Public Prosecutor v Saroop Singh

JudgeYong Pung How CJ
Judgment Date25 January 1999
Neutral Citation[1999] SGHC 21
Citation[1999] SGHC 21
Defendant CounselRespondent in person
Published date19 September 2003
Plaintiff CounselHay Hung Chun (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
Date25 January 1999
Docket NumberMagistrate's Appeal No 157 of 1985
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Subject MatterWhether court ought to stay criminal proceedings on ground of long delay,Long delay of 13 years,Appeal against acquittal,Appeal,Whether court ought to hear appeal after long lapse of time,Acquittal,Acquittal at close of prosecution's case,Criminal Procedure and Sentencing
Judgment:

YONG PUNG HOW CJ

Facts and case history

1.The facts are that the respondent was seen by police officers beating a red light in his motor vehicle along East Coast Parkway on 9 April 1981 at 10.10pm. He was stopped by the officers, who, upon examining him, suspected him to be driving under the influence of alcohol. He was arrested, brought to Tan Tock Seng Hospital and subjected to a physical examination, and his blood alcohol level was tested. He was found to have 198 g of ethanol per 100 ml of blood, which exceeded the (then) statutory limit of 110 g of ethanol per 100 ml of blood. The respondent was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol to such an extent as to render him incapable of having proper control over the vehicle under s 29(1) of the Road Traffic Act (then Cap 92, 1973 Ed).

2.He was tried in the district court on 29 March, 6 April and 13 April 1985 and acquitted by district judge Rahim Jalil at the close of the prosecution`s case on 22 April 1985. His defence was not called. The district judge found that the prosecution`s evidence contradicted itself, and that accordingly the presumption that he was unable to exercise proper control over the vehicle was rebutted. The district judge`s reasoning is set out in further detail below.

3.The Public Prosecutor lodged a notice of appeal against the district judge`s decision on 23 April 1985. The grounds of decision were released on 30 May 1985 and the petition of appeal was filed on 18 June 1985.

4.The appeal was fixed for hearing on 20 November 1985. The respondent did not appear for the hearing.

5.The appeal was then re-fixed for 12 March 1986. The respondent was sent a notification of the second date by registered post, which was sent to his address at 2041 Changi Village S 1749. The notice was unclaimed. The respondent was absent at the appeal and a warrant of arrest was issued by the High Court on 12 March 1986.

6.Letters were sent to the Officer-in-Command of the Criminal Record Office, CID by the High Court asking for updates as to the action taken on the warrant of arrest on 4 May 1988, 20 March 1990, 4 June 1994 and 4 June 1998. There is no evidence of any reply to these letters on the part of the CID.

7.The respondent was arrested on 13 November 1998 when he attended at the traffic police for a different matter. He was arrested pursuant to the warrant issued on 12 March 1986. On the same day, he applied to be released on bail.

8.The respondent appeared in person before Chan Seng Onn JC. He explained that he did not receive the notice of the hearing fixed for 20 November 1985 because his shop at 2041 Changi Village had already closed down at that time. Thereafter he went to Australia where he remained until 1988. He was unaware of the appeal against his acquittal, or of the warrant for his arrest. The learned judicial commissioner granted the respondent bail in the sum of $5,000 in one surety.

9.The appeal was then fixed for hearing before me on 3 December 1998. The respondent appeared in person. I dismissed the Public Prosecutor`s appeal and now give my reasons.

10. History of legislation

It is first convenient to set out the history of the provision under which the respondent was charged. In the 1970 Revised Edition of the Road Traffic Act (then Cap 92), the provision appeared as s 28 which read:

(1) Any person who, when driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a road or other public place, is under the influence of drink or a drug to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of such vehicle, shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, and in the case of a second or subsequent conviction to a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months or to both such fine and imprisonment.

11.Under Revision 1/73, the provision was renumbered as s 29 with no other amendments. In 1976, s 30B was introduced to provide that:

Any person who has been arrested under sections 29 or 30 of this Act shall be presumed to be incapable of having proper control of a motor vehicle if the specimen of blood provided by him under s 30A of this Act is certified by a medical practitioner to have a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 110 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 milllitres of blood.

However, it was still open to an accused person to rebut the presumption by demonstrating that he was capable of exercising proper control over the vehicle even if his blood specimen contained an alcohol level over the prescribed limit. See my decision in Joseph Roland v PP [1996] 1 SLR 179 .

12.Section 29 of the 1973 edition was subsequently renumbered as s 67 in the 1985 Revised Edition (Cap 276). The maximum fine for a first conviction was enhanced from $500 to $1,000 and the ceiling of six months` imprisonment maintained. By Act 7/90, the penalties under s 67 were further enhanced to a fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 for a first conviction, and of not less than $3,000 and not more than $10,000 for a second conviction.

