PP v Ng Guan Hup

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 24 July 2009
• Date: 24 July 2009
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 132 of 2008
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Public Prosecutor

Plaintiff

and

Ng Guan Hup

Defendant

[2009] SGHC 170

Lee Seiu Kin J

Magistrate's Appeal No 132 of 2008

High Court

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing–Charge–Withdrawal–Accused pleading guilty to charge–District judge convicting accused and adjourning trial for sentencing–Whether Prosecution may exercise discretion not to further prosecute accused–Whether judge should exercise discretion to grant a discharge amounting to acquittal–Criminal Procedure and Sentencing–Judgment–Accused pleading guilty to charge–District judge convicting accused and adjourning trial for sentencing–Prosecution attempting to not prosecute accused further–Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) allowing for this only “before judgment has been delivered”–Whether “judgment” included pronouncement of sentence–Section 184 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed)

The accused was charged in the District Court with mischief under s 425 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), with two other charges to be taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. The charges stated that the accused had administered a drug to three racehorses, causing them to underperform during a race later. He pleaded guilty, admitted to the statement of facts and was duly convicted of the charge. After hearing the mitigation plea, the district judge adjourned the trial for sentencing. However, on the adjourned date, the Prosecution informed the court that fresh evidence had been uncovered which cast doubt on the truthfulness of the accused's plea of guilt. The Prosecution applied for the accused to be given a discharge not amounting to an acquittal but the district judge refused the application. Against that decision the Prosecution appealed.

Held, allowing the appeal:

(1) The term “judgment” was capable of bearing different meanings in different parts of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (“CPC”). The adoption of one singular definition of “judgment” would lead to absurdity in the interpretation of certain provisions in the CPC: at [32].

(2) The word “judgment” in s 184 (1) of the CPC included the pronouncement of sentence where there was a conviction and therefore the power of the Prosecution under this provision may be exercised at any time before the accused person was sentenced. The Prosecution's appeal was therefore allowed and the accused was discharged from and of the three charges concerned: at [48].

(3) The discretion of the court to grant a discharge amounting to an acquittal was an unfettered one. The underlying theme in the exercise of that discretion was that it was a fine balance between the public interest in ensuring that criminal acts were punished and fairness to the accused: at [51] and [58].

(4) The circumstances of the present case justified granting the Prosecution's application for a discharge not amounting to an acquittal. First, the new evidence suggested that it was right and proper for the Prosecution to make the present application. The Prosecution had also stated that it would proceed with appropriate charges against the accused once it had ascertained the involvement of the accused. Second, the accused, by pleading guilty to the charge, appeared to have some role, still unascertained, in the whole affair. In any case, unless there was likely to be an indeterminate delay, the respondent would not suffer great prejudice in having his case delayed pending further investigations. Third, there were often high pecuniary stakes associated with horse racing and therefore a strong public interest in getting to the root of the matter and ensuring that the guilty were appropriately punished. Fourth, there were reasons to believe that there would not be an indeterminate delay in the resolution of the case: at [62] to [66].

Arjan Singh v PP [1993] 1 SLR (R) 542; [1993] 2 SLR 271 (refd)

Cheng Siah Johnson v PP [2002] 1 SLR (R) 839; [2002] 2 SLR 481 (refd)

Forward Food Management Pte Ltd v PP [2002] 1 SLR (R) 443; [2002] 2 SLR 40 (refd)

Ganesun s/o Kannan v PP [1996] 3 SLR (R) 125; [1996] 3 SLR 560 (refd)

Goh Cheng Chuan v PP [1990] 1 SLR (R) 660; [1990] SLR 671 (refd)

K Abdul Rasheed v PP [1985-1986] SLR (R) 1; [1984-1985] SLR 561 (refd)

Koh Thian Huat v PP [2002] 2 SLR (R) 113; [2002] 3 SLR 28 (refd)

Lim Teck Leng Roland v PP [2001] 2 SLR (R) 859; [2001] 4 SLR 61 (refd)

Loh Siang Piow v PP [1998] 1 SLR (R) 347; [1998] 2 SLR 384 (refd)

Marzuki Bin Mokhtar v PP [1981] 2 MLJ 155 (refd)

PP v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR (R) 183; [2007] 4 SLR 183 (refd)

PP v Oh Hu Sung [2003] 4 SLR (R) 541; [2003] 4 SLR 541 (refd)

Ranjit Kaur d/o Awthar Singh v PP [1999] 1 SLR (R) 43; [1999] 1 SLR 836 (refd)

