Nim Minimaart v MCST Plan No 1079

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 11 October 2013
• Date: 11 October 2013
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 228 of 2013
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)

Nim Minimaart (suing as a firm)

Plaintiff

and

Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 1079 and others

Defendant

[2013] SGCA 54

Sundaresh Menon CJ

,

Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA

and

V K Rajah JA

Originating Summons No 228 of 2013

Court of Appeal

Civil Procedure—Appeals—Leave—Whether leave was needed to appeal High Court's decision in District Court appeal—Whether one could claim higher value of subject matter in Court of Appeal since time of trial at district court

Civil Procedure—Extension of time—Whether High Court's refusal to grant extension of time to file leave application was appealable—Whether Court of Appeal could grant extension of time where High Court had already made refusal to do so

Civil Procedure—Jurisdiction—Whether Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to manage timelines on matter which had been statutorily prescribed to be within High Court's exclusive remit

The plaintiff operated a mini supermarket on the premises of a condominium, Nim Gardens. The first defendant (‘the MCST’) was the management corporation of the condominium and the other defendants were the council members of that management corporation at the material time. The plaintiff and the MCST had entered into a licence agreement which contained a clause that purportedly granted the plaintiff an extension of the contract for another year, subject to the revision of rental, in consideration of a monthly payment of $500.00 during the two years that the agreement ran from. The meaning and effect of this clause was heavily contested between the parties as the two-year term came to an end and the MCST eventually offered to renew the contract on terms that were unacceptable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff commenced proceedings alleging a breach of the renewal obligation by the MCST.

The dispute was tried before a district judge in 2009, but it concluded with a settlement agreement. However, the plaintiff subsequently alleged that improper pressure had been exerted by the district judge in trying to get parties to come to a settlement. The plaintiff pursued an appeal to the High Court, which allowed the appeal and ordered a retrial before another district judge. An eight-day retrial was conducted before another district judge, who eventually dismissed the plaintiff's entire claim. The plaintiff's appeal against this dismissal was heard by the High Court, which dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff's request for further arguments was rejected by the High Court. Being out of time to file an application for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of its claim, the plaintiff applied to the High Court for an extension of time to make an application for leave to appeal. This was refused by the High Court. The plaintiff then tried to appeal against this rejection for an extension of time, but its notice of appeal was rejected by the Registry as it was not accompanied by a certificate of security for costs.

The present originating summons was filed by the plaintiff purporting to seek guidance from the Court of Appeal as to whether leave was required for the plaintiff to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of its appeal; to the extent it was held that this was necessary, the plaintiff prayed, inter alia, for an extension of time to file an application for leave before the High Court.

Held, dismissing the claim:

(1) The plaintiff did require leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of its appeal as the subject matter of the dispute amounted to less than $250,000. It was not for the plaintiff, who started the action in the District Court, to say that its claim should be regarded as one for a higher sum for the purposes of securing a right to appeal: at [21] to [25] .

(2) The purpose of the 2010 amendments to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (‘the SCJA’) was to limit and regulate the scope of appeals against interlocutory orders and certain final orders: at [27] .

(3) It would not have been open to the plaintiff to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the High Court's refusal to grant an extension of time to apply for such leave, notwithstanding that such a decision was not explicitly listed as a non-appealable order under the Fourth Schedule of the SCJA, because s 34 (2) (a) of the SCJA provided that ‘no appeal shall be brought’ without leave of the High Court ‘where the amount in dispute ... does not exceed $250,000’, which clearly was the case here: at [28] to [30] .

(4) It would be incongruous if the plaintiff were able to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court refusing the extension of time to file its leave application when it could not have brought an appeal without leave in relation to the substantive merits. Moreover, by this stage, the plaintiff already had two bites at the cherry: one at the District Court at trial and one in the High Court on appeal: at [31] .

