Re Lim Chor Pee

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgePunch Coomaraswamy J
Judgment Date21 September 1990
Neutral Citation[1990] SGHC 64
Docket NumberOriginating Summons No 452 of 1988
Date21 September 1990
Year1990
Published date19 September 2003
Plaintiff CounselCS Wu and Lim Teng Leong (Donaldson & Burkinshaw)
Citation[1990] SGHC 64
Defendant CounselJules Sher QC and Lisa Chong (Chor Pee & Co)
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Subject MatterAmended charge not inquired into by inquiry committee,Amendment of charge at late stage,Disciplinary procedures,Professional conduct,Whether fatal to charge,Income tax summons and Penal Code summons issued against solicitor,No notice given to respondent,Whether disciplinary committee could rely on the evidence,Evidence contained conjectures, inferences and opinions,Proof of facts to support such inferences,s 199 Penal Code (Cap 224),Admission to certain facts,Legal Profession,Composition of other offences,Expert evidence relied upon by disciplinary committee not admissible,Whether composition paid under Income Tax Act similar to that under Penal Code,Conviction of offence not involving dishonesty,Charge not within scope of information from Attorney General,Subsequent fresh settlement,Grossly improper conduct,Charge,Evidence,Whether paying composition amounted to admission of guilt,Settlement with prosecution withdrawn subsequently

Lim Chor Pee (the respondent) is an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court and was ordered in these proceedings to show cause why he should not be dealt with under s 80 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) (the Act).

These proceedings arose from a determination by a disciplinary committee (the committee) appointed by the Chief Justice under s 87(1) of the Act that, in relation to the information referred by the Attorney General to the Law Society of Singapore (Law Society), which the committee had investigated, cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed under s 80 of the Act.
The determination was based on six complaints or charges - the committee used the term `charges` - framed by the Law Society which the committee found had been proved. These six charges formed the subject matter of the hearing in these proceedings, and at the conclusion of the hearing, we found that none of the charges against the respondent had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and, accordingly, we ordered that the order nisi to show cause made under s 95 of the Act be discharged; we also set aside the order for payment of costs made by the committee against the respondent and ordered the Law Society to pay the costs of the respondent in respect of the hearing before us. We now give our reasons.

Information

The charges against the respondent arose from the information referred by the Attorney General to the Law Society under what was then s 86(2) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 217, 1970 Ed), and the information was contained in the letter dated 2 March 1983 written by Mr Glenn Knight on behalf of the Attorney General.
The letter referred to the investigations conducted by the Commercial Crimes Division of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the prosecution under the Income Tax Act that followed. The material portion of the letter is as follows:

In connection with investigations conducted by the Commercial Crimes Division, the Income Tax Act, the following were disclosed:

Lim Chor Pee had in manipulating the accounts of the firm of Chor Pee & Hin Hiong, in particular the disbursements account sought and succeeded in fraudulently evading the payment of tax. The specific allegations of fraud are contained in a report by Keith Tay, a partner of the firm of Peat Marwick & Mitchell, a copy of which is already with you. The report specifically avers to:

(a) The falsifying of ledger pages of the disbursement and other accounts relating to fee income received by the firm of Chor Pee & Hin Hiong for work done in respect of loan agreements entered into by International Holdings, Cho Jock Kim and Banque National de Paris et des Pays Bas (BNP). (Please see the report at pp 7-10.) This was done to conceal the fact that the income was not reported to the Comptroller but was expended instead by Lim Chor Pee and Khoo Hin Hiong for personal expenses.

(b) Lim Chor Pee requesting his former accounts clerk, Jeannie Yim, to falsify books of account to cover up the transfer of income to Hong Kong. This was done to assist Khoo Hin Hiong to defraud the tax authorities. (See pp 6 and 7 of the report.)

