Prathib s/o M Balan v PP

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: See Kee Oon J
• Judgment Date: 22 November 2017
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 8 of 2017
• Date: 22 November 2017

Prathib s/o M Balan

and

Public Prosecutor

[2017] SGHC 303

See Kee Oon J

Magistrate's Appeal No 8 of 2017

High Court

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Appeal — Stay of execution — Whether court has power to stay disqualification order pending appeal — When disqualification should commence on dismissal of appeal if stayed — Section 42(4) Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) read with s 3(5) Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed)

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Sentencing — Disqualification order — Offender permitting employee to use lorry without insurance — Whether any “special reasons” warranted reversal or reduction of mandatory disqualification — Section 3(3) Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed)

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) The legal position on the circumstances that amounted to “special reasons” was well-settled. Only factors which related to the facts or circumstances of the offence, and not factors which related to the personal circumstances of the offender, were to be considered. That there might be only a few circumstances that would amount to “special reasons” reflected precisely the policy considerations and seriousness of the offence under s 3(1) of the MVA. On the facts, none of the circumstances raised by the appellant amounted to “special reasons” under s 3(3) of the MVA: at [11] to [16].

(2) Section 42(4) of the RTA, read with s 3(5) of the MVA, conferred upon the court the power to stay disqualification ordered under s 3(3) of the MVA pending appeal. First, the precedents demonstrated that the court had such a power under those provisions. Second, such a reading of the MVA together with the RTA was supported by legislative history, which lent support for the view that the legislature intended that the MVA be read closely and harmoniously with the RTA, in particular where the disqualification of a driving licence was concerned. Third, policy considerations would lead logically to the same result. The MVA and the RTA provisions on disqualification should be read and understood to apply together seamlessly throughout the trial and appeal process, so that there would be no gaps which may undermine the administration of justice. The underlying principle was to avoid undue prejudice to an accused person where an earlier order or sentence may be revised. In this connection, the court's power to stay a disqualification order made pursuant to s 3(3) of the MVA pending appeal was buttressed by the general power to stay execution provided under s 383(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed): at [21] to [24], [30].

(3) There was no inconsistency between the relevant provisions in the MVA and RTA if s 42(4) of the RTA was read such that it applied to all disqualification orders made by the court. A plain reading of s 42(4) of the RTA would suggest that it applied to all disqualification orders meted out by a court. The absence of an express provision in the MVA permitting a stay or suspension of disqualification did not preclude the use of s 42(4) of the RTA: at [26] and [27].

(4) If a stay of disqualification had been ordered and the appeal was subsequently dismissed, the only sensible result must be that the disqualification (or any remaining duration of it) commenced from the date the conviction (or sentence) was affirmed on appeal. The disqualification order may be rendered wholly nugatory otherwise, should the appeal take some time to be heard. On the facts, since the appellant had already served three months of his disqualification, he was only required to serve the remaining nine months from the date the appeal was dismissed: at [31] and [32].

Case(s) referred to

Bander Yahya A Alzahrani v PP [2017] SGHC 287 (refd)

Chua Chye Tiong v PP [2003] SGDC 188 (refd)

Chua Chye Tiong v PP [2004] 1 SLR(R) 22; [2004] 1 SLR 22, HC (refd)

Ho Chun Kow v PP [1990] 1 SLR(R) 575; [1990] 3 MLJ 356 (distd)

Knowler v Rennison [1947] 1 KB 488 (refd)

M V Balakrishnan v PP [1998] 2 SLR(R) 846; [1998] 3 SLR 586 (refd)

Muhammad Faizal bin Rahim v PP [2012] 1 SLR 116 (folld)

PP v Aw Yick Hong [2014] SGDC 275 (refd)

PP v Chen Horng Yeh David [2007] SGDC 326 (refd)

PP v Chia Hong Quan [2015] SGDC 33 (refd)

PP v Edmund Wang Choon Teck [2009] SGDC 178 (refd)

PP v Ho Soo Hiam [2015] SGDC 18 (refd)

PP v Mohamed Fuad bin Abdul Samad [2014] SGDC 178 (refd)

PP v Muhammad Haidhir bin Raub [2016] SGDC 19 (refd)

PP v Viswamoorthy s/o Ramanthan [2009] SGDC 243 (refd)

