Sim Leng Chua v Manghardt

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeChan Sek Keong JC
Judgment Date18 February 1987
Neutral Citation[1987] SGHC 3
Date18 February 1987
Subject MatterWhether private interest of plaintiff prevails against public interest,Abuse of process of court,Discovery of documents,Civil Procedure,O 18 r 19 Rules of the Supreme Court 1970,Applicability of 'Riddick principle',Defamatory remarks in list of documents
Docket NumberSuit No 336 of 1986
Published date19 September 2003
Defendant CounselMargaret Neo (Advani Hoo Morris & Kumar)
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Plaintiff CounselPauline Tan (Drew & Napier)

Cur Adv Vult

This is an appeal by the defendant against the decision of the assistant registrar dismissing his application to strike out, on the ground of abuse of process of court, the action of the plaintiff for damages for defamation. The action arose in the following circumstances. In Suit No 4049 of 1982 (the Interfood action which is currently part-heard), the plaintiff in this action as plaintiff in that action sued Interfood Ltd (Interfood) a company in which the defendant in this action was, at all material times, the `director-general adjoint` for damages for breach of contract and for procuring another party, vizKhee San Food Industries Sdn Bhd (Khee San), to breach its contract with the plaintiff. The claims in the Interfood action are not relevant to the claim in this action except to the extent that they provided the occasion for the alleged defamatory statements to come to light. What happened was that pursuant to the usual orders for discovery of documents made in that action, Interfood disclosed amongst its documents a letter dated 25 March 1982, written to Dato Yan Kok Hian, the managing director of Khee San. The letter was written on paper bearing the letterhead of Interfood with the name of the defendant on the top left hand corner, and the designation `director general adjoint` underneath his name. The letter was signed by the defendant without indicating whether he wrote the letter in his private capacity or as an officer of Interfood.

The said letter contained the following statements:

(1) Agreement between your company and Messrs Rene Scheidegger and Sim Leng Chua.

`I cannot help telling you how upset and disappointed I was on reading this document. These gentlemen deliberately avail themselves of the international renown of our trademark `Sugus` and know-how to induce you to sign this agreement for an unlimited period of time, thereby granting both of them an allowance of 3% not only on the Sugus sales but also on all Interfood products.`

(2) I deeply regret that you did not consult us at the time. I can assure you that we would have then spoken very sharply to these gentlemen who turn out to be nothing else but racketeers!



In view of these defamatory statements, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant.
It is to be noted that the plaintiff has elected not to sue Interfood as the party responsible for the libel. Presumably he has been advised by his solicitors that to do so would meet with immediate dismissal by reason of the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 677; [1977] QB 881 which applied a general principle that `public interest requires that documents disclosed on discovery are not to be made use of except for the purpose of the action in which they are disclosed` (per Lord Denning at p 687). For convenience, I shall hereafter refer to this as the Riddick principle.

Undaunted by his tactic, the defendant made an application to strike out the action against him on the ground that the Riddick principle was equally applicable to civil proceedings against a third party arising out of such discovery.
Counsel for the plaintiff, however, contended that the Riddick principle was limited in its operation to use of such information against the same party or the parties to the action where discovery was given. It was further contended that if the Riddick principle extended to the use of such information against third parties, the court has a discretion and ought to allow the plaintiff to pursue this action against the defendant.

Before I examine the rationale and scope of the Riddick principle, I should deal first with a preliminary point raised by counsel for the plaintiff concerning the scope of O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1970, under which this application was made.
It was contended by counsel for the plaintiff that since the issues raised in the application would involve prolonged and serious argument, they would more appropriately have been the subject of an application under O 33 r 3 as preliminary questions of law and for that reason I should decline to hear the appeal. Counsel referred to Williams and Humbert Ltd v W & H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd [1986] 2 WLR 24 where Lord Templeman, in reference to the observations of Lindley MR in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson [1899] 1 QB 86 (at p 91) said:

