Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Yong Qiang Construction

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chao Hick Tin JA
• Judgment Date: 07 September 1999
• Neutral Citation: [1999] SGCA 68
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 23 of 1999
• Date: 07 September 1999
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1999
• Plaintiff Counsel: Ravi Chelliah and Soh Lip San (Cooma Lau & Loh)
• Citation: [1999] SGCA 68
• Defendant Counsel: N Sreenivasan (Derrick Ravi & Partners) and Ramalingam Kasi (Raj Kumar & Rama)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Whether leave required under s 34(2)(a) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322),Construction of statute,Meaning of 'trial' in s 34(2)(a),Purposive approach,Meaning of 'Trial',Words and Phrases,Leave,s 34(2)(a) Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322),'Trial',Civil Procedure,Appeals,Statutory Interpretation

(delivering the grounds of judgment of the court): Introduction

This was a motion by the respondents to strike out CA 23/99 filed by the appellants on the ground that leave to appeal was required under s 34(2)(a) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Ed) (`the SCJA`) and that no such leave had been obtained by the appellants. We agreed with the respondents that leave to bring this appeal was required, and as no leave had been obtained, we allowed the motion and struck out the appeal. We now give our reasons.

The facts

The appellants were the main contractors for the Housing and Development Board`s building project known as `Kallang Whampoa`. The respondents were appointed the sub-contractors of the appellants for the same project by an agreement made between them. In relation to that subcontract, a dispute subsequently arose between them. On 7 March 1998, the respondents took out a writ of summons in Suit 1219/98 in the District Court, claiming against the appellants the sum of $62,275.51, representing the retention sum under the subcontract. The writ was served on the appellants on 17 March 1998. On 19 March 1998, the appellants entered an appearance. The appellants then took out an application for an extension of time to file and deliver their defence, and at the hearing of that application, an order was made giving the appellants an extension of time to 29 April 1998 to file their defence. The appellants` solicitors, however, were still unable to finalise the defence by the extended time. On 30 April 1998, the appellants` solicitors asked the respondents` solicitors for a further extension of time to file their defence. The latter replied that the respondents had applied to enter judgment in default of defence against the appellants. The default judgment was duly entered against the appellants on 30 April 1998.

On 4 May 1998, the appellants filed an application to set aside the default judgment. The application was heard before the deputy registrar, who granted the appellants` application and set aside the default judgment. The respondents appealed to the District Judge against the deputy registrar`s decision. The District Judge allowed the appeal and reinstated the default judgment. Against the decision of the District Judge the appellants appealed to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The appellants then appealed to this court against the decision of the High Court refusing to set aside the default judgment.

The issue

It was not in dispute that the amount or value of the subject matter involved in the appeal was $62,275.51. That was the amount claimed by the respondents for which the judgment in default was entered, and that was the judgment the appellant sought to set aside. The issue before us was whether, in view of the amount or value of the subject matter being less than $250,000, the appellants were required to obtain leave to appeal under s 34(2)(a) of the SCJA. Section 34(2), in so far as relevant, provides as follows:

Except with the leave of the Court of Appeal or a Judge, no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of the following cases:

(a) where the amount or value of the subject-matter at the trial is $250,000 or such other amount as may be specified by an order made under subsection (3) or less;

...

Counsel for the respondents submitted that where the amount or value of the subject matter was $250,000 or less, an appeal cannot be brought unless leave under s 34(2)(a) has been obtained. That precisely was what happened here. The amount or value of the subject matter in this case was much less than the jurisdictional limit, and as no leave had been obtained, the appellants` appeal was not sustainable and ought to be struck out. Counsel for the appellants, on the other hand, submitted that in view of the wording in s 34(2)(a), namely: `the amount or value of the subject-matter at the trial is $250,000 ... or less`, that provision is applicable only where there has been a trial in the court below, whether it be the High Court or the District Court. In this case, there had not been a trial, and therefore the appellants were not required to obtain leave under s 34(2)(a) of the SCJA to bring the appeal before this court.

The issue really turned on the interpretation of the word `trial` in para (a) of sub-s (2) of s 34. On this issue, both counsel appeared to have accepted the following definition of `trial` as given in the following passage of Jowitt`s Dictionary of English Law (2nd Ed) at p 1805:

Trial, the hearing of a cause, civil or criminal, before a judge who has jurisdiction over it, according to the laws of the land. A trial is the finding out by due examination the truth of the point in issue or question between the parties, whereupon judgment may be given (Co Litt 124b).

A trial is that step in an action, prosecution or other judicial proceeding, by which the questions of fact in issue are decided.

Counsel for the respondents relied essentially on the first paragraph of this passage and submitted a broad meaning for the word `trial`. In his submission, a trial need not necessarily involve the calling of...