These two matters were covered by Income Tax Summonses No 50002/80 and 51001-51004/81. They were not withdrawn but were compounded at three times the penalty, the same penalties applicable if Lim Chor Pee was convicted under s 96 of the Income Tax Act which makes it an offence to defraud the tax authorities.

(c) Lim Chor Pee transferring fee income to separate ledger accounts to enable personal expenses to be paid from them. Also falsifying the ledgers to cover this. This was done to evade payment of tax of this income and was intended to defraud the tax authorities. This was done in some cases by diverting a percentage of the fee income earned to a travel account and deducting personal and travel expenses of his family. See p 10 para (4) of the report.



Prior to this date, the Attorney General had written to the Law Society on 16 July 1982 forwarding: (i) a report dated 6 April 1982 prepared by Mr Keith Tay (Keith Tay report) - this is the report referred to in the Attorney General`s letter of2 March 1983, and (ii) a statement of facts admitted by the respondent in the proceedings before the district court, namely, Income Tax Summons No 51105/81 in which the respondent pleaded guilty to and was convicted of a charge under s 95 of the Income Tax (Cap 141, 1970 Ed) (Income Tax Act).
These two documents formed part of the information referred by the Attorney General to the Law Society.

Historical background

As the investigation of the complaints or charges and the findings by the committee touched on various matters connected with the investigation and prosecution of the respondent on the criminal charges brought against him, it is necessary to set out briefly the relevant events which led to the `settlement` that was finally concluded in March 1982.
Prior to 1979 or thereabout, the reswas a senior partner of his firm than known as Chor Pee & Hin Hiong (the firm). In August 1978, one of his partners, Khoo Hin Hiong (Mr Khoo), was convicted of the offence of abetting a criminal breach of trust by one Cho Jock Kim (Mr Cho). Following this, the CID commenced investigation into matters relating generally to the accounts of the firm and sought numerous files and account books of the firm; in fact, the officers of the CID went to their office on several occasions and seized various account books and files in September and October 1978. This was followed by interviews of the respondent by the CID in January and February 1979. On 28 February 1979, the respondent was served by the CID with a notice of intended prosecution of an offence of criminal breach of trust under s 409 of the Penal Code in respect of a sum of $19,729.70. The respondent made representations to the prosecution and there followed a series of correspondence between the respondent`s solicitor, Mr Joe Grimberg of Drew & Napier, and Mr Glenn Knight, the deputy public prosecutor, which, however, did not lead to any acceptable resolution of the matter in question.

On 4 October 1979, the respondent was served with four additional notices of intended prosecution in respect of:

(i) conspiring with one Jeannie Yim to rewrite the 1973 `P` ledger account book of the firm, an offence punishable under s 120B of the Penal Code;

(ii) instigating Jeannie Yim to give false evidence in respect of the sum of $19,729.70, an offence punishable under s 193 of the Penal Code;

(iii) giving false evidence to the CID in respect of asking Jeannie Yim to rewrite the `P` books, an offence punishable under s 193 of the Penal Code; and

(iv) criminal breach of trust of 8,023,000 shares of Far Eastern Hotel Development Ltd belonging to International Holdings Pte Ltd, an offence punishable under s 409 of the Penal Code.



Once again, there followed a series of discussions and negotiations between the respondent`s solicitor and the authorities, including negotiations with the Comptroller of Income Tax.
In that connection, with a view to staving off the intending prosecution, a proposal was made to the authorities for consideration that the respondent would resign from his firm, then known as Chor Pee & Co, and cease to practise as an advocate and solicitor `for an appropriate period`. That, however, was not accepted. Eventually, on 30 November 1979, which was just before the day the respondent was to be charged in court for criminal breach of trust in respect of the sum of $19,729.70, Mr Grimberg on behalf of the respondent reached agreement with Mr Glenn Knight, and this was set out in a letter of that date written by Mr Grimberg to Mr Knight, as amended by a second letter ofMr Grimberg of the same date. The principal terms agreed upon were: that the respondent would admit to facts constituting an offence under s 96(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act, namely, that he had authorized Jeannie Yim to falsify books of accounts of the firm with intent to assist Mr Khoo to evade tax; that a charge against the respondent would be framed; that if the Comptroller of Income Tax decided not to compound the offence, the respondent would plead guilty to the charge, and that if disciplinary proceedings were subsequently taken against the respondent founded on the facts constituting the offence, the respondent would admit to such facts and also `those facts` which warranted a `striking off`. It was also part of the agreement that the respondent would not be charged on the following day in open court with the offence of criminal breach of trust as originally scheduled.

