Re Tay Quan Li Leon

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Sundaresh Menon CJ
• Judgment Date: 06 June 2022
• Docket Number: Admission of Advocates and Solicitors No 35 of 2022 (Summonses Nos 1625 and 1664 of 2022)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Re Tay Quan Li Leon

[2022] SGHC 133

Sundaresh Menon CJ

Admission of Advocates and Solicitors No 35 of 2022 (Summonses Nos 1625 and 1664 of 2022)

General Division of the High Court

Civil Procedure — Discontinuance — Applicant found to have cheated in Singapore Bar examinations — Applicant not fit and proper to be admitted to Singapore Bar — Applicant applying to withdraw application to be admitted to Singapore Bar — Whether court should grant application to withdraw — Whether court should impose conditions upon granting withdrawal — Order 21 r 3 Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed)

Civil Procedure — Inherent powers — Applicant claiming to suffer from mental health condition that had been exacerbated by publicity — Applicant applying for sealing and redaction order for case file to be sealed and his name redacted from papers — Whether court should exercise its inherent powers to order redaction — Whether principle of open justice should be derogated from — Whether court should order partial sealing order — Section 8 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) — Order 92 r 4 Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed)

Held, dismissing the Sealing Order Application and allowing the Withdrawal Application:

(1) The starting point was that granting a sealing and redaction order was a departure from the hallowed principle of open justice. Open court proceedings protect public confidence in the judicial system and guard against judicial arbitrariness. Further, admissions to the Bar were matters of public interest, given the role of the legal profession in upholding the justice system: at [17].

(2) Any derogation from the principle of open justice had to be grounded either in statute or the court's inherent powers to do what was necessary to serve the ends of justice. The exercise of the court's inherent powers to seal and redact a case file might be guided by how Parliament had provided for statutory derogations. The court could also have regard to the factors in s 8(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), which provided for situations where hearings could be held in private, such as where it would be in the interests of public security, national interests or national security. The power to derogate from the principle of open justice would only be sparingly exercised: at [19], [23] and [24].

(3) Where there was credible evidence that the publication of the name of a litigant would pose imminent risk of danger to that litigant, or if the sealing order was necessary to spare the litigant from imminent harm, the court had the discretion to permit redaction of certain information. In considering the exercise of such discretion, the court would have regard to all the circumstances, including whether such harm was self-induced or the likely consequence of the acts of others, or of some illness or underlying condition: at [25].

(4) The court dismissed the Sealing Order Application. First, the court did not accept that the principle of open justice did not apply or could be readily derogated from where a litigant, after having invoked the justice system himself, sought to withdraw from it. The principle of open justice continued to apply in such circumstances. Moreover, it was evident that even the Withdrawal Application raised questions of public interest, which pertained to the character required of a candidate seeking to gain admission to the Bar: at [27] and [28].

(5) Secondly, Prof Kua's memo fell short of the threshold required to justify any departure from the principle of open justice. The sparse memo provided no reasoning nor analysis, and the conclusion that publication of the Applicant's name could trigger a severe depression was at best tentative. The memo was based on the Applicant's self-reported symptoms, with no verification of the severity of his symptoms. Therefore, Prof Kua's memo did not come close to showing that there was an imminent and credible threat of real harm to the Applicant, should his name be published: at [29] and [30].

(6) The court rejected the Applicant's alternative request for a partial sealing order over the information pertaining to the Applicant's mental health issues, including Prof Kua's memo. It was untenable for the Applicant to rely on Prof Kua's memo as a central pillar of the Sealing Order Application, and then having failed in that application, to seek its redaction. It would place the court in an impossible position of explaining its reasons for not relying on Prof Kua's memo without being able to refer to the very document: at [31].

(7) The court granted the Withdrawal Application. It was not disputed that the Applicant was not a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Singapore Bar. His cheating in the 2020 Part B Exams, how he had dealt with the SILE when confronted with the suspected cheating, and the unsatisfactory disclosures he made in the present Admission Application showed a deficit of honesty and integrity expected of those who aspired to be part of the legal profession: at [33] and [34].

