Public Prosecutor v BPK

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Woo Bih Li J
• Judgment Date: 04 June 2018
• Neutral Citation: [2018] SGHC 135
• Docket Number: Criminal Case No 10 of 2017
• Date: 04 June 2018
• Published date: 07 June 2018
• Plaintiff Counsel: Bhajanvir Singh and Lim Ai Juan Daphne (Attorney-General's Chambers)
• Defendant Counsel: Rengarajoo s/o Rengasamy Balasamy (B Rengarajoo & Associates) and Tan Heng Khim (Apex Law LLP)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Hearing Date: 23 April 2018,30 April 2018
• Subject Matter: Attempted murder,Criminal Procedure and Sentencing,Sentencing

Woo Bih Li J: Introduction

On 14 February 2018, the Accused was convicted of the Charge which was framed under s 307(1) of the PC for attempted murder causing hurt:

YOU ARE CHARGED …

That you …

on the 20th day of December 2013, at about 8.30 a.m., at the void deck of [the Block], did inflict multiple stab and slash wounds to [the Victim] on her head, neck, chest, abdomen, back and arms with a knife measuring about 33 cm, with such intention and under such circumstances that, if by that act you had caused the death of the [Victim], you would have been guilty of murder, and by such act you did cause hurt to the [Victim], and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 307(1) of the Penal Code (Chapter 224, 2008 Revised Edition).

The background to the offence has been set out in detail in Public Prosecutor v BPK [2018] SGHC 34 (“the Judgment”) and I will not repeat it here. There, issues relating to the Accused’s capacity to form mens rea at the material time, his factual intention at that time, and the partial defence of provocation have also been discussed. For reasons stated in the Judgment, I found that the Prosecution had proven the Charge beyond a reasonable doubt and that the partial defence of provocation was not made out.

On 30 April 2018, having heard the parties’ submissions, I sentenced the Accused to 14 years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane. The term of imprisonment was backdated to 21 December 2013. These are my grounds of decision. For ease of reference, I adopt the abbreviations used in the Judgment.

Submissions on sentence

The Prosecution urged the Court to impose a sentence of at least 14 years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane, based on the following: The paramount sentencing considerations in this case were deterrence, both general and specific, as well as retribution.¹ In particular, general deterrence was needed for offences such as the present which was committed in anger and out of vengeance.² There were several aggravating factors including that: the offence was premeditated;³ the offence was committed in a public place and caused public disquiet;⁴ the assault was particularly vicious and violent;⁵ and the assault had long term implications on the Victim’s well-being.⁶ As a matter of precedent, the present case warranted a heavier sentence than that imposed in Public Prosecutor v Ravindran Annamalai [2013] SGHC 77 (“Ravindran”),⁷ which was to date the only case under s 307(1) of the PC since the amendment of the provision in 2007. In this regard, cases under s 304(a) of the PC for culpable homicide not amounting to murder were not appropriate precedents.⁸ The sentence urged was justifiable based on the Prosecution’s proposed sentencing framework for attempted murder.⁹

The Defence submitted that the appropriate sentence was no more than eight years’ imprisonment¹⁰ with no caning, or alternatively, not more than two strokes of the cane.¹¹ The following main arguments were made: Deterrence, whether general or specific, did not have a role in the present case. Retribution had been met by the fact, amongst other things, that the Accused was going to “pay[] very heavily for the sin he was drawn into”.¹² Mercy should therefore be shown to him. The following factors should be taken into account: The assault arose in the context of a relationship between the Accused and the Victim where the Victim was “essentially having fun at [the Accused’s] emotional expense”.¹³ The location of the offence was fortuitous, and there was no evidence of public alarm or threat to public safety.¹⁴ The Accused was remorseful,¹⁵ had no antecedents, and was of good character.¹⁶ A long custodial term would cause hardship to the Accused’s parents.¹⁷ The likelihood that the Accused would be repatriated upon his release from prison was itself punishment for him.¹⁸ As for the precedents, the Defence relied on Public Prosecutor v Seng Inn Thye [2003] SGHC 88 (“Seng Inn Thye”) which it argued remained relevant even though this was decided before the 2007 amendments to s 307 of the PC.¹⁹ It further argued that Ravindran, which was the precedent cited by the Prosecution, was factually distinguishable from the present case.²⁰

