Public Prosecutor v Lim Tze Fong

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeJanet Wang Lan Jee
Judgment Date20 March 2012
Neutral Citation[2012] SGDC 96
CourtDistrict Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberMOM Summons No. 134 of 2009
Year2012
Published date21 May 2013
Hearing Date22 July 2010,07 September 2010,21 July 2010,18 March 2010,19 March 2010,21 May 2010,18 May 2010,15 March 2010,01 April 2010,20 July 2010,17 March 2010,31 March 2010,06 September 2010,09 March 2011,25 May 2010,21 January 2010,16 March 2010,19 January 2010,24 May 2010,30 March 2011,27 May 2010,20 January 2010,19 May 2010,18 January 2010,23 February 2011
Plaintiff CounselMr Gokul Haridas, Ms Melissa Goh & Mr Vince Tio (MOM prosecutors)
Defendant CounselMr Tng Kim Choon (M/s Christopher Bridges)
Citation[2012] SGDC 96
District Judge Janet Wang: Background Undisputed facts1

A fatal worksite accident occurred on 15 October 2007 at 61 Meranti Crescent, Jurong Island, Singapore. The occupier of the said worksite was one Rotary Engineering Limited (‘REL’), which was awarded a contract by Universal Terminal (S) Pte Ltd (‘UT’) to erect tanks and construct pipes for petroleum storage terminal. The supply and installation of electrical and instrumentation system at the workplace was subcontracted to Rotary Electrical Company (Private) Limited (‘REC’) by the occupier. At the material time, the accused was deployed by his company Spot Management Services Pte Ltd (‘Spot’) as a Workplace Safety and Health (also known as ‘HSE’) officer for REL.

The occupier, REL, had implemented a permit to work system at the workplace to be complied by all subcontractors, including REC. The fatal workplace accident involved a construction worker of REC, who fell from height at the work area known as PS1. Prior to the accident, the deceased, Ooi Eng Hooi, was tasked to carry out installation work of cable trays on reinforced concrete. A working at height permit, namely, Exhibit P1, was obtained by the site supervisor, Tee Sing Ling (‘Tee’), PW12, for installation of cable trays on reinforced concrete to be carried out at the workplace, P1. Prior to signing on P1, Tee failed to inspect and ensure that the safety measures were in place before work at height started. The safety measures included a properly secured work platform that was free from obstruction, trip and slip hazards, as well as the provision of fall protection devices, rigid lifeline and barrication. Tee subsequently pleaded guilty to a charge under Section 15(1)(b) of the Workplace Safety and Health Act (Cap 354A) (‘WSHA’) for failing to inspect the workplace prior to applying for the permit to work, namely, P1. He was sentenced to a fine of $1000 (in default 2 weeks’ imprisonment)2. Following the incident, composition fine was offered to REL by the Ministry of Manpower (‘MOM’) for an offence under Section 20(2) of the then Factories (Building Operations Works of Engineering Constructions) Regulations on 12 December 20083.

In the present case, the accused claimed trial to the offence of contravening Regulation 9(1)(a) of the Workplace Safety and Health (Workplace Safety and Health Officers) Regulations (Cap.354A), namely, for failing to assist the occupier of the workplace to identify and assess foreseeable risks when he failed to conduct an inspection of the worksite to ensure compliance of the safety provisions prior to approving the permit to work, and which contravention resulted in the death of the deceased4. At the close of the trial, the prosecution invited the court to amend the charge on the basis that there was no evidence to show that the accused person’s contravention directly resulted in the death of the worker5. I convicted the accused on the following amended charge6 :

“…are charged that you, on or about 15 October 2007, being the Workplace Safety & Health Officer appointed by the occupier, one Rotary Engineering Limited (UEM:198000255E), of a workplace located at 61 Meranti Crescent, Jurong Island Singapore 627807, which is a workplace within the meaning of the Workplace Safety and Health Act (Cap.354A), did fail to assist the said occupier of the workplace to identify and assess any foreseeable risks arising from the work processes, to wit, by failing to ensure that the safety measures at PS1 were complied with before you endorsed the permit to work at height, and you have thereby contravened Regulation 9(1)(a) of the Workplace Safety and Health (Workplace Safety and Health Officers) Regulations (Cap.354A), which is an offence punishable under Regulation 9(2) of the said Regulations.

