Syariahization of intra-Muslim religious freedom and human rights practice in Malaysia: the case of Darul Arqam.

AuthorAbdul Hamid, Ahmad Fauzi

Whenever the question of religious freedom or related concepts such as religious pluralism and religious tolerance appear in Malaysian public discourse, one's attention is invariably focused on inter-faith rather than intra-faith social engagements. Pluralist conceptions of Malaysian society inherited from colonial forms of knowledge had, to a large extent, ignored religious variations within local Muslim communities, especially the Malays, whose leaders shouldered the post-independence burden of maintaining political hegemony in the face of an apparent threat of being overwhelmed by migrant ethnic groups. On independence in 1957, and later as a federation in 1963, Malaysia's socio-political structures were inaugurated on the assumption that Malay-Muslims were religiously uniform. However, while socio-political categories of the nation-state ossified under the inaugural constitutional set-up, the religious-intellectual make-up of Malay-Muslims continued to undergo discursive developments, being liable to myriad influences from not only the ummah at large, but also from organic internal changes. Amidst the rapid political-economic developments of the post-colonial era, internal tension within the Malay-Muslim community was inevitable, but temporarily concealed under the facade of an ethnically driven Muslim unity legitimized by legal strictures.

The scenario above is reflective of the dilemma befalling Malaysian Muslims pertaining to the public role of Islam. On the one hand, Article 3(1) of the Federal Constitution--which reads "Islam is the religion of the Federation, but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation" (1)--provides legal safeguards for Islam's position in Malaysia's body politic. On the other hand, while apparently privileging Islam over other religions, the Constitution via Article 11 confers on every individual the right to profess, practise and propagate his or her own religion, although the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among Muslims may be legally controlled or restricted. Moreover, Article 11 authorizes all religious groups to manage their own religious affairs, to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes, and to acquire, possess, hold and administer property in accordance with the law. (2) The provision on Islam as the federal religion cannot preferentially trump other constitutional clauses, as spelt out in Article 3(4): "Nothing in this Article derogates from any other provision of this Constitution." (3)

However, jurisdictional vagueness regarding its express role has laid constitutional provisions pertaining to Islam vulnerable to multiple interpretations. Hence, for example, despite Islam being under the guardianship of different individual states making up the Malaysian federation rather than the federal government, as signified by the different Majlis Agama Islam (Councils of Islamic Religion) and Jabatan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam (Departments of Islamic Affairs) operating separately in each of the states, (4) what we see in practice, especially since the enunciation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the National Cultural Policy (NCP) in 1971, is a gradual dilution of states' control over Islam in favour of the federal administration. In the name of administrative coordination, power over Islam was effectively transferred from the states to the federal Islamic bureaucracy helmed by the Department of Islamic Advancement of Malaysia (JAKIM: Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia) situated in the Prime Minister's Department. The successor to the Islamic Affairs Division of the Prime Minister's Department, or otherwise known as the Islamic Centre (Pusat Islam), JAKIM began operations in 1997 with expanded functions. As for the judicial branch, a Department of Syariah Judiciary (JKSM: Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia) was established in 1998 as a coordinating body for syariah courts in all Malaysian states, with most syariah judges and court officials being gradually absorbed by a parallel scheme called the Common-Use Syariah Administrative Service Scheme (Perkhidmatan Guna Sama Pegawai Syariah Persekutuan). (5) By then, a majority of the states had begun emulating the federal government's "Syariah Criminal Offences Enactments" model which subjected Muslims to a host of syariah-based criminal punishments. (6)