The agreement having been reached, the next step was for the prosecution to provide a statement of facts constituting the tax offence and to frame a charge against the respondent.
However, there was a lull for a period of about 51/2 months until on 15 May 1980, when a complaint by one Mr Robert Kang, the Assistant Commissioner of Inland Revenue, was filed and Income Tax Summons No 50002/80 was issued; the summons was served on the respondent on the following day. The charge against the respondent under that summons was that he had in June 1978 wilfully authorized Jeannie Yim to falsify books of account of the firm with intent to assist Mr Khoo to evade tax, an offence punishable under s 96(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The respondent by a letter dated 16 June 1980 admitted to the complaint and requested the Comptroller of Income Tax to compound the offence, at the same time forwarding a cheque for $50,000. This request was rejected and the cheque was returned. The Income Tax Summons No 50002/80 was mentioned in the district court in June and July 1980; but the parties failed to agree on the statement of facts. Subsequently, on 22 July 1980, the `agreement` reached on 30 November was called off by the prosecution. The prosecution of the respondent in respect to the charges of which...

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15 cases
  • The Law Society of Singapore v Wong Kai Kit
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 3 Diciembre 1993
    ... ... Since the court was not concerned with the ability of the inquiry committee to inquire into matters not directly revealed by the original complaint this case is not applicable to the instant case. In Re Lim Chor Pee 4 the court of three judges held that: ... the Law Society cannot frame a charge which was not contained in the `information` referred by the Attorney General to the Law Society and notice of which was not given by the inquiry committee under that section : see Isaac Paul ... ...
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    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 29 Octubre 1991
    ... ... The finding of the disciplinary committee on the charge against the respondent under s 84(2)(b) cannot therefore be supported on the grounds as stated in sub-para 13(ix) of the report ... More recently the same point was decided in the case of Re Lim Chor Pee [1991] 2 MLJ 154 There, the Attorney General acting under s 82(2) of the Act referred to the Law Society certain information touching upon the conduct of an advocate and solicitor in his professional capacity, and one of the charges preferred by the Law Society against the advocate and ... ...
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    • Singapore
    • Court of Appeal (Singapore)
    • 1 Julio 2021
    ...composition of straightforward or less serious offences amounts to an admission of guilt. Instead, the observation in Re Lim Chor Pee [1990] 2 SLR(R) 117 (“Re Lim Chor Pee”), that individuals agree to compound offences for a variety of reasons, is correct. There has also been erroneous reli......
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    • High Court (Singapore)
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    ...4 SLR 854 (refd) Law Society of Singapore v Ang Boon Kong Lawrence [1992] 3 SLR (R) 825; [1993] 1 SLR 522 (refd) Lim Chor Pee, Re [1990] 2 SLR (R) 117; [1990] SLR 809 (refd) Lim Teng Ee Joyce v Singapore Medical Council [2005] 3 SLR (R) 709; [2005] 3 SLR 709 (refd) Oshlack v Richmond River ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • COMPOSITION
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Journal No. 2015, December 2015
    • 1 Diciembre 2015
    ...Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) and s 241(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed); see also Re Lim Chor Pee[1990] 2 SLR(R) 117, where the High Court affirmed that the same principle applies when an offence is compounded under an Act other than the Criminal Procedure Cod......

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