Sukhpreet Kaur Bajaj d/o Manjit Singh and Another v Paramjit Singh Bajaj and Others

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Tan Lee Meng J
• Judgment Date: 13 November 2008
• Neutral Citation: [2008] SGHC 207
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Published date: 14 November 2008
• Year: 2008
• Plaintiff Counsel: Rey Foo Jong Han (K S Chia Gurdeep & Param)
• Defendant Counsel: Philip Jeyaretnam, SC (instructed) / Elizabeth Yeo (Rodyk & Davidson LLP) / Godwin Campos (Godwin Campos & Co)
• Subject Matter: Trusts
• Citation: [2008] SGHC 207

13 November 2008 Judgment reserved.

Tan Lee Meng J:

1 The present case involves proceedings commenced by the plaintiffs, Ms Sukhpreet Kaur Bajaj d/o Manjit Singh (“Sukhpreet”) and her brother, Mr Bhupinder Singh s/o Manjit Singh (“Bhupinder”), against their maternal uncles (the 1^st and 2^nd defendants) and their paternal uncles (the 3^rd and 4^th defendants).

2 Sukhpreet and Bhupinder sued Mr Paramjit Singh Bajaj (“Paramjit”) and Mr Manbir Singh Bajaj (“Manbir”) (both referred to as the “maternal uncles”), who were the executors of their mother’s estate, for breach of their duties as trustees of the said estate. They also sued Mr Bhajnik Singh Bajaj and Mr Jagjit Singh Bajaj (both referred to as the “paternal uncles”), for unconscionably procuring the transfer of trust property to themselves.

Background

3 The dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants has its roots in the estate of the plaintiffs’ paternal grandfather, Mr Bhagwan Singh Bajaj (“Bhagwan”), who died intestate on 30 December 1947.

4 Bhagwan owned a number of properties, which were mainly situated in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Following his death in 1947, the plaintiffs’ father, Mr Manjit Singh (“Manjit”) inherited a one-sixth share of Bhagwan’s estate (“the trust property”).

5 In January 1972, Manjit assigned the trust property to his wife, Mdm Kuldip Kaur Bajaj (“Kuldip”). Kuldip made a will and she appointed her brothers, Paramjit and Manbir, as her executors. Upon Kuldip’s death on 17 June 1980, her four children, including the plaintiffs, became entitled to her estate.

6 In 1982, while the plaintiffs were still minors, the maternal uncles, in their capacity as trustees of the trust property, sold the said property to the paternal uncles. According to the plaintiffs, the trust property was sold for RM50,000. However, this is not borne out by the evidence and Paramjit testified that apart from this sum, the paternal uncles also paid the maternal uncles S$250,000 for the trust property. The S$250,000 was spent on renovations to Kuldip’s house at No 1 Goodman Road. After the said renovations had been completed, the plaintiffs and their siblings moved into that house. The property at Goodman Road was subsequently sold by the plaintiffs and their siblings in 2001 for S$2,000,000.

7 Sukhpreet and Bhupinder, who are now aged 40 and 35 years respectively, asserted that the trust property had been sold at an undervalue by the maternal uncles to the paternal uncles in 1982. Hence, they instituted the present action against their maternal and paternal uncles.

8 Before the trial commenced, the plaintiffs withdrew their claim against their maternal uncles for breach of their duties as trustees. According to them, this step was taken because Paramjit is presently a bankrupt while Manbir cannot be contacted as he now resides in India. As it turned out, Paramjit then agreed to become the plaintiffs’ witness.

9 At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, counsel for the paternal uncles, Mr Philip Jeyaretnam SC (“Mr Jeyaretnam”), informed the court that his clients took the position that there was no case to answer and that they would not be giving any testimony.

Effect of a Submission of No Case to Answer

10 The effect of the paternal uncles’ submission that there was no case to answer must first be considered. In Bansal Hermant Govindprasad v Central Bank of India [2003] 2 SLR 33, Chao Hick Tin JA, who delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal, referred to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Storey v Storey [1960] 3 All ER 279, and accepted that there were two situations in which a submission of no case to answer may be made by a defendant. The first situation is where even if the plaintiff’s evidence is accepted on the face of it, no case has been made out against the defendant. The second situation is where the plaintiff’s evidence is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the plaintiff’s burden of proof has not been discharged.

