Re Linus Joseph

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chan Sek Keong J
• Judgment Date: 31 August 1990
• Neutral Citation: [1990] SGHC 58
• Date: 31 August 1990
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 728 of 1988
• Plaintiff Counsel: Kan Ting Chiu (Low Yeap & Co)
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Whether on charge or facts of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action,Disciplinary procedures,Disciplinary committee's jurisdiction,Whether committee competent to decide its own jurisdiction,Alleged misconduct of lawyer took place in Brunei,Legal Profession,s 80(2)(b) Legal Profession Act (Cap 161)

Cur Adv Vult

This is an application under s95(6) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) (the Act) for an order absolute against Joseph Linus (JL), an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court. JL was also at material times an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Brunei. We shall in this judgment use the terms `Singapore solicitor` and `Brunei solicitor` to describe respectively an advocate and solicitor of each of the said courts.

JL was `charged` before the disciplinary committee (the committee) on the following `charge`:

You, Joseph Linus are charged that you in or about the month of September 1986 at Bandar Seri Begawan while employed as a limited partner in the firm of Hilborne Hawkin & Co, Advocates and Solicitors, received payment of professional fees of B$1,000 from Yusof Holdings Bhd for services rendered by you in the course of such employment, which fees you dishonestly withheld from Hilborne Hawkin & Co in breach of the terms of your employment and you have thereby been guilty of grossly improper conduct as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of s 80(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161).

JL denied the charge. His defence was that the bill in question was rendered and sent on the direction of the sole proprietor of the firm which employed him, one Vinod Kumar. Prior to the actual date of hearing, JL had apprised the committee by affidavit of his intention to argue that he was not subject to disciplinary proceedings under the Act as his alleged misconduct took place in Brunei. At the commencement of the hearing, the chairman was fully aware of this preliminary objection as he requested full submissions on the issue. However, submissions on and the determination of this objection were deferred and the committee proceeded to hear the evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing which lasted three days during which four witnesses testified on behalf of the Law Society and JL gave evidence on his own behalf, the committee adjourned to write its report. In the report, the committee made its findings and determination in the following order. First, it found as follows:

Findings

The respondent admitted in his evidence that it was during office hours that he advised the directors of Barangan Land on the agreement he was requested to vet; that it was redrafted or revised by him in the office of Hilborne Hawkin & Co during office hours; that the revised agreement was typed by a secretary employed by Hilborne Hawkin & Co and that it was printed on a word processor of Hilborne Hawkin & Co during office hours. On this evidence we find that the work done and the services provided by the respondent in respect of the said agreement were on behalf of Hilborne Hawkin & Co and it could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered work done outside office hours and on his own personal account. In any case, being employed full time by Hilborne Hawkin & Co, there was no question of his being at liberty to do work on his own account, even after office hours.

Loyalty to the firm required that any professional work offered had to be accepted for and on behalf of Hilborne Hawkin & Co.

The respondent admitted sending a bill for $2,250 for the services rendered in respect of the said agreement and also admitted that he accepted the sum of $1,000 in full satisfaction of the said bill.

The respondent also admitted that he had not paid over to Hilborne Hawkin & Co this sum of $1,000 received by him as a fee for work done by him in respect of the said agreement.

We accept Awang`s evidence that right at the beginning of this episode it was the respondent`s suggestion that he would carry out the work after office hours and for his own account and that the matter should not be disclosed to Mr Vinod Kumar.

We do not accept the respondent`s evidence that the said bill of $2,250 was sent on the direction and with the consent of Mr Vinod Kumar the sole proprietor of Hilborne Hawkin & Co. We accept the evidence of Vinod Kumar that he never directed or authorized the respondent to send to Barangan Land the bill of $2,250. We accept his evidence that he did not know anything about this whole matter until Awang came to see him with the said agreement; that he criticized the drafting of the agreement as very poor shoddy work; and that thereupon Awang told him that it was revised and redrafted by the respondent who had been paid $1,000 for that service. We also accept his evidence that he discovered this after the respondent had left Hilborne Hawkin & Co; that he discovered further that the fee of $1,000 collected by the respondent had not been paid over to Hilborne Hawkin & Co and that upon this discovery he was so incensed that he reported the matter to the Attorney General of Brunei requesting disciplinary action to be taken against the respondent.

We reject the respondent`s defence that he was directed by Vinod Kumar to send his personal bill and keep the fee earned in respect of the work done in revising or redrafting the agreement in question.

Determination

The committee finds that it has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent, while employed as a limited partner by Hilborne Hawkin & Co in the State of Brunei, in the course of his professional work done on behalf of the said firm, collected a fee of $1,000 from a client and failed to pay it over to Hilborne Hawkin & Co. This conduct of the respondent in dishonestly withholding the said sum of $1,000 from his employers, Hilborne Hawkin & Co, in the opinion of the committee, was clearly fraudulent and therefore grossly proper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty within the meaning of s 80(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act Society. The committee determines under s 90(1)(c) of the Act that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under s 80 of the Act.

Having made that determination, the committee then proceeded to consider the submission of counsel for JL on jurisdiction in these words:

Counsel submitted that this disciplinary committee had no jurisdiction to deal with the complaint of the Law Society because the misconduct, if any, was committed in the State of Brunei which is a foreign country; that the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) applies only to misconduct committed in Singapore; that it has no extra-territorial application; and that `there is a presumption of [sic] territorial jurisdiction unless express provisions otherwise are made in the statute.

The reasons that were given are as follows:

A disciplinary committee is not a court of law. It has no inherent powers. It is a creature of statute and its powers and duties are spelled out in the

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