Re Andrews Geraldine Mary QC

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeV K Rajah JA
Judgment Date15 November 2012
Neutral Citation[2012] SGHC 229
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberOriginating Summons No 589 of 2012
Year2012
Published date27 November 2012
Hearing Date24 August 2012
Plaintiff CounselNarayanan Vijya Kumar (Vijay & Co)
Defendant CounselCavinder Bull SC, Woo Shu Yan and Lin Shumin (Drew & Napier LLC),Jeffrey Chan Wah Teck SC, Dominic Zou Wen Xi and Cheryl Siew May Yee (Attorney-General's Chambers),Christopher Anand s/o Daniel (Advocatus Law LLP), Alvin Chen and Harjean Kaur
Subject MatterLEGAL PROFESSION,Admission,Ad hoc
Citation[2012] SGHC 229
V K Rajah JA: Introduction

This application is made pursuant to s 15 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“the current LPA”) for Ms Geraldine Mary Andrews QC (“the Applicant”) to be admitted as an advocate and solicitor of Singapore for the purpose of representing one Ng Chee Weng (“the Plaintiff”) in the hearing of Suit No 453 of 2009 (“Suit 453/2009”), including in any appeals therefrom. It is opposed by all the statutorily identified interested parties. As this is the first application under the new ad hoc admission scheme for Queen’s Counsel or foreign counsel holding an appointment of equivalent distinction (collectively referred to hereafter as “foreign senior counsel”) introduced earlier this year, I attempt to explain here how the applicable provisions ought to be construed and might be applied. It appears to me, after considering counsel’s submissions, that there has been a serious misapprehension as to the real extent of the change brought about by the new ad hoc admission scheme. A formulaic approach no longer applies in assessing the merits of an application for ad hoc admission. The court’s discretion to admit a foreign senior counsel is now to be exercised after considering holistically all the matters identified as relevant, and not primarily by assessing the complexity of the case. Complexity of the case is no longer a threshold requirement that must be satisfied in every ad hoc admission application. Lamentably, there has been undue reliance on outdated case law by counsel. The Bar and court users may therefore find it helpful if there is further elucidation of the matters which the court may consider in similar applications in future.

The facts

On 26 May 2009, the Plaintiff commenced Suit 453/2009 against Bryan Lim Jit Ming (“the First Defendant”) and Teo Soo Geok Josephine (collectively, “the Defendants”). The Plaintiff claimed that a portion of the dividends declared by SinCo Technologies Pte Ltd (“the Company”) between 2003 and 2007, amounting to about $8.88m, were due to him from the Defendants because they held certain shares in the Company on trust for him with effect from April 2002. For convenience, I will refer to this claim as “the original cause of action”.

When the Plaintiff commenced Suit 453/2009 on 26 May 2009, he was represented by Mr Peter Low (“Mr Low”) from Colin Ng & Partners LLP.1 The Defendants were then, and are still, represented by Mr Cavinder Bull SC (“Mr Bull”) from Drew & Napier LLC (“D&N”).

On 3 June 2009, the Defendants applied to strike out various paragraphs in the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim (“SOC”) and in two affidavits supporting the Plaintiff’s application for a Mareva injunction. This was on the basis that the paragraphs in question disclosed “without prejudice” communications between the Plaintiff and the Defendants for the purpose of settlement of the dispute. The SOC contained paragraphs which referred to settlement discussions between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant, but stopped short of alleging that a settlement agreement had been reached. On 14 July 2009, a High Court judge struck out the paragraphs in question: see Ng Chee Weng v Lim Jit Ming Bryan and Another [2010] SGHC 35 (“Ng Chee Weng (HC)”).

On 31 July 2009, Mr Low, on behalf of the Plaintiff, filed an appeal in Civil Appeal No 93 of 2009 (“CA 93/2009”) against the decision of the High Court judge allowing the Defendants’ striking-out applications. Sometime in February or March 2010, the Plaintiff discharged Mr Low and instructed Mr Narayanan Vijya Kumar (“Mr Vijya”) from Vijay and Co to represent him in Suit 453/2009 and CA 93/2009. The basis of this appointment was that Mr Vijya would only act as his solicitor, and would assist him in securing an able advocate who would be able to “stand up” to Mr Bull and ensure that his claim was properly presented. Mr Vijya in turn instructed Mr Roderick Edward Martin (“Mr Martin”) to prepare for and argue CA 93/2009.2 Mr Martin, it bears mention, is an experienced and well-regarded counsel who was subsequently appointed a Senior Counsel in January 2011.

At the hearing of CA 93/2009 on 17 May 2010, Mr Martin presented to the Court of Appeal the Plaintiff’s proposed amendment to the SOC to plead a claim to enforce a settlement agreement as an alternative claim to the original cause of action (“the First Proposed Amendment”). In the First Proposed Amendment, the Plaintiff pleaded in the alternative that settlement negotiations had concluded in a settlement agreement under which the Defendants agreed to pay him $4.5m. The Court of Appeal adjourned the hearing to 19 May 2010 for further submissions on whether the First Proposed Amendment should be allowed. On 19 May 2010, after hearing Mr Martin, the Court of Appeal dismissed the Plaintiff’s appeal in CA 93/2009 and disallowed the First Proposed Amendment. It, however, subsequently issued an addendum on 21 May 2010 (“the Addendum”) to clarify the consequences of its decision.

