Re Lopez Joseph Francis

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeChua F A J
Judgment Date27 January 1976
Neutral Citation[1976] SGHC 1
Docket NumberOriginating Motion No 5 of 1975
Date27 January 1976
Published date19 September 2003
Year1976
Plaintiff CounselCS Wu (Donaldson & Burkinshaw)
Citation[1976] SGHC 1
Defendant CounselSachi Saurajen (Drew & Napier)
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Subject MatterProfessions,Medical certificates,Medical profession and practice,Medical Registration Act (Cap 218, 1970 Ed),Professional conduct,Infamous conduct,Certificates issued signed by unqualified person

This is an appeal against the decision of the Singapore Medical Council that the appellant, Dr Joseph Francis Lopez, had been guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect and that his name should be removed from the Register of Medical Practitioners.

There were nine charges against the appellant.
The charges were that on 10 November 1973, 12 November 1973, 18 December 1973, 2 January 1974, 11 January 1974, 14 March 1974, 9 May 1974, 5 June 1974 and 12 July 1974, the appellant allowed one SS Pillai, his employee in his clinic known as the Lopez Clinic at Jurong, to issue and sign medical certificates to three persons when the said SS Pillai was not a registered medical practitioner.

The appellant is a medical practitioner in general practice and he had three clinics - the Lopez Clinic at Thong Teck Building, Scotts Road; Commonwealth Clinic & Nursing Home at Commonwealth Crescent and the Lopez Clinic at Taman Jurong (the Jurong Clinic).
There was at the material dates no resident doctor at the Jurong Clinic. SS Pillai is a qualified Hospital Assistant Grade II and at the material dates was the only employee at the Jurong Clinic.

Counsel for the appellant urged before this court two main points which he argued should result in the council`s decision being set aside.
The points are (1) that the Council`s solicitor had at the close of his case failed to make out a prima facie case against the appellant on any of the charge preferred against the appellant and the Council should therefore have dismissed the said charges and not called upon the appellant`s defence and (2) that the decision of the Council is contrary to the weight of the evidence adduced.

Before considering these points it is necessary first to state the standard of proof required by a domestic professional tribunal and secondly the function of this court in proceedings of this nature.


Where knowledge or intention is an ingredient of a disciplinary offence it appears from the authorities that the criminal standard of proof applies.
In Bhandari v Advocates Committee [1956] 3 All ER 742 the Privy Council approved this statement by the Court of Appeal for East Africa:

In every allegation of professional misconduct involving an element of deceit or moral turpitude a high standard of proof is called for, and we cannot envisage any body of professional men sitting in judgment on a colleague would be content to condemn on a mere balance of probabilities.



In Libman v General Medical Council [1972] AC 217 the appellant, a consultant physician, was found guilty serious of professional misconduct by the Disciplinary Committee of the General Medical Council and his registration was suspended for six months.
The terms of the Medical Act 1956 confer a right of appeal from a decision of the General Medical Council to the Privy Council. The appellant appealed to the Privy Council. The Board was invited by counsel for the appellant to make some general observations on the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Board in proceedings of this nature. Lord Hailsham, delivering the judgment of the Board, said (at p 220):

During the course of argument on the extent and exercise of this jurisdiction their Lordships were referred to Felix v General Dental Council[1960] AC 704, 716, a decision under the parallel provisions of the Dentists Act 1957; to Fox v General Medical Council[1960] 1 WLR 1017; to Sivarajah v General Medical[1964] 1 WLR 112 and to Bhattacharya v General Medical Council[1967] 2 AC 295, especially at p 265. Of these authorities, the account of the jurisdiction by Lord Radcliffe in Fox v General Medical Councilat pp 1020-1022 is the fullest and perhaps the best, but their Lordships draw the following general propositions from all four decisions:

(1) The appeal lies of right by the statute and the terms of statute do not limit or qualify the appeal in any way, so that the appellant is entitled to claim that it is in a general sense nothing less than a rehearing of his case and a review of the decision: see per Lord Radcliffe, Fox v General Medical Council[1960] 1 WLR 1017, 1020.

(2) Notwithstanding the generality of the above language, the actual exercise of the jurisdiction is severely limited by the circumstances in which it can be invoked. The appeal is not by way of rehearing in the sense that the witnesses are heard afresh or the evidence gone over again (see per Lord Radcliffe). This, amongst other things, means that there is a heavy burden upon an appellant who wishes to displace a verdict on the grounds that the evidence alone makes the decision unsatisfactory.

(3) Beyond a bare statement of its findings of fact, the Disciplinary Committee does not in general give reasons for its decision as in the case of a trial in the High Court by judges alone from which an appeal by way of rehearing lies to the Court of Appeal (see per, Lord Radcliffe, at pp 1021, 1023). It follows from this that the only circumstances in which an appellate court can reverse a view of the facts taken by the Disciplinary Committee would be a case where, on examination, it would appear that the committee had misread the evidence to such an extent that they were not entitled to make a finding in the state of the evidence presented before them.

(4) The legal assessor who assists the Committee at its hearing is not a judge,...

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