Public Prosecutor v Chinnathambi Gunasekaran

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Shawn Ho
• Judgment Date: 19 January 2018
• Neutral Citation: [2018] SGDC 14
• Court: District Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: DAC 900553 of 2018 & Ors, MA 9021/2018/01
• Published date: 17 May 2018
• Year: 2018
• Hearing Date: 16 January 2018,08 January 2018
• Plaintiff Counsel: Police Prosecutor Shrmani B Abdul Hamid
• Defendant Counsel: Accused in person.
• Subject Matter: Criminal Law - Road Traffic Act - Drink Driving - Disqualification Order
• Citation: [2018] SGDC 14

District Judge Shawn Ho: INTRODUCTION

After imbibing alcohol, the Accused sped along an expressway in his motor lorry.¹ He was stopped by the Traffic Police, and he reeked of alcohol. He was arrested after failing the Breathalyzer test. The alcohol in his breath – 70 µg of alcohol in 100 ml of breath – was double the prescribed limit.²

The Accused pleaded guilty to two charges.

For the speeding charge under s 63(4) read with s 63(1) punishable under s 131(2)(a) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, RTA), he was fined $500 in default 2 days’ imprisonment.

For the drink driving charge under section 67(1)(b) of the RTA, he was fined $2800 in default 14 days’ imprisonment, and disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving license for all vehicle classes for 22 months with effect from 8 January 2018. A prohibition order under s 47F of the RTA was also ordered.

The Accused has appealed against his disqualification order. He has paid the fines. All things considered, I am of the view that the disqualification order of 22 months is appropriate.

I now set out my reasons for the disqualification order.

APPROPRIATE SENTENCE Prescribed Punishment

The prescribed punishment for s 67(1)(b) of the RTA is as follows: Fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 or Imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, and Disqualification from driving for a period of not less than 12 months, unless there are special reasons to order otherwise.

The two components of the overall sentence generally are not to be regarded as mutually compensatory. Hence, an increase in the fine or custodial sentence should not be taken to mandate the imposition of a reduced period of disqualification than would otherwise have been ordered. A disqualification order combines three sentencing objectives: punishment, protection of the public, and deterrence.³ (See also Menon CJ’s Opening Address, Sentencing Conference 2017 at [25] and [30]-[31])⁴

Due to the limited range of fines from $1,000 to $5,000 for a first time offender, the mandatory disqualification order is in fact the principal punitive element of an offence under section 67(1) of the RTA, and the impact of a disqualification order is likely to be felt much more acutely than any marginal increase in the quantum of the fine.⁵

I am mindful that the offence’s statutory maximum sentence signals the gravity in which Parliament views such offences. A sentencing judge ought therefore to take this into account when determining precisely where the offender’s conduct falls within the entire range of punishment devised by Parliament.⁶

Submissions on Sentence & Mitigation Plea

The Prosecution did not submit on the sentence. In mitigation, the Accused pleaded for leniency and said that he was sorry for committing the offences.

Sentencing Considerations

Drink driving is irresponsible. Bringing this to sharper focus is the fact that drink driving is entirely preventable: taxis, valets, and other chauffeur-driven private hire cars abound.⁷

A motor vehicle in the hands of a drunk driver⁸ is a potentially devastating weapon writ large – and needlessly so.⁹ Drink driving imperils other law-abiding road users.¹⁰ These include drivers, passengers, motorcyclists, pillion, commuters, cyclists, and pedestrians.¹¹ I pause here to note that the number of drink driving cases has increased in recent years from 520 in 2011 to 1340 in 2016.¹²

In sum, drink driving is an example of an offence affecting public safety, which warrants general deterrence.¹³ (See also Wilkinson’s Road Traffic Offences, Sweet & Maxwell (26th Ed, Vol 1, General Editor: Kevin McCormac) at [4.01]-[4.344])¹⁴

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

My judgment is based on the following analytical framework¹⁵:¹⁶

Issue 1: Culpability – Alcohol Level

After surveying the precedents, the High Court in Edwin s/o Suse Nathen set out the appropriate range of sentences for first time offenders under s 67(1)(b) of the RTA:¹⁷

Alcohol Level (µg per 100 ml of breath)	Range of Fines	Range of Disqualification
> 35 – 54	$1,000 – $2,000	12 – 18 months
55 – 69	$2,000 – $3,000	18 – 24 months
70 – 89	$3,000 – $4,000	24 – 36 months
≥ 90	> $ 4,000	36 – 48 months (or longer)

These benchmarks are neutral starting points based on the relative seriousness of the offence considering only the level of alcohol in the offender’s blood or breath and not yet having regard to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.¹⁸ These categories are not to be seen as rigid or impermeable. The precise sentence to be imposed in any individual case would, as it must always do, depend on an overall assessment of all the factual circumstances.