PP v Xu Feng Jia [2016] SGDC 160 (refd)

Rajendar Prasad Rai v PP [2017] 5 SLR 796 (refd)

Siti Hajar bte Abdullah v PP [2006] 2 SLR(R) 248; [2006] 2 SLR 248 (refd)

Sivakumar s/o Rajoo v PP [2002] 1 SLR(R) 265; [2002] 2 SLR 73 (refd)

Stewart Ashley James v PP [1996] 3 SLR(R) 106; [1996] 3 SLR 426 (refd)

Toh Yong Soon v PP [2011] 3 SLR 147 (refd)

Facts

The appellant was convicted after claiming trial to a charge under s 3(1) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed) (“the MVA”). He was found guilty of permitting his employee to use a lorry without an insurance policy in force, and was fined and disqualified from driving all classes of vehicles for 12 months. The appellant appealed against only the disqualification order.

The primary issue in this appeal was thus whether or not the disqualification order should be upheld, ie, whether there were any circumstances which amounted to “special reasons” under s 3(3) of the MVA for the court to order otherwise.

In the course of proceedings, a novel point of law also arose as to whether the court had the power to stay disqualification ordered under the MVA pending appeal. The relevant statutory provisions, in addition to ss 3(1) and 3(3) of the MVA, were s 3(5) of the MVA and s 42(4) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) (“the RTA”). Section 3(5) of the MVA provided that a person disqualified under s 3 of the MVA shall be deemed to be disqualified for the purposes of Pt II of the RTA, whereas s 42(4) of the RTA (which is within Pt II of the RTA) provided that the court had the power to stay a disqualification order pending appeal.

Legislation referred to

Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) s 383(1) (consd); s 4

Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 1985 Rev Ed) s 3(2)

Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed) ss 3, 3(1), 3(3), 3(5) (consd); s 3(2)

Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Ordinance 1960 (No 1 of 1960)

Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) ss 379A(2), 411(2)(b), 414(2)(b)

Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) s 42(4) (consd); ss 35, 42(1), 42(3), 68(1)

Road Traffic Act 1930 (c 43) (UK) ss 6(2), 35(1), 35(2) (consd)

Dhanwant Singh (SK Kumar Law Practice LLP) for the appellant;

Lee Zu Zhao (Attorney-General's Chambers) for the respondent.

22 November 2017

See Kee Oon J:

Introduction

1 The appellant was convicted after having claimed trial to one charge under s 3 of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed) (“the MVA”) and another under s 35 of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) (“the RTA”). He was found guilty of permitting his employee to use a motor lorry (“the lorry”) without an insurance policy in force in relation to his employee's use of the lorry, and of permitting him to drive the lorry when he did not have the requisite driving licence. For the MVA charge, he was fined $700 and disqualified from driving all classes of vehicles for 12 months. For the RTA charge, he was fined $800. The total sentence was a fine of $1,500 (in default 15 days' imprisonment) and disqualification from holding or obtaining a driving licence for all classes of vehicles for 12 months, with effect from 16 May 2017, the date of conviction.

2 The appellant appealed against the order of disqualification in respect of the MVA charge. The district judge's findings and reasons for her decision are set out in her grounds of decision in PP v Prathib s/o M Balan[2017] SGDC 161 (“the GD”). After hearing the parties' submissions on 27 September 2017, I dismissed the appeal and I now set out the grounds for my decision.

The charge

3 The MVA charge in question was as follows:

You … are charged that you, on 09.10.2013 at about 03.22 pm at Bukit Ho Swee Crescent, being the Sole-Proprietor of Falcon Logistics SVCS, the registered owner of motor lorry No. YM 7922 D, did permit one Krishnan S/O Shanmugam to use the said vehicle when there was not in force in relation to the use of the said vehicle such a policy of insurance in respect of third party risks as complies with the requirement of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risks and Compensation) Act, Chapter 189 and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 3(1) and punishable under Section 3(2) of the said Act, Chapter 189.

The district judge's decision

4 Having duly considered the evidence adduced at trial, the district judge was satisfied that the appellant had permitted his employee to drive the lorry. She rejected the appellant's defence that he had simply given strict instructions to all his employees not to drive (at [10] of the GD). In addition, the district judge found that there were no facts peculiar to the offence which would have constituted “special reasons” under the...