Re Nalpon, Zero Geraldo Mario

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: See Kee Oon J
• Judgment Date: 20 November 2017
• Neutral Citation: [2017] SGHC 301
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 675 of 2017 (Registrar’s Appeal No 232 of 2017)
• Year: 2017
• Published date: 03 November 2018
• Hearing Date: 18 September 2017
• Plaintiff Counsel: The applicant in person
• Defendant Counsel: P Padman and Timothy Yeo (KSCGP Juris LLP)
• Subject Matter: Administrative Law,Judicial review,Leave
• Citation: [2017] SGHC 301

See Kee Oon J: Introduction

In May 2017, Mr Zero Geraldo Mario Nalpon (“the applicant”) lodged a complaint with the Law Society of Singapore (“the Law Society”) in respect of three lawyers who were his opposing counsel in a civil suit (“the Lawyers”). He alleged that the Lawyers were guilty of conduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor because of the manner in which they had conducted the proceedings in that suit. Review Committee No 035 of 2017 (“the Review Committee”) was constituted to examine his complaint. In due course, the Review Committee informed the applicant that there was no support for his complaint and directed that it be dismissed. Dissatisfied with the Review Committee’s decision, the applicant filed the present Originating Summons No 675 of 2017 (“OS 675/2017”), an ex parte application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings in respect of that decision.

During a Pre-Trial Conference (“PTC”) for OS 675/2017, the Law Society, which had originally listed itself as a respondent to the action, indicated that it had taken steps to remove itself as a party. However, it did not remove the Notice of Appointment of its own solicitors (“the Notice of Appointment”) from the record. When the applicant objected to this, Assistant Registrar James Elisha Lee (“AR Lee”) stated that he was not minded to direct the removal of the Notice of Appointment from the record. The applicant then filed Registrar’s Appeal No 232 of 2017 (“RA 232/2017”), ostensibly appealing against AR Lee’s direction.

OS 675/2017 and RA 232/2017 came before me on 18 September 2017. After hearing the parties, I made no order on RA 232/2017 as I was of the view that AR Lee’s direction was not a judicial decision that could be appealed against. I dismissed OS 675/2017 and denied the applicant leave to commence judicial review proceedings because I did not consider that he had made out a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies he sought. The applicant has filed an appeal against my decision to dismiss OS 675/2017 and I now set out the full grounds for my decision.

Background facts and procedural history

The Lawyers were acting for the plaintiff in Suit No 1083 of 2012, Innovez ID Pte Ltd (“Innovez”), a construction and renovation company. The applicant was acting for the defendant in that suit, Mr Wong Yoke Shin (“Mr Wong”), who was purportedly Innovez’s project manager responsible for securing its contracts. The suit was commenced against Mr Wong, inter alia, for a breach of his warranty that the costs and expenses for a project at 86 Jalan Pemimpin Singapore 577237 (“the Pemimpin Project”) would be about $900,000. Relying on this, Innovez accepted the Pemimpin Project at a contract price of $1,507,000. However, Innovez alleged that Mr Wong caused or allowed the actual costs and expenses of the Pemimpin Project to escalate to $1,936,453.86. Innovez therefore claimed that it had suffered a loss of more than $400,000. Mr Wong, on the other hand, insisted that the Pemimpin Project was profit-generating.

At the hearing of a discovery application in early 2014, the applicant argued that certain documents disclosed by Innovez supported Mr Wong’s position that Innovez had not made a loss on the Pemimpin Project. In order to determine the profitability of the Pemimpin Project, Innovez filed an application for an account to be taken in respect of the Pemimpin Project, pursuant to O 43 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“the Rules of Court”). This application was heard by Assistant Registrar Wong Baochen (“AR Wong”) over six days in 2015. During the taking of accounts, Innovez took the position that the Pemimpin Project was its only ongoing project at the material time, while Mr Wong strenuously denied that this was the case.

