a total of $25,000 in general damages.

Special damages

The plaintiff and the intervener are aligned as to the special damages in respect of transport expenses and medical expenses, both of which were paid by plaintiff out of his own pocket. The second defendant made no submission on these damages. I find that the quantum of these damages as claimed by the plaintiff is reasonable and assess damages accordingly as follow: Transport expenses: $300.00; and Medical expenses paid by the plaintiff: $6,926.32.

I turn to the medical expenses that were paid by SPH, Shenton, Medishield, and AIA. The plaintiff seeks to recover these expenses as special damages in these proceedings. The intervener disagrees and submits that these expenses should not be recoverable as damages because they did not involve out-of-pocket expenditure on the part of the plaintiff. In the alternative, the intervener submits that the damages should be paid not to the plaintiff but to the entities that paid for the medical expenses in question.

The entities that paid these medical expenses, and the quantum of these expenses, are as follow: SPH: $1,519.28; Shenton: $30,956.28; Medishield: $1,125.00; and AIA: $21,288.77.

Medical expenses paid by SPH and Shenton

In my judgment, the medical expenses paid by SPH (the employer of the plaintiff) and Shenton (the insurers of SPH) are recoverable as damages by the plaintiff. As the Court of Appeal held in Minichit Bunhom v Jazali bin Kastari and another [2018] 1 SLR 1037 at [83], where a plaintiff has paid for insurance with his own moneys, the fruits of his thrift and foresight in buying that insurance should inure to his and not to the defendant’s advantage. This is notwithstanding that the plaintiff may thereby be compensated beyond his loss. Here, even if the plaintiff did not pay for the medical expense coverage provided by SPH/Shenton in cash, he did so in kind, through his labour as an employee of SPH. This medical expense coverage so provided by SPH is but the fruit of that labour of the plaintiff, and it is difficult to see why those fruits should inure to the benefit of the defendants, who have no relation to SPH. I thus find that these medical expenses are recoverable by the plaintiff.

It is irrelevant, as the intervener submits, that neither SPH nor Shenton have required the plaintiff to reimburse them the amount of his medical expenses that they have paid. Indeed, the willingness by SPH and Shenton to bear the medical expenses without seeking recovery from the plaintiff fortifies the conclusion that the medical expenses coverage is an employment benefit. There is no suggestion that SPH or Shenton provided this medical expense coverage other than in the context of the employer-employee relationship between SPH and the plaintiff.

In any event, even if these payments by SPH and Shenton were made benevolently and outside...