In general, the higher the alcohol level, the greater should be the fine and the longer should be the disqualification period.¹⁹ An offender with a higher alcohol concentration is prima facie in more flagrant violation of the law and is therefore deserving of more serious punishment.²⁰

In the present case, the proportion of alcohol in the Accused’s breath is 70 µg of alcohol in every 100 ml of breath. This is double the prescribed limit of 35 µg of alcohol per 100 ml of breath. According to the police officer, the Accused “reeked of alcohol”.²¹ Our present case falls within the third band of the table in Edwin s/o Suse Nathen (70 to 89 µg of alcohol in every 100 ml of breath), with a disqualification period of 24 – 36 months.

Issue 2: Aggravating²²/ Mitigating Factors

Antecedents. While the Accused’s driving record is not unblemished, little weight was placed on two composition fines.²³

Plea of Guilt. Offenders have had their sentences reduced for timeous and appropriate pleas of guilt.²⁴ The Accused pleaded guilty at the first mention in Court 21. I gave due weight to his plea of guilt²⁵ and cooperation with the authorities.²⁶

Finally, I am mindful of the principle of proportionality in sentencing.²⁷

CONCLUSION

Sentencing is a multi-layered determination of what is just in the circumstances before the court,²⁸ and it is ultimately an exercise in evaluative ethical judgment: Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGCA 37 at [48].

The highly fact-specific nature of traffic offences means that sentencing, being ultimately a matter of discretion, must be approached judiciously with the highest level of attention to the facts and circumstances of each case.²⁹ I endeavoured to evaluate all the relevant considerations in fashioning a condign sentence.

In my judgment, the disqualification period of 22 months is within the range of sentences usually imposed for such offences. In fact, it is slightly below the disqualification period of 24 – 36 months for the third band of the table in Edwin s/o Suse Nathen.³⁰

There are no special reasons in the present case.³¹ For completeness, I note that the fact that an offender requires his driving licence for a livelihood does not constitute a special reason.³²

Summary

In summary, I have considered the facts and circumstances of the present case, including: The extent to which the alcohol concentration in the Accused’s breath exceeds the prescribed limit. The proportion of alcohol in the Accused’s breath – 70 µg of alcohol in every 100 ml of breath – is double the prescribed limit. The present case falls within the third band of the table in Edwin s/o Suse Nathen, with a disqualification period of 24 – 36 months (see [1], and [16] to [19] above). While the Accused’s driving record is not unblemished, little weight was placed on two composition fines (see [20] above). Due weight was given to his plea of guilt and cooperation with the authorities (see [21] above). I am mindful of the principle of proportionality in sentencing (see [22] above). All things considered, the disqualification period of 22 months is within the range of sentences usually imposed for such offences. In fact, it is slightly below the disqualification period of 24 – 36 months for the third band of the table in Edwin s/o Suse Nathen (see [25] above). There are no special reasons in the present case (see [26] above).

In the final analysis, I sentenced the Accused to a fine of $3300 in default 16 days’ imprisonment. A disqualification order and a prohibition order were imposed for all vehicle classes for 22 months with effect from 8 January 2018.

---

1 He sped along the Ayer Rajah Expressway. His speed of 116 kmph exceeded the motor lorry’s speed limit of 70 kmph: SOF at [3].

2 The prescribed limit is 35 µg of alcohol in 100 ml of breath.

3 Edwin s/o Suse Nathen at [13]-[14].

4 The 4 sentencing considerations – retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and prevention – are “mutually reinforcing rationales for punishment” and “the ultimate goal of all of these sentencing objectives is the protection of the public...