Public Prosecutor v Koon Seng Construction Pte Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Yong Pung How CJ
• Judgment Date: 31 January 1996
• Neutral Citation: [1996] SGHC 17
• Date: 31 January 1996
• Subject Matter: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing,Scope of High Court's revisionary jurisdiction,Whether revision powers of High Court included power to amend charge,ss 256(b)(ii), 266 & 268 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68),Revision of proceedings
• Docket Number: Criminal Revision No 2 of 1996
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Defendant Counsel: Ranjit Singh (Darshan & Pnrs)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Lee Sing Lit (Deputy Public Prosecutor)

This was an application by the Public Prosecutor for a criminal revision in respect of a notice to attend court No 114249 (the notice). The notice was served on the respondent on 5 October 1995, requiring its attendance in a subordinate court in answer to a charge of having committed an offence under s 25(1) of the Destruction of Disease-Bearing Insects Act (Cap 79) (DDBIA). The respondent was alleged to have failed to comply with an order served on them by the Ministry of the Environment (ENV) pursuant to s 9 of the DDBIA, which requires the offender to take specified preventive measures as to premises or anything therein which is or may become favourable to the propagation or harbouring of disease-bearing insects. The maximum fine prescribed under s 25(1) DDBIA is a sum of $1,000.

The present application arose because of what was described by the petitioner as a `clerical error`. It appears that the offence section was inadvertently entered into a computerized data entry system as s 6(1) DDBIA instead of s 25(1) DDBIA. As a consequence, the charge sheet generated for the court`s reference in Night Court 13N of the subordinate courts recorded the charge against the respondent as being one under s 6(1) DDBIA, which states:

No person shall take, do or perform any act or thing which may, or be liable to, create such conditions as may be favourable to the propagation or harbouring of disease-bearing insects.

The maximum fine prescribed for contravention of s 6(1) DDBIA is $1,000. In the case of a second or subsequent conviction, the maximum fine is $2,000.

The respondent`s case was first mentioned in Court 13N on 14 November 1995. A two-week adjournment was granted. The respondent, represented by Mr Ranjit Singh who also appeared in the present proceedings, eventually pleaded guilty to the charge under s 6(1) DDBIA on 28 November 1995. The prosecuting officer informed the presiding magistrate in Court 13N that the respondent had eight previous convictions under s 6(1) DDBIA and was last fined $1,500 on 26 September 1995. The magistrate therefore imposed a fine of $2,000.

The prosecuting officer subsequently discovered the error in the charge which was presented in Court 13N. The present application for criminal revision was thus filed at the instance of the Public Prosecutor, seeking an order from the High Court reversing the conviction and sentence, and directing a retrial in the subordinate courts on the intended charge of s 25(1) DDBIA. Before me, the learned DPP submitted that the High Court could amend the charge and direct a retrial pursuant to s 256(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68) (CPC), in the exercise of its revisionary jurisdiction. Counsel for the respondent, Mr Ranjit Singh, stated that he had no objection to the DPP`s application.

There was clearly an administrative or clerical error. The error was compounded both by counsel`s failure to clarify the matter before the court, as well as by the ENV`s listing of eight antecedents under s 6(1) DDBIA. Nevertheless, there was never any doubt which offence the respondent had committed. The respondent had been notified that it would be charged with an offence under s 25(1) DDBIA and had intended all along to plead guilty to that charge. Indeed, counsel informed me that the respondent would still plead guilty to that charge once the existing conviction and sentence were quashed. Bearing all the above matters in mind, I was doubtful of the purpose of ordering a retrial.

In the premises, I sought the views of the DPP and counsel as to whether I could not amend the charge to the correct one under s 25(1) DDBIA in the exercise of my revisionary powers pursuant to s 266 CPC, set aside the conviction and sentence imposed, and reduce the sentence to a fine commensurate with the prescribed maximum fine under s 25(1) DDBIA. Neither the DPP nor counsel saw any difficulty with this.

In State of Orissa v Nakula Sahu AIR 1979 SC 663, Jaswant Singh J, delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court of India, observed:

... normally the jurisdiction of the High Court under [our s 266 CPC] is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice.

The revisionary jurisdiction of the High Court exists to set right serious injustice. In this connection, Dua J, in the Supreme Court decision of Akalu Ahir v Ramdeo Ram AIR 1973 A 2145, stated:

The High Court has been invested with this power to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognized rules of criminal jurisprudence and that the subordinate courts do not exceed their jurisdiction or abuse the power conferred on them by law. As a general rule, this power, in spite of the wide language of [the equivalent sections] Cr PC, does not contemplate interference with the conclusions of fact in the absence of serious legal infirmity and failure of justice.

As I have stated in Ang Poh Chuan v PP [1996] 1 SLR 326 , there is no precise definition of what constitutes serious injustice. A wide discretion is vested in the High Court, the exercise of which depends largely on the particular facts. Section 27(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322) (SCJA) provides:

In addition to the powers conferred on the High Court by this Act or any other written law, the High Court shall have general supervisory and revisionary jurisdiction over all subordinate courts, and may in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, if it appears desirable in the interests of justice, either of its own motion or at the instance of any party or person interested, at any stage in any matter or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, in any subordinate court, call for the record thereof, and may remove the matter or proceeding into the High Court or may give to the subordinate court such directions as to the further conduct of the

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