11 The plaintiffs asserted that their paternal uncles took the position that there was no case to answer because they wanted to avoid cross-examination. That may well be true but the plaintiffs have only themselves to blame because the way they ran their case was most unsatisfactory. The paternal uncles’ counsel, Mr Jeyaretnam, asserted that there were a number of important flaws in the plaintiffs’ case, including the following:

(a) The claim was time-barred;

(b) There was no credible evidence that the trust property had been sold at an undervalue;

(c) On the basis of the pleadings, there was no evidence that the paternal uncles owed any fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs;

(d) There was no evidence of any breach of trust by the maternal uncles; and

(e) There was no evidence of any misrepresentation by the paternal uncles.

Time-bar and laches

12 Although the sale of the trust property took place in 1982 when the plaintiffs were minors, it was not until 2006, some 24 years later, and long after the plaintiffs had attained the age of majority, that the present action was initiated against their maternal and paternal uncles. In view of this, it is not surprising that the paternal uncles pleaded that the action was time-barred by virtue of s 6 of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996, Rev Ed). They added that in any case, the question of laches arose because the plaintiffs were guilty of prolonged, inordinate and inexcusable delay in instituting the present action against them.

The Limitation Act

13 It is astonishing that the plaintiffs pleaded nothing specific in response to their paternal uncles’ defence of limitation of action and laches. It was only in their closing written submissions, which were forwarded to the court out of time, that the question of limitation was addressed.

14 The plaintiffs had to bring their cause of action within the ambit of s 22(1) or s 29 of the Limitation Act in order to avoid the time-bar in s 6 of the Act. However, they made no reference to s 22(1) or s 29 in their Statement of Claim, and they did not file a reply to the assertions with respect to the time-bar in the Defence.

15 Section 22(1) of the Limitation Act provides as follows:

No period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action –

(a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or

(b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds thereof in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use.

16 The plaintiffs are in no position to rely on s 22(1) of the Limitation Act for two reasons. To begin with, they did not plead fraud on the part of any of the defendants as trustees so as to bring the case within the embrace of limb (a) of s 22(1). Secondly, they cannot rely on limb (b) of s 22(1) in their action against their paternal uncles because the trustees of the trust property were their maternal uncles and not their paternal uncles.

17 As for s 29(1) of the Limitation Act, the relevant part is as follows:

Where, in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act –

(a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant ….

(b) The right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; ….

The period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud ….. or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.

18 As has been mentioned, the above statutory provision was not pleaded by the plaintiffs and no evidence was furnished by them as to how it may be relevant in the present case. As such, it need not be considered any further.

19 For the reasons stated, I hold that the plaintiffs’ action against their paternal uncles is time-barred.

Laches

20 Whatever may be the position in relation to the Limitation Act, the question of laches arises in the circumstances of this case. At the outset, it may be noted that s 32 of the Limitation Act provides as follows:

Nothing in this Act shall affect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence, laches or otherwise.

21 When considering the corresponding English provision in Green v Gaul (also known as Loftus, decd, In re) [2006] EWCA Civ 1124, [2007] 1 WLR 591, Chadwick LJ noted (at [33]) as follows:

Section 36(2) of the Limitation Act 1980 provides, in terms, that: “Nothing in this Act shall affect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence or otherwise”…. At first sight, therefore, it is difficult to see how an express provision in the 1980 Act that no period of limitation prescribed by the Act shall apply to the claim – or, more generally, the absence of any provision in the Act which does, on a true analysis, prescribed a period of limitation in respect of the claim – can have the effect of excluding a defence of laches if, on the facts, such a defence would otherwise be available.

22 The above approach was endorsed by Sundaresh Menon JC in Re Estate of Tan Kow Quee (alias Tan Kow Kwee) [2007] 2 SLR 417 (“Tan Kow Quee”) (at [29] – [30]).

23 As for what laches entails, in Underhill and Hayton’s Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, the authors, quoting from Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1874) 5 LR PC 221 (“Lindsay Petroleum”) (at 239-240), stated (at p 1139):

Laches consists of a substantial lapse of time coupled with circumstances “where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards asserted.

24 In Scan Electronics (S) Pte Ltd v Syed Ali Redha Alsagoff [1997] 3 SLR 13 (“Scan Electronics”), Karthigesu JA, who delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal,...