AR Wong delivered her grounds of decision for the application on 7 July 2016 and made certain findings on the cost and expenses of the Pemimpin Project. She noted that the taking of accounts “presented significant difficulties” because the issue of liability had not been determined yet. She was therefore careful not to make findings that would circumscribe the proceedings before the trial judge.¹ In particular, she reiterated that there was “no real evidence” with regard to some of the “broader issues” before her and hence “no findings of fact” that could be made as to (a) whether Innovez had more than one project at the material time; instead, this was a “finding of fact that [could] be canvassed and determined at trial” and (b) whether Innovez had withheld or was still withholding documents from Mr Wong and the court, such as evidence of its income and expenditure, which again was a matter that could be “canvassed at trial”. She opined that these broader issues were in any event not directly relevant to the taking of accounts; rather, the trial judge should have latitude to hear the evidence and make the appropriate findings at trial. ²

Discontented with AR Wong’s decision, Mr Wong appealed. Hoo Sheau Peng JC (as she then was) heard and dismissed the appeal on 23 November 2016. The applicant then made an application on behalf of Mr Wong to request for further arguments to be heard, asserting that the taking of accounts had proceeded on the erroneous basis that Innovez only had one project at that time. In fact, the applicant contended, Innovez had withheld certain documents such as invoices and there were “much more bank deposits and other work than declared”. Hoo JC heard the further arguments on 27 December 2016 but did not change her decision. The applicant filed an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. This was dismissed by Hoo JC on 23 January 2017.

On 14 February 2017, Innovez, through its director Mr Tang Wai Chong Eldee (“Mr Tang”), lodged a complaint with the Law Society against the applicant for “threatening criminal action against Innovez and its representatives, including wrongfully accusing Mr Tang of committing perjury”.³ Mr Tang alleged that throughout the application for taking of accounts and the corresponding appeal before Hoo JC, the applicant had made “numerous personal attacks” on various parties, including allegations that the Lawyers were “misleading the court”. Innovez pointed out that AR Wong had, in her Notes of Evidence for the taking of accounts, noted the “numerous statements [made in the applicant’s written submissions] that were essentially personal attacks on various members on [Innovez’s] side” and that “there [was] clearly no need for personal attacks in Court documents. Such professional discourtesy should not be encouraged or even condoned”.⁴

It was in this context that the applicant filed his complaint to the Law Society on 2 May 2017 against the Lawyers. His main grievance was that Innovez had “lied that [it] had only one project or work during the period [from] December 2010 to December 2012”. This was first stated by Mr Tang in his affidavit of evidence-in-chief for the suit, and “perpetuated” by Innovez’s auditor, Mr Kelvin Thio, in his Report of Investigation on the suit. The Lawyers further referred to this during the cross examination of Mr Wong, in their written and reply submissions and in the correspondence between the parties and with the court. The applicant alleged that the Lawyers were fully aware that Innovez was engaged in other projects during the material period. In fact, the applicant claimed, Innovez had deliberately withheld or concealed a substantial portion of their invoices, payment vouchers and bank deposits which would have shown that it had been conducting other projects or work.⁵ It should be noted that these were the same allegations on which basis the applicant claimed, in his correspondence with the Lawyers and the court, that Innovez (through Mr Tang) had committed perjury and the Lawyers had misled the court.⁶ The accusations made by the applicant led to Innovez’s complaint to the Law Society against him in February 2017, as outlined in the preceding paragraph.

In the applicant’s complaint to the Law Society, he alleged that the Lawyers’ conduct was unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor because of purported breaches of the following six provisions of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (S 706/2015): Rule 9(2)(a) – attempting to mislead the court and a legal practitioner during the application for taking of accounts, by submitting that Innovez had only one project during the material period; Rule 9(2)(g) – contriving the fact that Innovez only had one project when evidence clearly showed otherwise; Rule 10(3)(a) – assisting their clients to suppress evidence in the form of the payment vouchers, invoices and bank account deposits; Rule 10(3)(b) – assisting their client to give false information to the court that Innovez only had one project; Rule 10(4)(a) – continuing to act for their client when it had given false information to the court; Rule 10(4)(b) – perpetuating Innovez’s falsehood that it was working on only one project “after it had been exposed numerous times”.

On 18 May 2017, the Review Committee was constituted to examine the applicant’s complaint. On 25 May 2017, the Review Committee rendered its decision in the form of a letter to the applicant. The letter read as follows:⁷

REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE

1. This Review Committee was constituted on 18 May 2017. 2. The Complainant’s complaints are set out at Paragraph 3 of the Complainant’s letter dated 2 May 2017 to the Law Society. 3. However, the information and documents provided by the Complainant do not provide any support for any of the complaints. 4. For the above reasons, the Committee is unanimously of the view that the Complainant’s complaints are lacking in substance and directs the Council to dismiss them.

On 16 June 2017, the applicant filed OS 675/2017, an ex parte...