Deputy Registrar Kim Bum Soo:
Mr Paul Jeyasingam Edwards (“the Tenant”) has appeared before eleven different judicial officers in approximately fifteen different applications brought in four different suits/writs over the span of two years (see [37]). Though these were strictly speaking different proceedings, they were all episodes of the same saga: he had been staying on Ms Loke Wei Sue’s (“the Landlord”) property (“the Property”) without paying rent. Each of these proceedings tell the same story of a man convinced of his entitlement to stay on a property that he no longer legally owns, based on an alleged agreement that he cannot prove. And so, the Tenant has at every instance (save on one occasion), been refused stays of proceedings, “setting aside” applications, and “injunctions” as he attempted to remain on the property.
DC/DC 146/2022 (“DC 146”) is one such instalment of this saga. In this suit, the Tenant has gone on the offensive. In DC 146, he sues the Landlord for, among other things, breach of an alleged agreement to let him stay on the Property indefinitely at a fix rental rate. In response, the Landlord has commenced DC/SUM 853/2022 (“SUM 853”) to strike out the Tenant’s action. I grant the orders sought in SUM 853 and the reasons for my decision are as follows.
A preliminary jurisdictional point
Two jurisdictions form the potential basis for any striking out application – one stems from the provisions in O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of Court 2014 (“ROC 2014”) and the other, flows from the inherent jurisdiction of the Court: The “Bunga Melati 5” [2012] 4 SLR 546; [2012] SGCA 46 (“Bunga Melati 5”) at [29] and [33]; Singapore Civil Procedure 2021 (Cavinder Bull S.C. gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2021) at para 18/19/1 (“White Book”). Unfortunately, it was unclear what precisely was the jurisdictional basis for this application. All the summons stated was that this was an application for orders “that [the Tenant’s] action herein be struck out”.
It behoves an applicant to specify which of these jurisdictions he/she relies on since there are at least two serious differences between the two jurisdictions: First, the applicable tests. An application under ROC 2014 would be based on one or more of the four grounds stated in O. 18 r. 19(1). The tests for each, though sometimes involving similar factors, are slightly different and “each limb, conceptually speaking, serves a specific purpose apropos the court’s power to summarily dismiss a party’s claim”: Bunga Melati 5 at [31]. A full exposition of the relevant tests for each of these grounds/limbs was helpfully consolidated in Tan Swee Wan and another v Lian Tian Yong Johnny [2016] SGHC 206 at [39] (“Tan Swee Wan”). In contrast, there is only one test governing the inherent jurisdiction of the court to strike out a party’s claim – whether an action is plainly or obviously unsustainable: Bunga Melati 5 at [33]. Second, the mode of proof. For striking out applications under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) ROC 2014 (for pleadings that “disclose no reasonable cause of action or defence”) no evidence is admissible on that application: O. 18 r. 19(2) ROC 2014. In contrast, those pursued under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction may be supported with affidavit evidence: Bank of China Ltd, Singapore Branch v BP Singapore Pte Ltd and others [2021] 5 SLR 738; [2021] SGHC 120 at [21]; White Book at para 18/19/5.
Since there was no mention of any invocation of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction in the supporting affidavit, the submissions filed, or the summons itself, I proceeded on the basis that this was an application brought under ROC 2014. Specifically, there were references in the affidavit which tracked the language used in O. 18 r. 19(1) ROC 2014 and the matters discussed therein were reasonably referrable to the various grounds stated in O. 18 r. 19(1) ROC 2014. Accordingly, I concluded that the application was brought on the grounds of O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), O. 18 r. 19(1)(b), and O. 18 r. 19(1)(d).
Issues to be determined
This being an application to strike out the Tenant’s action, the natural starting point is the Tenant’s Statement of Claim (“SOC”). This can be distilled into three broad claims by the Tenant: The Tenant was the previous owner of the Property. When it was sold to the Landlord’s father, it was verbally agreed that the Tenant could reside on the property indefinitely by paying a fixed rent at $3,800 per month and that the Tenant could repurchase the Property at an agreed price, at a time of his choosing (“the Verbal Agreement”). The Landlord’s attempts to repossess the property and claim rental arrears are allegedly breaches of those terms (“the Conditional Sale Claim”). There was “wilful mispresent[ation]” of the Tenant’s text messages in a bid to “illegally terminate the condition of sale, evict [him] from the Property and get higher rentals renting the Property to others.” (“the Misrepresentation Claim”). The Landlord’s negligence in DC/OSS 94/2021 and DC/DC 1662/2021 has allegedly cost the Tenant money and loss of productivity. (“the Negligence Claim”).
