Singapore Recreation Club v Abdul Rashid Mohamed Ali and another

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeAng Cheng Hock J
Judgment Date28 July 2020
Neutral Citation[2020] SGHC 156
Docket NumberSuit No 1104 of 2017
Date28 July 2020
Published date31 July 2020
Plaintiff CounselPonnampalam Sivakumar, Anand George and Tan Ming Quan (BR Law Corporation)
Defendant CounselPateloo Eruthiyanathan Ashokan and Soon Meiyi Geraldine (Withers KhattarWong LLP)
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Hearing Date10 September 2019,15 November 2019,06 April 2020,05 September 2019,26 November 2019,13 November 2019,17 September 2019,19 November 2019,21 November 2019,18 September 2019,06 September 2019,22 November 2019,03 September 2019,11 September 2019,12 November 2019,04 September 2019,20 November 2019,12 September 2019
Subject MatterAnnual,Annual wage supplement,Employment Law,Termination,Pay,Unincorporated Associations and Trade Unions,Meetings,Leave,Minutes,Friendly societies,Disputes
Ang Cheng Hock J:

The claims and counterclaim in Suit 1104 of 2017 (the “Suit”) arise in the backdrop of a change in leadership at one of Singapore’s oldest social clubs.1 As is usual in cases involving clubs of this nature, there is an undercurrent of acrimony and frayed relationships between the members that comprise the past and present leadership of the club. I say this to explain that the various claims must be viewed and understood in this context, and because the motivations of the parties and the club members may be relevant in certain circumstances. However, ultimately, the disputes have to be decided strictly in accordance with the law, facts, and the evidence presented to the Court.

Background The parties

The plaintiff (“the Club”) is one of the oldest members clubs in Singapore, having been established in 1883. It is managed by and acts through a management committee (“MC”), which is elected by the members of the club once every two years.2 Article 31 of the Club’s constitution provides that the “entire management” of the Club shall be deputed to the MC, and that the MC has the power to, inter alia, “examine the accounts and arrange the affairs of the Club” and “appoint such Sub-Committees as [may be] deem[ed] necessary or expedient”.3 The upshot of Article 31 of the Club’s constitution is that the MC is, for all intents and purposes, the proverbial “mind and will” of the Club.

The first defendant was employed by the Club as its general manager and secretary from June 2002 until the end of August 2014.4 On 1 September 2014, the first defendant was summarily dismissed in circumstances which will be detailed later in this judgment.

The second defendant is a member of the Club. He was elected as the Club’s president in 1995 and held that position for almost 22 years.5 Although the second defendant was the Club’s president until April 2016, he had in fact been suspended by the Club at the end of 2015. This was pursuant to a complaint made in July 2015 by the Club’s then vice-president, Dr Sarbjit Singh (“Dr Singh”), who is presently the Club’s president. The substance of that complaint is not directly relevant to the present proceedings.

The events leading to the Suit

In the MC elections of April 2014, nine of the 12 members elected were part of a team led by Dr Singh.6 These nine had campaigned as part of Dr Singh’s team.7 The remaining three elected MC members were the second defendant and two members of the previous MC. Thus, while the second defendant still held his position as the Club’s president, he no longer held sway over the MC.

After the new MC took office, there were discussions amongst the members who came in as part of Dr Singh’s team that the time was ripe for a change of general manager/secretary for the Club.8 At that time, to the knowledge of the MC members who were part of Dr Singh’s team, it was not the case that the first defendant had done something wrong which warranted immediate dismissal. Even at trial, none of the Club’s witnesses identified any single act by the first defendant which warranted immediate dismissal at this time. It was therefore agreed between the MC members who had been part of Dr Singh’s team that the first defendant’s performance would be raised as the reason for terminating his employment, but it was fairly apparent that Dr Singh’s team simply wanted the first defendant replaced with someone else.