TS Video and Laser Pte Ltd v Lim Chee Yong [2001] 3 SLR (R) 639; [2002] 1 SLR 68 (refd)

Wong Hong Toy v PP [1987] SLR (R) 213; [1994] 2 SLR 396 (refd)

Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed)s 184 (consd);ss 134,163,184 (2), 212,215, 216,217,217 (1),217 (2),218, 219,220, 241,243, 247,247 (1),251, 252,258, 259,261, 263,314, 318,396, 400

Criminal Procedure Code (Ordinance 13 of 1955)s 175

Criminal Procedure Code (Ordinance X of 1910) (SS) s 182

Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 21, 1936 Rev Ed) (SS)s 187

Indian Act XVI1852 (SS)

Ordinance V of1870 (SS)

Ordinance VI of1873 (SS)

Penal Code (Cap 224,2008 Rev Ed)ss 425, 426

Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance (Ordinance 13 of 1947) (MU)s 254

Criminal Procedure Code (Act 593) (M'sia)s 254

Criminal Procedure Code (FMSCap 6)s 307 (i)

Criminal Procedure Code1903 (FMS)s 214

Criminal Procedure Code1926 (FMS)s 214 (i)

Lau Wing Yum and Lee Jwee Nguan (Attorney-General's Chambers) for the appellant

Harold Seet and Raymond Lim (Harold Seet & Indra Raj) for the respondent.

Judgment reserved.

Lee Seiu Kin J

Introduction

1 The respondent was charged in the district court with mischief under s 425 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“the Penal Code”). He pleaded guilty to the charge, admitted to the statement of facts and was duly convicted of the charge. He agreed for two other charges of mischief to be taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing. After hearing the mitigation plea, the district judge adjourned the trial to 15 April 2008 for sentencing. However on the adjourned date, the Prosecution informed the court that fresh evidence had been uncovered which cast doubt on the truthfulness of the respondent's admissions and plea of guilt. The Prosecution applied under s 184 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the CPC”) for the respondent to be given a discharge not amounting to an acquittal on the three charges. The district judge refused the application and the Prosecution appealed before me against the refusal.

Background

2 The offence of mischief under s 425 is punishable under s 426 of the Penal Code. Sections 425 and 426 provide as follows:

Mischief

425. Whoever, with intent to cause, or knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to the public or any person, causes the destruction of any property, or any such change in any property, or in the situation thereof, as destroys or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it injuriously, commits “mischief”.

…

Punishment for committing mischief

426. Whoever commits mischief shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.

3 The three charges stated that sometime in July 2007, at the Singapore Turf Club, the respondent had used a syringe to administer a drug, 2– (1–hydroxyethyl)-promazine-sulphoxide (“the banned substance”), to three racehorses belonging to one Charles Leck (“Charles”). As a result of the injections, the horses underperformed during a race on 20 July 2007.

4 On 8 April 2008, before the district judge, the respondent pleaded guilty to the charge and admitted to the statement of facts without qualification. He was duly convicted of mischief under s 425 of the Penal Code. The respondent also admitted and consented to the court taking into consideration the other two charges for the purpose of sentencing.

5 According to the statement of facts, the respondent was working as a stable hand at the Singapore Turf Club. On 12 September 2007, he was detained in the vicinity of the Singapore Turf Club and found in possession of two unused syringes, which he had no authority to bring onto the premises. In his locker, a vial was found. The respondent admitted to having administered the banned substance, via a syringe, to a racehorse named “Arabian Star” sometime in July 2007 at 9am, as he wanted it to underperform during a race on 20 July 2007. This racehorse was under the charge of Charles, a racehorse trainer. A letter from the Malayan Racing Association to Charles, dated 7 August 2007, states that the racehorses, “Arabian Star”, “Kingtrap” and “Justohelp”, tested positive for the banned substance for races on 20 July 2007. During the mitigation submissions, it was also revealed that Charles was the respondent's nephew.

6 On 15 April 2008, before the district judge could pronounce sentence, the Prosecution informed him that it had uncovered evidence which cast doubt on the truthfulness of the respondent's admissions and plea of guilt, and required further investigation. In particular, the Prosecution informed the district judge that the closed-circuit television (“CCTV”) recording disclosed that the respondent had not entered the stables at the material time, contrary to his admission. Moreover, the vial which the respondent claimed to have contained the banned substance used to inject the three horses was analysed and found not to contain the said substance. The Prosecution proceeded to apply under s 184 of the CPC for the respondent to be given a discharge not amounting to an acquittal on the three charges. Counsel for the respondent objected to the application and, after hearing the submissions...