In the Addendum, the Court of Appeal stated that the dismissal of CA 93/2009 did not preclude the Plaintiff from applying for leave to make further amendments to the SOC. However, the Court of Appeal reiterated that leave to make any proposed amendment in the precise form and sequence as that of the First Proposed Amendment would not be granted because it had already ruled that the First Proposed Amendment was not in order. The Court of Appeal also observed that the admissibility of evidence pertaining to “without prejudice” negotiations would still have to be assessed with reference to the form of the pleadings before the court, whether presently or as amended in future, and that the dismissal of CA 93/2009 did not mean that such evidence would be inadmissible under any circumstances.

Thereafter, Mr Martin did not want to continue acting as counsel for the Plaintiff in Suit 453/2009.3 The Plaintiff immediately attempted to find “a local senior counsel of commensurate experience in commercial disputes”4 who would be prepared to represent him. Mr Vijya approached two leading law firms, Wong Partnership (“WP”) and Allen & Gledhill LLP (“A&G”). However, they informed him that they were conflicted out from acting for the Plaintiff in Suit 453/2009.5

Before Mr Vijya formally approached Rajah & Tann LLP (“R&T”) (which had previously informed him informally that it was also in a position of legal conflict), Professor Tan Cheng Han SC (“Prof Tan”) agreed to represent the Plaintiff. Mr Vijya felt then that there was no need to look elsewhere for local counsel to represent the Plaintiff.6

Concerned by his counsel’s persistent lack of success up to that point in properly formulating his claim before an assistant registrar (“AR”), the High Court and the Court of Appeal, the Plaintiff also concurrently sought the advice of foreign senior counsel.7 An approach was made to the Applicant, who accepted his instructions and reformulated the pleadings. The reformulated pleadings were eventually accepted by the Court of Appeal as disclosing viable causes of action (see [13] below).

On 23 August 2010, the Plaintiff applied via Summons No 3969 of 2010 (“SUM 3969/2010”) for leave to amend his SOC again. The proposed amendment this time (“the Second Proposed Amendment”) reversed the order of pleading the Plaintiff’s causes of action. His primary claim now was that there was a settlement agreement. Alternatively, if the court determined that there was no settlement agreement, the Plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to the dividends declared on the shares held by the Defendants on trust for him. The AR who heard SUM 3969/2010 denied the Plaintiff leave to make the Second Proposed Amendment. On 15 October 2010, a different High Court judge affirmed the AR’s decision: see Ng Chee Weng v Lim Jit Ming Bryan and another [2011] SGHC 120. The Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No 190 of 2010 (“CA 190/2010”). CA 190/2010 was heard on 15 August 2011.

At the hearings before the High Court and the Court of Appeal, the Plaintiff was represented by Prof Tan. However, Prof Tan informed the Plaintiff that he was only prepared to act for the Plaintiff in respect of the application for leave to amend the SOC, and that he could not take on any further role in the case because of his other commitments.8 The Applicant, I note, drafted the Plaintiff’s submissions and arguments for these hearings in consultation with Prof Tan.

On 18 November 2011, the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment allowing the Plaintiff’s appeal: see Ng Chee Weng v Lim Jit Ming Bryan and another [2012] 1 SLR 457 (“Ng Chee Weng (CA)”). The Court of Appeal held that: The Plaintiff was not precluded from pleading inconsistent causes of action in the alternative so long as the facts were not mixed up and were stated separately in order to specify the facts upon which each cause of action was based. This was what the Plaintiff did in the Second Proposed Amendment, which was accordingly properly pleaded. The Plaintiff was not otherwise precluded from amending his pleadings. The Second Proposed Amendment disclosed a reasonable cause of action and was not an abuse of the process of the court. Therefore, it was not liable to be struck out under O 18 r 19(1)(a) or O 18 r 19(1)(d) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed). The Court of Appeal also noted with dismay that the case had been seriously (and, by implication, unnecessarily) delayed. It censoriously observed (at [105] of Ng Chee Weng (CA)) that “more than two years ha[d] passed since the commencement of the suit, yet the actual trial ha[d] not even begun because the [Defendants had] been valiantly resisting every single application of the [Plaintiff] at the interlocutory stage” [emphasis added]. While, in fairness, I should add that the Defendants were of course not responsible for the bewildering muddle in the Plaintiff’s pleadings,...

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1 cases
  • Re Andrews Geraldine Mary QC
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 15 Noviembre 2012
    ...Andrews Geraldine Mary QC [2012] SGHC 229 V K Rajah JA Originating Summons No 589 of 2012 High Court Legal Profession—Admission—Ad hoc—Amendment of Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (‘LPA’) with effect from 1 April 2012—Issuance of Legal Profession (Ad Hoc Admissions) Notification......
1 firm's commentaries
  • Foreign Senior Counsel / QCs In Singapore Courts
    • Singapore
    • Mondaq Singapore
    • 4 Diciembre 2012
    ...The grounds of that application were only recently considered in the Singapore High Court decision of Re Andrews Geraldine Mary QC [2012] SGHC 229. The grounds are that the lawyer is a Queen's Counsel or holds an equivalent appointment in any jurisdiction, they do not ordinarily reside in S......

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