Saseedaran Nair s/o Krishnan v

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 16 January 2012
• Date: 16 January 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 84 of 2010
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)

Saseedaran Nair s/o Krishnan (now known as K Saseedaran Nair)

Plaintiff

and

Nalini d/o K N Ramachandran

Defendant

[2012] SGCA 5

Chao Hick Tin JA

,

Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA

and

Tan Lee Meng J

Civil Appeal No 84 of 2010

Court of Appeal

Family Law—Matrimonial assets—Matrimonial home—Husband and Wife entering into divorce—Parties settling all ancillary matters and Consent Order made accordingly—Husband becoming legally blind and applying to Central Provident Fund Board for insurance payout under Home Protection Insurance Scheme—Husband applying for variation to Consent Order to state that insurance payout was to be deducted for purposes of calculating net value of matrimonial home, such that Husband was solely entitled to insurance payout—District judge ordering that insurance payout was to be deducted for purposes of calculating net value of matrimonial home—Wife appealing to High Court—High Court ordering that insurance payout was to not be deducted for purposes of calculating—Husband appealing to Court of Appeal—Whether insurance payout should be attributed solely to insured party, such that it should be deducted from sale proceeds before computing parties' respective shares in matrimonial home—Whether insurance payout was matrimonial asset—Section 112 Women's Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed)

Saseedaran Nair s/o Krishnan (now known as K Saseedaran Nair) (‘the Husband’) was married to the respondent, Nalini d/o K N Ramachandran (‘the Wife’) for 17 years, and the parties have two children aged 15 and 13 respectively. On 22 November 2006, the Wife filed a writ for divorce on the ground of four years' separation. On 22 January 2008, the parties settled all ancillary matters at mediation before a district judge and a consent order (‘Consent Order’) was made accordingly. Paragraph 5 (5) of the Consent Order relating to the division of the Property, a Housing and Development Board (‘HDB’) flat, provided, inter alia, that the Property should be sold in the open market, and that the net sale proceeds should be divided in the proportion of 60% to the Wife and 40% to the Husband. As at the date of the Consent Order, there was an outstanding mortgage loan on the Property of approximately $170,000.

On 13 February 2008 (after the Consent Order was made), his doctor at the National University Hospital confirmed in writing that he was suffering from Leber Hereditary Optic Neuropathy, a condition which left him with very poor vision in both eyes. At the time the Property was purchased, the Husband had taken up the Home Protection Insurance Scheme (‘HPIS’) established pursuant to s 29 of the Central Provident Fund Act (Cap 36, 2001 Rev Ed) (‘CPF Act’). The HPIS provided that in the event of the Husband's death or disability, his outstanding liability to repay the housing loan shall be discharged by the Central Provident Fund (‘CPF’). As such, on 15 July 2008, the Husband applied to the CPF Board for a payout due to his disability. On 16 December 2008, he was certified to be legally blind. On 26 December 2008, pursuant to the HPIS, the CPF Board paid a sum of $172,740.30 (‘the HPIS Payout’) directly to the HDB to fully discharge the outstanding mortgage loan on the Property.

On 10 September 2009, the Husband applied for a variation of the Consent Order, so that he would be solely entitled to the HPIS Payout. He further applied for a variation to the Consent Order requiring the Wife to transfer her interest in the flat to him, after which he would pay the Wife a sum being 60% of the net value of the flat after deducting, inter alia, the HPIS Payout. In effect, the Husband was asserting that he was solely entitled to the benefit of the HPIS Payout. The district judge ordered that the HPIS Payout was to be deducted for the purposes of calculating the net value of the matrimonial home.

The Wife appealed against the district judge's decision. On appeal, the judge varied the district judge's order and held that: (a) the Husband was not solely entitled to the HPIS Payout; and (b) that the HPIS Payout was not to be deducted for the purposes of calculating the net value of the Property for division between the parties. The Husband appealed against this variation made by the judge.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) The judge was correct in holding that the HPIS Payout was not for the sole benefit of the insured party, such that it should not be deducted from the sale proceeds before determining the net worth of the Property and in turn, the parties' respective shares in it. The character of the HPIS, as revealed by both the legislative intent and the mechanics of its operation, clearly indicated that a payout under the HPIS pertains to the insured CPF member's property rather than to the insured CPF member. The HPIS was a mortgage-reducing policy that was specifically targeted at protecting the family home. It was clear that the purpose of the HPIS was to reduce the mortgage outstanding on the property, not to compensate the insured for his incapacity: at [7] to [9].

(2) The manner in which a payout under the HPIS was effected, viz,direct payment from the CPF Board to the HDB, rather than a payout to the insured, reinforced the point that the object of the HPIS was to prevent the insured and his family from losing their home if the insured were to meet with some misfortune that would either claim his life or render him incapable of supporting his dependents: at [10] and [11].

(3) As regards the Husband's argument that as of the date on which he became entitled to the HPIS Payout, he was already divorced from the Wife, and as such, she should not be entitled to any benefit of the HPIS Payout: this was an argument without any regard to the object of the HPIS as well as the fact that the Wife was still a joint owner of the property: at [12].

(4) As regards the Husband's argument...