(8) The court had a broad discretion to grant leave on terms it thought just, when allowing an applicant to discontinue an originating summons under O 21 r 3 of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed): at [35].

(9) The court considered the best way to deal with the present matter was to permit the Applicant to withdraw the Admission Application, but subject to the imposition of suitable conditions. This was not with a view to punish the Applicant as the court was not exercising its disciplinary jurisdiction, which could only be exercised over those who had been admitted to the Bar. The court was exercising its jurisdiction to determine those who could properly be admitted to the Bar and was concerned with the question of suitability which was determined by considerations of character and competence. The conditions imposed were to ensure that the Applicant had time to rehabilitate himself and address the issues of character and competence that had been identified: at [38].

(10) The court required the Applicant to undertake not to bring a fresh application for admission to the Bar in Singapore or elsewhere for a period of five years. By way of comparison, five years would be the maximum period of suspension applicable to punish Advocates and Solicitors who were not struck off the roll, under s 83 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed). The second condition was that the Applicant would need to comply with any prevailing statutory or other requirements that the relevant stakeholders or the court might reasonably require in order to satisfy themselves that he was a fit and proper person for admission: at [40] and [44].

Case(s) referred to

BBW v BBX [2016] 5 SLR 755 (refd)

Chua Yi Jin Colin v PP [2022] 4 SLR 1133 (refd)

CTA, Re [2022] SGHC 87 (refd)

Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore [2020] SGHC 40 (refd)

Miya Manik v PP [2021] 2 SLR 1169 (folld)

Monisha Devaraj, Re [2022] SGHC 93 (refd)

Facts

The Applicant, Tay Quan Li Leon, was one of 11 students who were found to have cheated in the examinations for the Part B course of the Singapore Bar (the “Part B Exams”) in 2020 (the “2020 Part B Exams”). The Applicant sat for the Part B Exams again in 2021 and passed. By way of AAS 35 of 2022, he sought to be admitted as an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore (the “Admission Application”). The Attorney-General (“AG”) objected to his Admission Application, on the ground that he was not a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Singapore Bar. The Applicant subsequently applied to withdraw his Admission Application by way of Summons No 1625 of 2022 (the “Withdrawal Application”), and sought a sealing and redaction order of the Admission Application by way of Summons No 1664 of 2022 (the “Sealing Order Application”).

The AG's objections arose out of the Applicant's conduct during and after the 2020 Part B Exams. After the 2020 Part B Exams were held, the Applicant was asked to meet the Dean of the Singapore Institute of Legal Education (“SILE”). The SILE administered the Part B Exams. During the meeting on 15 February 2021, he was asked to explain the patent similarities between his answer scripts and those of one Kuek Yi Ting Lynn (“Ms Kuek”). His explanation then was that he and Ms Kuek had spent a significant amount of time studying together, and prepared study notes together, which could be why they would likely end up with similar or even identical answers. He submitted his study notes to SILE. On the same day, the SILE sent the Applicant a side-by-side comparison of their answer scripts, copies of the examination papers and a copy of the “Examination Rules”, and informed him to submit his written representations in response. The Applicant replied, stating that the examination answers were based on his study notes, which were based on “pre-written paragraphs” and “past year papers”. He was also asked to upload the source documents of his study notes, as the PDF files he submitted to SILE on 15 February 2021 were created on 15 February 2021. The Applicant complied.

Having examined the materials, the Director of the Part B course concluded that there was reason to believe that the Applicant had cheated and/or facilitated the cheating of another student in the 2020 Part B Exams, and referred the matter to the Student Disciplinary Committee (“SDC”). The SDC conducted a review of the answer scripts in relation to the six subjects in the 2020 Part B Exams, consulted the subject coordinators and considered the Applicant's written representations and the study notes he had submitted. The SDC gave the Applicant the benefit of the doubt for three subjects, and found that he had cheated in the other three subjects. The SDC also concluded that the Applicant had acted fraudulently or dishonestly in his dealings with the SILE. The SILE subsequently issued a notice dated 22 June 2021, stating...