Re Tai Choi Yu

• Judgment Date: 05 December 1987
• Date: 05 December 1987
• Docket Number: Admission of Advocates and Solicitors
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Re Tai Choi Yu

[1987] SGHC 49

Chan Sek Keong JC

Admission of Advocates and Solicitors No 167 of 1987

High Court

Administrative Law–Administrative discretion–Decision of Board of Legal Education not to exempt legal practitioner from Sarawak from Practice Law Course examination requirements–Whether exercise of discretion unreasonable–Principles applicable–Sections 11 (2), 12 (2) (a), 14 (2) and 21 Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1985 Rev Ed)–Legal Profession–Admission–Ad hoc–Criteria and exemptions–Application for exemption from Practice Law Course examinations–Exemption disallowed–Review of Board of Legal Education's decision–Sections 11 (2), 12 (2) (a), 14 (2) and 21 Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1985 Rev Ed)

The applicant was a qualified person under the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the Act”), being a barrister-at-law who had practised in the State of Sarawak for about 19 years. On 4 November 1986, the applicant, after having been informed by the Board of Legal Education (“the Board”) of the statutory requirements for his admission as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, wrote to the Board for exemption from having to serve the period of pupillage required under s 12 (2) (a)of the Act. On 8 November 1986, the Board replied by letter granting approval for exemption of three months' pupillage under s 12 (4) (c) of the Act, though it highlighted the requirement that the applicant “attend the Practice Law Course”.

After the applicant started attending the Practice Law Course, he learnt that all candidates had to take and pass the examination to be set at the end of the course. The applicant thus wrote to the Board on 13 August 1987 seeking clarification on his interpretation that there was no need for him to pass the said examination and that if such interpretation had been wrong, that the Board exercise its discretion to exempt him from the examinations under s 11 (2) of the Act. On 26 August 1987, the Board replied by letter that it was unable to grant the applicant exemption. On 4 September 1987, the applicant wrote once more to the Board requesting for the reasons of the Board in exercising its discretion to refuse the applicant's application for exemption. On 17 September 1987, the Board replied by letter that it was unable to grant such exemption by reason of the applicant's experience being limited to practice in Sarawak and that accordingly, he was not a fit and proper person to be so exempted.

The applicant applied to the court for review of the Board's two “decisions”, viz that the interpretations of the conditions specified by the respondent in the 8 November 1986 letter required the applicant to pass any examination as a condition precedent to the call, and that the respondent had been unable to grant the petitioner exemption under s 11 (2) of the Act by reason of his limited experience.

Held, dismissing the application:

(1) The applicant's complaint that the “decision” of the Board in its letter dated 8 November 1986 had misled him to act to his detriment was wholly misconceived. First, it should have been obvious to the applicant that he, having made no application to the Board for exemption from attending the Practice Law Course, had no reason to believe that the Board would make a decision in that respect. Second, the said letter contained no words which could have given rise to an expectation or could reasonably be construed by an experienced lawyer like the applicant that the Board had exempted him from passing the Practice Law Course. Third, even if the Board had said nothing about the Practice Law Course in its letter, the applicant, unless exempted would still have been required to attend and pass the course, it being a statutory requirement under s 11 (1) of the Act. Fourth, even assuming it was reasonable for the applicant to have construed the Board's letter in the manner he alleged he had done, there was no evidence that he ever acted on such a construction: at [17].

(2) As the court was concerned with the exercise of a discretionary power, it would not substitute its decision for that of the Board so long as the Board had directed itself properly in law and had taken into account the proper considerations. Accordingly, since length of practice in the practice of the law was not per se experience in the law, the Board's decision not to exempt the applicant from the Practice Law Course examinations was not unreasonable as the Board applied the very consideration that was prescribed by s 11 (2) of the Act, ie the experience of the qualified person: at [22].

(3) The applicant's contention that the Board had, in effect, made a finding of fact that the applicant had no experience in many areas of the law was also misconceived. The onus had been on the applicant to furnish to the Board requisite evidence to persuade the Board to decide in his favour. It was not for the Board to produce evidence to deny him such an exemption. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Board could have simply rejected the application. Instead, the Board preferred to draw an inference, perfectly justified given that it was common knowledge amongst lawyers that the laws of Sarawak and the laws of Singapore were different in many significant areas, all of which were subjects taught in the Practical Law Course, that the applicant's experience, being essentially limited to practice in Sarawak, could not have touched upon many areas of Singapore law and practice: at [23] and [24].

[Observation: There was no reason that the practice of the law in West Malaysia cannot or should not be equated with the practice of the law in East Malaysia for the admission of a Malayan practitioner as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore under s 14 (2) of the Act. In any event, the expression “any part of Malaysia” in s 14 (2) must be given its ordinary meaning to include Sarawak as part of Malaysia. Section 14 (2) of the Act must therefore be read to mean that any Malayan practitioner, however briefly he has carried on practice as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court in West Malaysia, would be entitled to be admitted as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore without having to serve any period of pupillage or attend any course or instruction or pass any examination so long as he satisfied the prescribed period of practice in any part of Malaysia: at [20].

On the face of the application, there was nothing for the court to review. After all, the application before the court called for review of the applicant's interpretation of the Board's letter of 8 November 1986, which could not be a subject matter for review, and the Board's letter of 17 September 1987, which merely set out the reason for the Board's decision and not the decision itself which was given in its letter dated 26 August 1987. Indeed, even if the relief sought were a declaration that the decision of the Board made on 26 August 1987 was wrong, such a declaration would not assist the applicant as he would still not have been given an exemption from the Board: at...