Re Flint Charles John Raffles QC

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Lai Kew Chai J
• Judgment Date: 13 March 2001
• Neutral Citation: [2001] SGHC 47
• Docket Number: Originating Motion No 31 of 2000
• Date: 13 March 2001
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 2001
• Plaintiff Counsel: Vinodh Coomaraswamy and David Chan (Shook Lin & Bok)
• Citation: [2001] SGHC 47
• Defendant Counsel: Bernadette Balan and Kueh Ping Yang (Haridass Ho & Partners),Eric Chin (Attorney General’s Chambers),Cho Sooi Yoon
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Three-stage test for admission,Whether circumstances of case warranted court exercising discretion in favour of admission,s 21(1) Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2000 Ed),Whether case of sufficient difficulty and complexity that local counsel unable to adequately and ably handle,Admissionad,Factors non-exhaustive,ad hoc,Legal Profession

: By Originating Motion filed on 16 November 2000 Mr Charles John Raffles Flint QC (`Mr Flint`) of Blackstone Chambers, Blackstone House, Temple, London EC4Y 9BW sought ad hoc admission under s 21 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2000 Ed) (`the Act`) to practise as an advocate and solicitor of this court as leading counsel for the purpose of appearing on behalf of Malaysian International Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd (`Mitco`) in Suit 280/2000/L (`the Suit`) including any interlocutory appeal proceedings in connection therewith until the final disposal of the matter. On 1 December 2000 the application was heard by me. At the conclusion of the hearing, I dismissed the application.

As I had indicated during arguments, I was guided by case law to `balance the long-term need to foster a strong and independent Bar in our own jurisdiction against the individual justice of each case which may demand that a particularly specialised and skilled Queen`s Counsel` be admitted to assist the court. I further indicated that I had prior to the hearing of the originating motion dealt with some of the urgent and significant interlocutory applications in the Suit handled by local counsel, Mr Vinodh Coomaraswamy and his team of advocates, and that having had the immense benefit of knowing the nature of the case in some depth and observing and evaluating the performance of local counsel, and particularly the level of assistance he and his team had been able, in their roles as advocates, to extend to the court, I needed to be convinced that the case is of sufficient difficulty and complexity that local counsel is unable to handle it adequately for Mitco. Further, I needed to be satisfied on the guidelines laid down by case law that a refusal of the services of a Queen`s Counsel may conceivably result in some disadvantage to the prosecution of Mitco`s case against the defendants at the trial of the Suit.

For the reasons set out in his written submissions, which he elaborated, local counsel strenuously urged for Mr Flint`s admission. However, in the end I formed the view, for the reasons which I will set out, that the case would involve issues which local counsel could, as amply demonstrated, adequately and ably handle and that Mitco`s interest at the full-blown trial would be adequately and ably served by local counsel. Accordingly the motion was dismissed. On 2 January 2001 Mr Flint, being dissatisfied with my decision, filed his Notice of Appeal. I now set out the material circumstances and the reasons for my decision.

Section 21(1) of the Act, which is reproduced below, is the relevant legislation:

(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, the court may, for the purpose of any one case where the court is satisfied that it is of sufficient difficulty and complexity having regard to the circumstances of the case, admit to practise as an advocate and solicitor any person who -

(a) holds her Majesty`s Patent as Queen`s Counsel;

(b) does not ordinarily reside in Singapore or Malaysia but who has come or intends to come to Singapore for the purpose of appearing in the case; and

(c) has special qualifications or experience for the purpose of the case.

In this application, the impressive credentials of Mr Flint clearly fulfilled the requirements of s 21(1)(c) and that requirement was not in issue before me at all.

As was noted by Chan Sek Keong J (as he then was) in Re Oliver David Keightley Rideal QC [1992] 2 SLR 400 at 402D, the object of the amendment to s 21(1) of the Act, which was effected by Act No 10 of 1991 and which took effect from 1 February 1991, was to lay the foundation for the development of a strong local bar by `the imposition of more stringent conditions for the admission of Queen`s Counsel to appear in our courts, but at the same time, to continue to allow litigants to avail of their services in appropriate cases`. The amendments required the court to take into consideration two additional requirements: (1) the case must be of sufficient difficulty and complexity; and (2) the circumstances of the case.

Our courts have developed a three-stage test when considering an admission under s 21(1) of the Act. This test is best summarised in Re Caplan Jonathan Michael QC (No 2) [1998] 1 SLR 440 where Yong Pung How CJ stated in [para ] 11 on p 444 as follows:

The requirements of the above provision were considered at length by the Court of Appeal in Price Arthur Leolin v A-G & Ors [1992] 2 SLR 972 . In its judgment, the court articulated a three-stage test for admission under s 21(1). At the first stage, the applicant must demonstrate that the case in which he seeks to appear contains issues of law and/or fact of sufficient difficulty and complexity to require elucidation and/or argument by a Queen`s Counsel. Such difficulty or complexity is not of itself a guarantee of admission, for the decision to admit is still a matter for the court`s discretion. At the second stage, therefore, the applicant must persuade the court that the circumstances of the particular case warrant the court exercising its discretion in favour of his admission. Finally, he has to satisfy the court of his suitability for admission.

In Re Caplan Jonathan Michael QC (No 2) (supra) the applicant sought admission to appear in a long trial in a suit in which there were claims and counterclaims in contract containing different terms for alleged breaches of a contract in relation to the development of certain commercial and retail projects in Shanghai; namely, the New Time Project and the Mayflower Project. Restitution of sums paid was also sought. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had orally agreed to some commercial commitments. The defendants denied those allegations and they in turn alleged that through the agency of a named individual, who was alleged to have acted on behalf of the plaintiffs, they the plaintiffs had agreed that the two projects would be developed with certain Chinese parties and that the defendants had agreed to invest in those projects only on the basis that they would be given shareholding interests in the company designated as the Chinese parties` joint venture partner. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs in breach of their oral agreement failed to ensure that the defendants were given such interests. In admitting Mr Caplan, the Chief Justice in exercising his discretion took into account (1) the highly forensic nature of the suit in question, in which skills of advocacy, including prominently the art of cross-examination, were needed; and (2) the fact that the commercial reputation of the defendants who wanted Mr Caplan to represent them was at stake. The Chief Justice therefore acceded to the demands of individual justice to the defendants and ordered the admission of the Queen`s Counsel.

It is self-evident that the three factors which impressed the Chief Justice are non-exhaustive. There are other factors identified in the other cases. Section 21(1) requires the court to have regard, ie take into account, `the circumstances of the case`. Although circumstances vary from case to case, a court must always be concerned that those factors are material and have a bearing on its balancing act, as stated earlier, whether it or a combination of factors tilted one way or the other. Indeed, in Price Arthur Leolin v A-G [1992] 2 SLR 972 , the Court of Appeal indicated at p 976I that `[o]nce the court is satisfied that the case is difficult and complex enough to warrant the assistance of a Queen`s Counsel, the next consideration must be the exercise of discretion`. In balancing the...