Two courses are open to a defendant who wishes to raise the question whether, assuming a statement of claim to be proved, it entitles the plaintiff to relief. One method is to raise the question of law as directed by O xxv r 2; the other is to apply to strike out the statement of claim under O xxv r 4. The first method is appropriate to cases requiring argument and careful consideration. The second and more summary procedure is only appropriate to cases which are plain and obvious, so that any master or judge can say at once that the statement of claim as it stands is insufficient, even if proved, to entitle the plaintiff to what he asks.said that these observations although directed to striking out a statement of claim applied equally to applications to strike out a defence or part of a defence. His Lordship then went on to state (at p 37) that:

... if an application to strike out involves a prolonged and serious argument the judge should, as a general rule, decline to proceed with the argument unless he not only harbours doubts about the soundness of the pleading but in addition, is satisfied that striking out will obviate the necessity for a trial or will substantially reduce the burden of preparing for trial or the burden of the trial itself.



Lord Mackay delivered a concurring judgment and stated the general rule as follows (at p 42):

If on an application to strike out it appears that a prolonged and serious argument will be necessary there must at the least, be a serious risk that the court time, effort and expense devoted to it will be lost since the pleading in question may not be struck out and the whole matter will require to be considered anew at the trial. This consideration, as well as the context in which O 18 r 19 occurs and the authorities upon it, justifies a general rule that the judge should decline to proceed with the argument unless he not only considers it likely that he may reach the conclusion that the pleading should be struck out, but also is satisfied that striking out will obviate the necessity for a trial or will so substantially cut down or simplify the trial as to make the risk of proceeding with the hearing sufficiently worth while.



In Williams & Humbert itself, the House of Lords held that the judge was justified by the very special circumstances in that case to proceed to hear the application (although it involved the applicability of international law and the admissibility of allegations against the Spanish Government which has passed expropriatory decrees in 1983) to strike out parts of the defence.
The special circumstances were that the application was heard in open court; both parties were well apprised of the serious and lengthy questions involved and were armed with leading counsel and the appropriate authorities; if the application had been heard as an O 33 r 3 application, it would have taken a similar amount of time; and on the whole, no harm had been done.

I considered this preliminary point and decided to proceed to hear the appeal for the following reasons: (1) the circumstances here were substantially similar to those in Williams & Humbert , save for the absence of leading counsel, which is a normal occurrence in our courts in any case; (2) the point of law involved, was a short one involving the scope of the Riddick principle and the time taken to hear arguments on it would be no more than would have been required if they were heard under an O 33 r 3 application; (3) the hearing took place just before the December vacation and I was prepared to make time available for counsel to argue the matter fully during vacation; (4) counsel for the plaintiff should have made this submission before the assistant registrar, but not having done so and having succeeded before him it would be unfair to the defendant to preclude him from proceeding with his appeal.


In Riddick`s case, the issue was whether the defendants` staff report on Riddick disclosed in an action brought by him against the defendants for damages for wrongful dismissal could be used in a subsequent action against the same defendants for damages for defamation based on the report so disclosed.
The Court of Appeal held that he was not entitled to use the report for the said purpose. Lord Denning, in his judgment (at pp 687-688), gave the following reasons.

Discovery of documents is a most valuable aid in the doing of justice ... .



The reason for compelling discovery of documents in this way lies in the public interest in discovering the truth so that justice may be done between the parties.
That public interest is to be put into the scales against the public interest in preserving privacy and protecting confidential information. The balance comes down in the ordinary way in favour of the public interest of discovering the truth, ie in making full disclosure. This balancing act, of weighing the competing public interests, is what I advocated in my judgment in D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. I proceed to hold the balance in...

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    ...in encouraging full disclosure, this seemed at first blush to be a persuasive argument. Beckkett relied on Sim Leng Chua v Manghardt [1987] SLR 205 (“Manghardt”), where Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was) said, at 213, The interest of the plaintiff in protecting his reputations is a private ......
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    ...process. 21.The rule in Riddick `s case was applied by Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was) in Sim Leng Chua v Manghardt [1987] 2 MLJ 153 [1987] SLR 205 . His honour explained the principle and the application of the rule in Riddick `s case in an erudite judgment in which he discussed all the......
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