He was sentenced to pay a fine of $2,500 (in default 3 weeks’ imprisonment) Against the order of conviction and sentence, the accused had brought this appeal. The prosecution’s case

In essence, the prosecution’s case was that a system involving permit to work was in place at the work site to ensure that the safety personnel identified and assessed the risks prior to allowing workers to commence work7. Evidence to this effect was given at this trial by 15 witnesses including the occupier and the safety personnel. The salient aspects of the evidence presented are set out as follows:

Evidence of Samuel Thomas s/o Gnaniah (PW1)

Samuel Thomas s/o Gnaniah (‘Samuel’), a safety supervisor with Spot management, testified that his duties included overseeing the work Activities in the work area and reporting any unsafe ones to his safety officer, the accused8. He gave evidence that it was the accused, the safety officer, as well as his senior colleagues who instructed him on the safety aspects at the work site9. According to him, various safety mechanisms were instituted for the safety of the workers. Apart from the daily and weekly tool box meetings, a permit to work system was put in place for working at height above 2 metres. This involved the site supervisor submitting an application for the permit in the form of P1 3 days in advance before commencing work10.

It was his evidence that the safety personnel had to conduct a proper check at the specified work site for any safety issues with the permit. Thereafter, he would return to the office with the permit and sign on it under the heading ‘Safety checks by safety personnel’ and place the form in the tray for the area or site manager to endorse11. Samuel added that the site or area manager only endorsed the permit. He further testified that as part of the safety personnel, he had signed working at height permits and he would take the permit along to physically check the work site for safety issues that needed to be corrected prior to approving it12. He emphatically stated that he would not sign on the permit when he encountered safety lapses. He only signed the permit after he had personally checked that all the safety issues at the site were identified and rectified13. He maintained that the permits were mostly signed in the morning after they had checked the site14. According to Samuel, it was the accused, his safety officer, who instructed that he should physically check the worksite prior to approving the permit to work15. He also told the court that when the work could not be completed within the specified period, the site supervisor had to apply for another permit. The safety personnel was required to check the site again16.

When questioned, Samuel said he neither had knowledge nor investigated the work area where the incident occurred17. He had not visited PS1 at all prior to 15 October 2007. It was his evidence that he attended to the deceased at the accident site with Krishnasamy s/o Thangavelu (PW2), another safety supervisor18.

Evidence of Krishnasamy s/o Thangavelu (PW2)

It was the evidence of Krishnasamy s/o Thangavelu (‘Krishnasamy’), a safety coordinator, to maintain the safety of the worksite, toolbox or safety meetings were conducted to ensure the workers followed the safe work procedures and methods19. These included the requirement of a working at height permit and safety body harness to be worn before work at height was carried out20.

Krishnasamy informed the court that the working at height permit was applied by either the site supervisors or engineers and approved by the site, construction or area manager. According to him, the safety personnel was responsible for approving the safety aspects of the application, namely, from the safety point of view on the worksite involving safety procedure and measures21. On the other hand, the engineers and site supervisors would check on the work progress and technical aspects at the worksite. It was his evidence that he had approved such permits and before he signed on the permit, he would speak to the applicant to ascertain the nature of the permit (weekly or daily), the number of workers involved, and the items in the ticked boxes. Following the preliminary round of questions, he would personally visit the worksite with the permit. In the presence of the applicant, he would check on the ticked boxes alongside the materials and equipment used, to ensure that the former had complied with the requirements in the ticked boxes. He categorically maintained that he would not sign the permit if there were safety lapses and would get these rectified by the supervisors or engineers before work commenced22. He emphatically reiterated the need to check the worksite first before signing on the work at height permit23. It was a standing procedure from the ministry regulations and he knew from his experience that it was necessary to conduct a physical check on the worksite prior to approving the application. It was also his evidence that the accused, the safety officer, took the position that safety supervisors and safety officers must conduct checks to ensure compliance with safety regulations and would remind them to physically check the worksite when necessary24. He added that both he and the accused had checked the safety measures in place at his designated work area of supervision together25.

Krishnasamy also gave evidence that he attended to the accident scene with Samuel (PW1). He observed that access to the work area where the deceased lay was obstructed with pipe lines, namely, permanent and scaffolding pipes26. According to him, the deceased was found under the work platform. He went up to the platform to investigate and found the personal belongings of the deceased and working equipment. Krishnasamy added that workers were required to wear a body harness when working at height on the platform and hook it to a supporting anchorage structure that could withstand weight of up to 70kg27. It was his evidence that the deceased was found without his safety harness on. He told the court he did not know the nature of work that was carried out at...

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