My decision

Section 307(1) of the PC provides for the offence of attempted murder:

Attempt to murder

307.—(1) Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if he by that act caused death he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 15 years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to imprisonment for a term which may extend to 20 years, and shall also be liable to caning or fine or both.

Illustrations

(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued, A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section. (b) A, with intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, throws the child into a river. A has committed the offence defined by this section, although the death of the child does not ensue. (c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section; and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of this section. (d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servants to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

As I observed in the Judgment at [322], s 307(1) of the PC has two limbs. The first limb provides that for attempted murder simpliciter, the accused “shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 15 years, and shall also be liable to fine”. The second limb provides that for attempted murder causing hurt, the accused “shall be liable to either imprisonment for life, or to imprisonment for a term which may extend to 20 years, and shall also be liable to caning or fine or both”. In the present case, the Charge was brought and the Accused was convicted under the second limb of s 307(1) of the PC.

Sentencing considerations

In my judgment, the paramount sentencing considerations in the present case were general deterrence and retribution.

Specific deterrence was not totally irrelevant. The Prosecution submitted that an enhanced sentence accounting for specific deterrence was necessary for the following reasons:²¹ It is necessary to remind the Accused that using violence out of anger and for vengeance would not be condoned. The Accused had admitted at several instances in his police statements that he had wanted to kill the Victim. The Accused’s belief that the Victim owed him fidelity “expose[d] his perverse sense of entitlement”.

I agreed that the first reason was a factor to be taken into account. While it was true that the Accused’s strong feelings had arisen out of his romantic relationship with the Victim, this was not to say that he would never have another romantic relationship or be in a situation where his strong emotions may again be stirred. That said, insofar as the Accused was not a local citizen or permanent resident, he would likely be repatriated at the end of his sentence, and this militated against giving paramount consideration to specific deterrence (see Zhao Zhipeng v Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 879 at [28]). As for the second reason, the Accused’s admissions in his statements were evidential points with little, if any, relevance to sentencing. I also did not agree that the Accused by desiring fidelity from the Victim (whether rightly or wrongly) could be characterised as having a “perverse sense of entitlement”, or that such entitlement would in itself warrant a sentence for specific deterrence. In the broader context, it was not shown that the Accused was recalcitrant or had a higher propensity for reoffending. Thus, specific deterrence, while relevant, was not a paramount sentencing consideration.

General deterrence was necessary to send the important signal that the law would not condone violence as a solution to problems, however personal they may be, and however angry or justified one might feel. The Defence argued that in Singapore it was “not a common phenomenon that someone will murder his or her lover whenever there is love failure”.²² It was not clear that violent crimes arising out of lovers’ disputes were as uncommon as assumed by the Defence. In any event, the focus here was on the law’s expectation of self-restraint even in moments of grave anger and in relation to disputes of a personal nature, and this reminder was relevant to more than just the Accused. As the Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v Leong Soon Kheong [2009] 4 SLR(R) 63 stated (at [61]), “[n]o one is entitled to exact violence in order to seek redress for grievances whether real or imagined.”

Retribution was also important to address the Accused’s highly culpable state of mind at the time of the offence, and to vindicate the Victim’s interests given the extensive injuries that she suffered as a result of the assault, some of which were life-threatening and/or permanent. The Defence asked for mercy on the basis that the Accused would “pay[] with his future, the dishonourable name that he has earned for his family and the hardship that had befallen on his parents and dependants.”²³ I was not persuaded. Retributive justice required that, within the limits of proportionality, the punishment imposed must reflect and befit the gravity of one’s crime. None of...