As such, each of these claims ought to be analysed in the following fashion: Whether each of the claims disclosed a reasonable cause of action, per O.18 r. 19(1)(a) ROC 2014; Whether any of the claims were frivolous or vexatious, per O. 18 r. 19(1)(b) ROC 2014; and Whether any of the claims amounted to an abuse of process of the Court, per O. 18 r. 19(1)(d) ROC 2014.
Issue 1: Reasonable cause of action
The applicable principles
Traditionally, “reasonable causes of action” have been understood as those which have “some chance of success when only the allegations in the pleading are considered”: Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin and others [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649; [1997] SGCA 53. And the metric for whether something has a “chance of success” really depends on the two dimensions of the concept of cause of action. “First, it means the legal basis which entitles the plaintiff to success. Next, it signifies the factual situation which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person.”: Phillip Morris Products Inc. v Power Circle Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [1999] 1 SLR(R) 964.
So understood, the law suggests that a cause of action has no “chance of success” when (a) the cause of action is just not legally recognised and (b) when the facts pleaded do not sufficiently establish any of the legal elements for that cause of action. Needless to say, where (b) is concerned, the issue is not necessarily a matter of proof. The pleaded facts are presumed to be in favour of the claimant (assuming that the defendant is bringing the striking out application): Tan Eng Khiam v Ultra Realty Pte Ltd [1991] 1 SLR(R) 844; [1991] SGHC 62 at [29]. It is really a matter of sufficiency of the pleadings.
The Conditional Sale Claim
What then, is the cause of action in question for the Conditional Sale Claim? It appears to be a simple one – that there was some kind of breach of the Verbal Agreement between the Tenant and the initial purchaser of the Property, allegedly the Landlord’s father. This – a breach of contract – is obviously a legally recognised cause of action. The question then turns to whether the pleaded facts have established the legal elements of that cause of action.
Establishing a breach of contract would, at its core, involve establishing the existence of the agreement and establishing the breach of that agreement. Here, the Tenant has not pleaded any facts supporting the existence of the Verbal Agreement. He has simply asserted its existence in his SOC without more. That betrays a woeful lack of material facts. What are the circumstances in which that agreement arose? What was said between the parties at that time? What are the facts which suggest there was a meeting of the minds, establishing that agreement? None of that was canvassed. It follows that the fundamental factual foundation of this cause of action – the existence of the Verbal Agreement – was absent.
That said, I decline to strike out the Conditional Sale Claim on this basis for one simple reason. This cause of action was only hobbled by defects in the pleadings. It seems to me that the Tenant has plenty to offer and say about the circumstances under which this alleged agreement came into existence. He is unrepresented and is litigating this case without the benefit of any knowledge of the intricacies of civil procedure. He ought to be given a chance to state those particulars and if necessary, to amend his SOC. It would be disproportionate to strike out this case just on the basis of a failure to plead. Indeed, the whole function of pleadings is to bring notice of the case to meet. The Tenant has alluded to this alleged Verbal Agreement numerous times (most recently in Loke Wei Sue v Paul Jeyasingham Edwards [2022] SGDC 48). The Landlord cannot possibly be prejudiced or taken by surprise if the Tenant makes an application to amend either his SOC in DC 146 or more appropriately, as I will explain later, his defence in DC/DC 1662/2021.
I understand that the Landlord has also taken issue with the Tenant’s locus standi for bringing suit. The Landlord says that even if the Verbal Agreement existed, it would have been between the Property’s purchaser and the two joint-owners of the Property at that time (The Tenant and his wife). Accordingly, if a breach of agreement is being claimed, it should have been brought in the name of both the Tenant and his wife as joint vendors of the Property (rather than the Tenant alone).
In my view, issues of standing are not relevant to the question of whether there is a reasonable cause of action. This provision – O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) ROC 2014 – deals solely with the evaluation of the pleadings and the pleadings alone. I should not have to refer to the sales agreement or any other extrinsic evidence to...