13.Section 30B was renumbered as s 70 in the 1985 Revised edition and, by Act 9/85, the prescribed blood alcohol limit under s 70 was revised downwards from 110 mg/100 ml to 80 mg/100ml.

14.The current s 67 was introduced by the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 1996 and totally revamped the operation of the section. It now prescribes that:

(1) Any person who, when driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a road or other public place -

(a) is unfit to drive in that he is under the influence of drink or of a drug or an intoxicating substance to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of such vehicle; or

(b) has so much alcohol in his body that the proportion of it in his breath or blood exceeds the prescribed limit,

shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months and, in the case of a second or subsequent conviction, to a fine of not less than $3,000 and not more than $10,000 and to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months.

15.The presumption under s 70 was abolished and fresh provisions governing the taking of breath tests introduced as the new ss 70 and 71 in the 1997 Revised Edition of the Act. This marked a sea-change in the operation of the drink driving provisions. Whereas in 1985 having more than the prescribed limit of alcohol merely gave rise to a rebuttable presumption, under the current legislation the proof of that fact alone leads to a conviction, regardless of whether the accused was in fact capable of controlling the vehicle. Accordingly, today, even if the accused can prove he has an exceptional tolerance for alcohol, and that he was not inebriated at the time of his arrest, he will still be guilty of the offence.

16. Effect of delay in prosecution

The offence in question was allegedly committed in 1981 when the accused was aged 39. He was, at the hearing of appeal, 57. There was a lapse of more than 17 years since the date of the offence, and of about 13 years since the filing of the appeal.

17.In view of the fact that the respondent appeared in person, I took it upon myself to pose the question whether the appeal ought to be allowed in view of that delay. In particular, I was concerned whether to exercise my discretion to stay the criminal proceedings on the grounds that it would not now be possible to conduct a fair trial.

18.In Attorney General`s Reference (No 1 of 1990) [1992] QB 630[1992] 3 All ER 169, it was held by the English Court of Criminal Appeal (per Lord Lane CJ) that:

(a) The jurisdiction to stay criminal proceedings on the ground of delay was exceptional even where the delay could be said to be unjustifiable; and

(b) A stay should rarely be imposed in the absence of any fault on the part of the complainant or prosecution and should never be imposed where the delay was due merely to the complexity of the case or was caused or contributed to by the actions of the defendant himself; and

(c) Furthermore, a stay ought not to be imposed unless the defendant showed on the balance of probabilities that owing to the delay he would suffer serious prejudice to the extent that no fair trial could be held and that the continuance of the prosecution amounted to a misuse of process. In assessing whether there was likely to be prejudice and, if so, whether it could properly be described as serious, the court should consider whether any prejudice and unfairness could be dealt with in the course of the trial process itself,...

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4 cases
  • PP v Soh Chee Wen
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 3 Septiembre 2020
    ...Mui [1993] 1 SLR(R) 57; [1993] 2 SLR 59 (refd) PP v Norzian bin Bintat [1995] 3 SLR(R) 105; [1995] 3 SLR 462 (refd) PP v Saroop Singh [1999] 1 SLR(R) 241; [1999] 1 SLR 793 (refd) R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42 (refd) R v Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104 (refd)......
  • Yunani bin Abdul Hamid v Public Prosecutor
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 11 Abril 2008
    ...to the Subordinate Courts for a re-trial. Mr Vergis invited me to stay further prosecution, relying on the decision in PP v Saroop Singh [1999] 1 SLR 793. In that case, the court, following English, Australian and Privy Council authorities, stayed further criminal proceedings because of the......
  • Yunani bin Abdul Hamid v Public Prosecutor
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 11 Abril 2008
    ...to the Subordinate Courts for a re-trial. Mr Vergis invited me to stay further prosecution, relying on the decision in PP v Saroop Singh [1999] 1 SLR 793. In that case, the court, following English, Australian and Privy Council authorities, stayed further criminal proceedings because of the......
  • Chan Kum Hong Randy v Public Prosecutor
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 4 Febrero 2008
    ...[69]. Duncan v R (1983) 47 ALR 746 (refd) Lai Oei Mui Jenny v PP [1993] 2 SLR (R) 406; [1993] 3 SLR 305 (refd) PP v Saroop Singh [1999] 1 SLR (R) 241; [1999] 1 SLR 793 (refd) Queen, The v Kearne Paul King [2007] VSCA 38 (refd) Queen, The v Lyndon Cockerell [2001] VSCA 239 (refd) R v Merrett......
1 books & journal articles
  • Criminal Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2008, December 2008
    • 1 Diciembre 2008
    ...whether the case ought to be stayed or remitted back to the District Court for retrial. Relying on the decision in PP v Saroop Singh[1999] SLR 793, counsel for the applicant submitted that the court ought to order a stay of further criminal proceedings due to the prejudicial effect occasion......

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