Islam in Malaysia evolved from being a perfunctory component of statecraft under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957-70) to an integral part of nation-building by the time Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad left office in 2003. Rather than dismissing the relevance of the Islamic revivalist challenge of the 1970s-80s, Mahathir deftly absorbed its currents by coopting its leading figures and hijacking its agenda. For resurgent Muslims prepared to work within the state-managed bureaucracy and party political system, Mahathir's offer of being part of the official power structure seemed like a golden opportunity to realize their dreams of creating an Islamic order. This Islamic order became formalized in the national ethos through identification with their political masters: Mahathir launched a campaign of inculcating Islamic values into the administration (Dasar Penerapan Nilai-nilai Islam); Mahathir's Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim (1994-98), (7) introduced Islam Madani (Civil Islam); and Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003-9) became perennially identified with Islam Hadhari (civilizational Islam). Nonetheless, the success of all these initiatives rested upon logistical and unwavering support from state officials entrusted with its implementation. At times, though, visions, interests and aims of different cohorts of politicians and officials differed. The consistent intersection of religion and politics in Malaysia has had the unfortunate consequence of reducing Islam to a political tool, to the detriment of a broad and inclusive understanding of the religion.

In the era of present Prime Minister Najib Razak, who succeeded Badawi in April 2009, Islam is said to have come under the threat of an ideology called "human rights-ism". "Human rights-ism", said to reject the religious and moral values, was linked instead to such Islamically repugnant actions as apostasy and homosexuality, and was viewed insidiously on the same plane with such ideologies as "liberalism", "secularism", "humanism" and "pluralism". (8) While Najib reaffirmed his commitment to the principles and values of universal human rights upon being queried by human rights organizations, his clarification failed to satisfy some quarters in Malaysia's human rights lobby. (9) Even the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM: Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia) expressed regret at Najib's cavalier demarcation of watertight boundaries between human rights and Islam. (10)

In light of the recent upsurge of an Islamist conservative lobby intent on imposing its arbitrary worldview upon Malay-Muslim society in Malaysia, (11) Najib's diatribe against modern humanistic values was not altogether surprising. Islamist conservatives' discourse was notoriously replete with the demonization of such allegedly ungodly concepts as "liberalism", "secularism" and "pluralism." (12) Having been elevated to the leadership of both the country and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)--chief component of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN: National Front) coalition, short of the Islamic slogans that had been bandied about by his predecessors, Najib's religious void was filled by ultra-conservatives who have been primarily responsible for the phenomenon identified as the syariahization of Malaysia's political-legal complexion. (13)

For the purpose of this article, syariahization is defined as the institutionalization of syariah-based values, norms and categories in the discourse and practice of Malaysia's legal corpus and ensuing human rights regime, while simultaneously operating within a larger secular judicial framework as set out in the Federal Constitution. (14) But while syariah may be explicated in broad terms from civilizational and philosophical perspectives, Malaysia's official religious gatekeepers have chosen to apply syariah in a narrowly legalistic manner. That is, limiting what the gatekeepers consider as Islamically acceptable to doctrine and action within the confines of the dominant Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah or Sunni theological school, with deleterious consequences to the rights of Muslims who fail or refuse to conform to arbitrarily imposed uniform standards. The case of Darul Arqam is briefly discussed towards the end as we interrogate the practical implications of syariahization.

Roles of Politics and the Islamic Bureaucracy in the Syariahization of Malaysia's Human Rights Discourse

In Muslim-majority countries, politicians find in general that religious elites--made up mostly of the ulama or learned scholars of Islamic sciences--make for powerful allies. A good example is the relationship forged between the Saud ruling family and Wahhabi-inclined ulama, the puritanical sect pioneered by the Nejdi reformer Muhammad ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (d. 1792), in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia since 1932. (15) But while the Sauds had a relatively firm grip on the nation as legitimized by its doctrine of family rule, the UMNO-led religious-political terrain in Malaysia has been vulnerable to electoral swings which can potentially upset power equilibriums to maintain its political hegemony. Such grassroots upheavals took place in 1969-70, when a Malaysia torn by ethnic strife, started adopting characteristics of an ethnic democracy founded upon an authoritarian state; (16) and in 1998-99, when unrest ensuing from the humiliation suffered by Anwar Ibrahim triggered a process of "secular de-alignment", entailing shifts on the political ground from party-based loyalties to short-term factors capable of causing unpredictable...

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