On 11 August 2014, the MC resolved, by majority, that the first defendant’s employment would be terminated.9 This resolution, proposed by Dr Singh, was passed at the MC’s monthly meeting, which is always held in the evening.10 It is not in dispute that Dr Singh and two other MC members, Professor Sum Yee Leong (“Professor Sum”) and Dr Christopher Chong, were tasked by the MC to communicate its decision to the first defendant and to handle the procedures for the first defendant’s exit from the Club. Therefore, after the MC meeting, the news that the MC had resolved to terminate his employment was conveyed to the first defendant by Dr Singh and the two other MC members. The first defendant was given an option to either resign or be given two months’ notice of the termination of his employment by the Club.11 The first defendant opted for the former option, and he then signed a pre-prepared letter of resignation which was handed to him by Dr Singh. He was instructed that he would be placed on garden leave until his last day of employment.12

What then transpired that night of 11 August 2014 is one of the main disputes in this case. The Club claims that that first defendant was told by Dr Singh to return to the premises to collect his personal belongings the next morning, as arrangements had been made for three MC members to be present in order to supervise this process.13 The Club further claims that, disregarding this instruction, the first defendant removed not only his personal belongings, but also property of the Club, that very night. The second defendant, who had gone to offer some consolation to the first defendant, was present while the first defendant was packing, and helped him carry some bags to his car.14

This account is challenged by the first defendant, who claims that he was only told to do a “handover” the next morning, on 12 August 2014. He was not told that he could not remove his personal belongings straight away, and that was what he did that night.15 He denies taking any property belonging to the Club. As for the second defendant, as already mentioned, he was present as the first defendant was packing and removing various items from the office.16 While the second defendant helped the first defendant move some bags to his car, the second defendant did not pay attention to and/or was not told what had been packed into those bags. Although the Club initially disputed this characterisation of the second defendant’s behaviour, it no longer did so by the time of the trial (see [19(a)] below).

In the morning of 12 August 2014, the first defendant returned to the Club’s premises to do his handover and remove the rest of his things.17 He returned an old Compaq laptop, which he had used from 2002 to about 2006, and that had been issued to him by the Club, to the Club’s information technology department.18 He claimed to have left in his office a separate laptop, which he had been issued by the Club and that he was using at the time of his termination, before leaving the premises. This is disputed by the Club, which claims that no laptop was left in the first defendant’s office and that in fact, the laptop he was using at that time was never returned.19 It is common ground that the first defendant was not asked to sign any “handover” list or checklist setting out the Club’s property that he returned.20

In August 2014, one of the MC members, Derrick D’Souza (“Mr D’ Souza”), made two police reports claiming that the first defendant had wrongfully taken the Club’s documents and property, including the unreturned laptop.21 The unreturned laptop was specifically described as having been “stolen” in the second police report.22 The first defendant was not asked about the laptop prior to the making of the police report, nor did the Club even contact and inform him that the laptop was missing.

On 1 September 2014, whilst he was serving his garden leave, the first defendant was asked to attend a meeting at the Club.23 The reason he was given for the meeting was to discuss the issue of his substantial unconsumed annual leave and whether it would be encashed. However, at the meeting, which the Club itself acknowledges is more aptly described as an “inquiry”, Dr Singh, Professor Sum, and two other MC members, Leo Meng Tong and Fabian Chan, grilled the first defendant about the missing laptop.24 The first defendant denied any wrongdoing. The first defendant was then informed that the Club was dismissing him for unprofessional conduct. This meeting, which took place at the Club’s premises, was recorded by one of the MC members, without the knowledge of the first defendant. The transcript of the audio recording was adduced in evidence.25

About a year later, on 13 August 2015, the Club commenced proceedings against the first defendant in the State Courts (District Court Suit No 2440 of 2015) seeking, amongst other things, an order in relation to the delivery up of the allegedly missing laptop, which was described as a “Dell laptop”, and also documents belonging to the Club, although these documents were not identified.26 The first defendant counterclaimed for damages for (a) constructive dismissal arising from his having been forced by Dr Singh on 11 August 2014 to either resign or be terminated with two months’ notice, and/or (b) his termination with immediate effect on 1 September 2014.27

In July 2017, after the first round of affidavits of evidence-in-chief (“AEICs”) had been exchanged and the action set down for trial, the Club amended its case to add new claims in relation to “special” annual bonuses.28 These bonuses had been paid to the first defendant for the FYs 2004 to 2013, though the Club’s pleaded claim did not include the bonus paid for FY 2005. It is alleged that the claimed bonuses, totalling S$98,450.48, were never authorised by the MC. The Club claimed that it had learned about the payments of these bonuses only after the first defendant filed his affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) in the State Court proceedings and referred to those bonuses. The second defendant was then added as a defendant to the action in the State Courts because it was alleged that he had procured the payments of these bonuses by the Club to the first defendant without the MC’s approval.

Subsequently, in September 2017, the Club further amended its case to add new claims in relation to guest rooms that the Club had been operating from 2009 to 2017.29 These guest rooms were collectively referred to as the Residence...

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