(5) The only jurisdictional peg advanced by the plaintiff for its attempt to ask this court to decide afresh on the extension of time issue was O 3 r 4 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed). However, it would be odd if the plaintiff could bypass the need for leave to appeal against the refusal of the extension by the High Court by purporting to bring its application under O 3 r 4 instead. Moreover, it was the High Court that had the power to extend the time for the plaintiff to make a leave application but which power it had refuse to exercise in this case. Order 3 r 4 did not stretch so far as to allow the Court of Appeal to manage the timelines in relation to a matter that was entirely within the High Court's jurisdiction, as this leave application was, as opposed to enabling the Court of Appeal to extend time in relation to matters that were before itself: at [35] to [37] .

Blenwel Agencies Pte Ltd v Tan Lee King [2008] 2 SLR (R) 529; [2008] 2 SLR 529 (refd)

Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 (refd)

Nim Minimaart v MCST Plan No 1079 [2010] 2 SLR 1 (refd)

Open Net Pte Ltd v Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013] 2 SLR 880 (refd)

Virtual Map (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Singapore Land Authority [2009] 2 SLR (R) 558; [2009] 2 SLR 558 (refd)

Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) O 3 r 4 (consd) ;O 3 r 4 (4) , O 56 r 3, O 57 r 17, O 57 r 20

Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) ss 11 (4) , 22, 23

Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) ss 29 A, 34 (2) (a) (consd) ;ss 34, 34 (1) (a) , 34 (1) (d) , 34 (1) (e) , 34 (2) , 34 (2) (b) , 34 (2) (c) , 34 (2) (d) , 34 (2) (e) , 34 (2 A) , s 34 (2 B) , s 34 (3) , Fourth Schedule

Plaintiff in person through Sambasivam s/o Kunju

Teh Ee-Von (Infinitus Law Corporation) for the defendants.

Sundaresh Menon CJ

(delivering the grounds of decision of the court):

1 This matter came before us having followed a convoluted and tortuous course of litigation through various tiers of our courts over a period of more than five years. There have been many appearances before different judges and registrars. The originating summons before us concerned a number of points in relation to an appeal that the plaintiff had brought before a judicial commissioner of the High Court (‘the JC’), seeking to reverse the decision of a district judge. We dismissed the application on the ground that we had no jurisdiction to entertain it. The plaintiff then requested us to hear further arguments. Having considered its request, we remained of the view that we had originally formed and so declined it. However, we decided we would give our grounds in order to clarify any perceived ambiguity in the law and also in the hope that this might help put an end to this litigation.

Facts

Parties to the dispute

2 Nim Minimaart (‘the Plaintiff’) is a partnership that had operated a mini-supermarket store in a condominium known as Nim Gardens (‘the Development’). The Plaintiff is represented in this action, as it was in the proceedings below, by Mr Sambasivam s/o Kunju (‘Mr Sambasivam’), a partner of the Plaintiff. Although Mr Sambasivam is not a lawyer, it appeared from his submissions and his letters that he either had some knowledge, albeit incomplete, about civil procedure and about the legal issues generally, or that he was receiving advice and assistance from a sympathetic lawyer working behind the scenes.

3 The Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 1079 (‘the MCST’) is the management corporation of the Development. The other defendants were the council members of the MCST at the material time (collectively, ‘the Defendants’).

Background facts

4 On 15 January 2006, the Plaintiff and the MCST entered into a licence agreement. The Plaintiff was to take some premises at the Development for its business for a period of two years. The crucial clause in the licence agreement for the purposes of the entire proceedings is cl 3 (d) which reads as follows:

1. 3 In consideration of the payment by the Licensee monthly and proportionately for any part of a month for the duration of the Licence, a monthly fee of Dollars Five Hundred Only ($500.00) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Licence Fee') payable on the first day of each month, the Management Corporation hereby grants to the Licensee the Licence:

...

(d) to extend the contract for another year(15^thJanuary 2008 to 14^thJanuary 2009) subject to revision of rental.

[emphasis added]

5 At the end of the initial term of two years, the Plaintiff was keen to obtain an extension but was not ultimately successful. Accordingly, on 21 April 2008, the Plaintiff commenced proceedings against the Defendants, by District Court Suit No 1263 of 2008, for an alleged breach of the licence agreement by failing to...