Sumitomo Bank Ltd v Kartika Ratna Thahir

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 30 September 1996
• Date: 30 September 1996
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 308 of 1976
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Sumitomo Bank Ltd

Plaintiff

and

Kartika Ratna Thahir

Defendant

[1996] SGHC 216

Lai Kew Chai J

Originating Summons No 308 of 1976

High Court

Civil Procedure–Costs–Taxation–Plaintiff awarded costs–Complex issues of fact and law exist were canvassed but big portion of costs due to plaintiff's administrative incompetence–Extent to which costs to be allowed–Civil Procedure–Costs–Taxation–Application for review–Whether time limit for application ran from date of Registrar's decision or date of the delivery of grounds of decision

This was an application to review the taxation for a bill of costs which arose out of the case reported in [1992] 3 SLR (R) 638. Notwithstanding the protracted period of gestation, since 15 years had elapsed from the time the plaintiff became a party to the proceedings, getting up took a significant period of time. The hearing went on for 43 days. This was because much of the oral evidence on the side of the plaintiff was not preserved. The relevant documents were also not kept under lock and key, in consequence, documentary evidence of the plaintiff had to be procured in some cases from other sources or retrieved from a warehouse. Documents that were an essential chain in the documentary trail, were not subjected to the discovery process until close to the trial date. The defendant, short on substantive merits, became long on technicalities, putting the plaintiff to strict proof, as she was entitled to. The total party and party costs claimed by the plaintiff was $7,381,748.27 and the amount allowed by the deputy registrar was $2,671,294.33, on the basis that there was duplication of and overlap between the work done by two Queen's Counsel; the solicitors' work costs were almost the same as that of the Queen's Counsel, contrary to established authority that the solicitor was to be paid less due to his less onerous role, and that almost 20,000 hours had been spent in getting-up. The date of the decision was 19 June 1995; however, the grounds of decision were delivered only on 24 July 1995. On 5 August 1995 the plaintiff filed this application for review. The defendant applied to strike out the application on the basis that it was out of time pursuant to O 59 r 36 (2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court (Cap 322, R 5, 1990 Ed) (“the RSC”), which then provided that an application for review “may be made at any time within 14 days, or such longer period as the Registrar at the time when he signs the certificate or the court at any time may allow”. The plaintiff's solicitor had calculated the deadline for filing application for review from the date of delivery of the grounds of decision rather than the date of decision. The plaintiff wanted it established that management time of solicitors was claimable, and also sought a review of the quantum.

Held, dismissing the application:

(1) Under O 59 r 36 (2) of the RSC, an application for review of taxation must be made within 14 days of the date of the deputy registrar's decision, and not the date of the delivery of the grounds of the decision. The plaintiff's advisers' view on this, though erroneous, could conceivably and reasonably be taken. The plaintiff was thus to be allowed an extension of time but was to pay the defendant the costs of all the relevant applications: at [5].

(2) The process of assessment of party and party costs was not a matter of mathematical multiplication, with assumed multiplier and multiplicand, nor were time sheets conclusive of the total amount of time which reasonably would have been spent on any particular aspect of getting-up. They were, however, valuable as guides in assisting in the process of assessment: at [19].

(3) While the last set of solicitors and Queen's Counsel of the plaintiffs had to do extensive work after they took over in an air of urgency, the poor state of documentation was due to the poor state of administration of the plaintiff during the relevant period, and much of the additional work done was directly due to factors for which the defendant could not reasonably be made to pay: at [20].

Lister & Co v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch D 1 (refd)

Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 3 SLR (R) 622; [1993] 1 SLR 185 (refd)

Simpsons Motor Sales (London), Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1965] 1 WLR 112; [1964] 3 All ER 833 (refd)

Rules of the Supreme Court (Cap 322, R 5, 1990 Ed)O 59rr 27 (2), 27 (3),35 (3), 36 (2),36 (5)

Rules of Court 1996,TheO 59r 36 (2)

Wong Meng Meng and Sim Bock Eng (Wong Partnership) for the plaintiff

Michael Hwang, K Shanmugam and Francis Xavier (Allen & Gledhill) for the first defendant

Harry Wee (Braddell Brothers) for the second defendant.

Judgment reserved.

Lai Kew Chai J

1 All three parties to these proceedings (hereinafter referred to as “Pertamina”, “Kartika” and “the estate” respectively) applied under O 59 r 36 (1) Rules of the Supreme Court by summons to the High Court to review the taxation of getting up and certain other items in Bill of Costs No 1601 of 1994 by the deputy registrar, Mr Ng Peng Hong. In such a review of the deputy registrar's certificate the High Court “may make such order as the circumstances require, and in particular may order the Registrar's certificate to be amended or, except where the dispute as to the item under review is as to amount only, order the item to be...