Russia's image and soft power Resources in Southeast Asia: Perceptions among Young Elites in Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.

• Author: Bukh, Alexander

The main purpose of this study is to analyze Russia's soft power resources in Laos, Vietnam and Thailand. To achieve this goal, it draws on the results of a survey on perceptions of Russia conducted by the author in 2012-13 among students enrolled at the National University of Laos, Vientiane, Thammasat University in Bangkok and the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in Hanoi.

As Anton Tsvetov has argued, Southeast Asia today plays a secondary role in Russia's foreign policy. (2) Nevertheless, for a number of reasons it is important to understand the ways Russia is perceived in the region. From a purely academic perspective, the extant academic literature that deals with perceptions of Russia, its soft power and related topics is scarce and focuses almost exclusively on the former Soviet republics and Western countries. (3) Thus, a study of other countries and regions with different political structures and histories of relations with Russia such as Southeast Asia is needed to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the ways Russia is perceived in the world today.

A better understanding of perceptions of Russia in Southeast Asia is also important from a policy perspective. Russia's involvement in the conflict in Syria, and the strengthening of Sino-Russia relations, suggest that Russian policymakers are continuously seeking new arenas for its foreign policy aimed at re-establishing Russia's position as a truly global player in international relations. Importantly, Russia's strong support for the establishment of the New Development (BRICS) Bank, peace treaty negotiations with Japan, mediation in peace talks for Syria and recently voiced desire to mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, show that the tools deployed by Russia are not limited to the use of force but include "soft" measures as well. To a certain extent these transformations in Russia's foreign policy can be attributed to the recent crisis in Moscow's relations with the West brought about by the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and its ongoing involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Arguably, however, the worsening of Russia's relations with the West served more as a catalyst in the process of re-establishing Russia's position as a Great Power rather than its cause. One needs only to recall President Boris Yeltsin's fierce reaction to the bombings conducted by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) warplanes in Kosovo in 1998, and the subsequent dispatch of Russian troops to Pristina airport, or President Vladimir Putin's unexpected meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong II before the July 2000 G8 Summit during which he secured a moratorium on test-firing of long range missiles, to understand that Russia's self-perception as a global player and attempts to act as such are not a new phenomenon.

Overall, "soft" attempts to reshape international public opinion and improve Russia's image became an integral part of its attempts to re-establish itself as a global power in the early 2000s. It was at this time that Russian official policy documents started to refer to the "soft" tools of foreign policy, such as the promotion of Russia's language, culture and history, as well as its stance on international issues. (4) In 2005, Russia Today (later known simply as RT), a government funded English language news channel aimed at improving Russia's image abroad, was launched. Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation, whose purpose is to promote Russian language and culture in other countries, was established by a Presidential decree in 2007. In 2008, Soyuz Sovetskih Obshestv Drujby (Union of Soviet Friendship Societies), the main organ of Soviet public diplomacy that was closed down in 1994, was resurrected as Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation).

So far, most of these and other efforts to enhance Russia's influence have been directed mainly at Western countries and the former Soviet republics, often referred to as Russia's "near abroad". (5) However, certain developments in Russia's policy towards the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), such as the establishment of a branch of the Russkiy Mir Foundation in Bangkok in 2012, the re-opening of the Russian Cultural Center in Vientiane in 2013, and the ASEAN-Russia Summit in Sochi in May 2016, suggest that Russian policymakers are paying more attention to Southeast Asia. Arguably, the region's importance in the global economy and regionalism in the Asia Pacific, but also its relative lack of political cohesion and the deepening internal rift over the South China Sea dispute, make it an attractive arena for Russia's growingly assertive foreign policy. Moreover, the leaders of some ASEAN countries find appealing certain ideas and norms of international relations espoused by Russia, such as "sovereign democracy" and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. There is also a certain hope that Russia's "turn to the East" will increase multipolarity in the region and thus help offset China's overwhelming presence. (6) As such, the interest in deeper relations between Southeast Asia and Russia is not just limited to Moscow but is also shared, to a certain degree, by some ASEAN members.

From this perspective, further understanding of the ways Russia is viewed in the region, and the degree of correspondence between these views and Russia's self-image, may provide important clues for anticipating and analyzing certain developments in Moscow's relations with Southeast Asia, when and if its own "pivot to Asia" gains momentum. Admittedly, this study is based on a relatively small sample size and hence the conclusions that can be drawn from it are limited. Nevertheless, it is the author's hope that it will provide at least partial answers to the questions raised above.

The article proceeds as follows. In the first section I outline the analytical framework that guides this study and explain the reasons for focusing on soft power resources rather than on soft power per se, as well as the importance of self-image and perceptions within this framework. I then move on to explain the reasons for focusing on Laos, Vietnam and Thailand by providing a brief historical overview of Russia's relations with these three countries. The next section presents the main tenets of Russia's self-image as espoused by Russia's political elites. The main part of this article then presents and analyzes the results of the survey conducted by the author. In brief, I argue that there is a certain degree of correspondence between Russia's self-image and the way it is perceived by the respondents. At the same time I show that there are some important dissonances between the two that relate to Russia's previous incarnation as the Soviet Union. Based on the results of the survey, I also argue that historical memory plays an important role in shaping images of contemporary Russia.

Soft Power and Soft Power Resources

The concept of soft power was coined by the American political scientist Joseph Nye in the early 1990s, but gained worldwide popularity after the publication of his influential book Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics. (7) In brief, Nye's "soft power" refers to any state's ability (my emphasis) to shape other states' foreign policy choices through non-coercive measures.

Culture, political values and foreign policies are seen as the main sources of a state's ability to attract and co-opt others to act in the interests of the wielder of soft power.

Despite the overwhelming popularity of the concept among scholars and policymakers alike, measuring the actual effects of soft power (or lack thereof] as defined by Nye is not an easy task. As Nye's definition of the concept implies causality, the biggest problem is measuring the effectiveness of various non-coercive strategies deployed to influence other states' policies and showing the existence of a causal relationship between these strategies and certain policy changes. (8) Needless to say, Nye's definition of soft power is not the only one in the voluminous body of related scholarship that is generally divided along the agency/structure line. (9) While the former, (10) similar to Nye, implies causality between "soft" action and policy, the latter downplays the importance of domestic factors in favour of examining broader structures of power. (11)

It is beyond the scope of this article to engage in a theoretical debate regarding the primacy of either structure or agency. No doubt, global or regional structures of power are important, but so are domestic trends and policies. However, establishing causality between certain perceptions or "soft" measures and policy change is a very complicated, if not impossible, task. As such, in this article I choose to focus on soft power resources rather than soft power per se.

How are soft power resources defined? As Roselle et al. have argued, widely accepted narratives about actors' characteristics can be important soft power resources. (12) These narratives shape the way people see other actors and the international environment as well as their--as an individual or as a collective actor--place in it, and can be utilized by states to achieve certain foreign policy goals. Roselle et al. also suggest the need to study the content of strategic narratives deployed by political actors as well as their reception. (13) Elsewhere, the importance of alignment between the self-perception of an actor and the way it is viewed by others was noted by Kiseleva. (14) None of this implies that the alignment of perceptions will necessarily result in soft power effects, as there are multiple structural or agency level factors that can preclude this. Nevertheless, a focus on perceptions and their alignment can provide us with new insights into the bilateral relationships of the countries in question...