Ng Chee Wee v Tan Chin Seng
Judge | Vinodh Coomaraswamy JC |
Judgment Date | 28 February 2013 |
Neutral Citation | [2013] SGHC 54 |
Citation | [2013] SGHC 54 |
Court | High Court (Singapore) |
Published date | 11 March 2013 |
Docket Number | Suit No 302 of 2004 (Registrar’s Appeal No 320, 323 and 333 of 2012) |
Plaintiff Counsel | N Srinivasan (Hoh Law Corporation) |
Defendant Counsel | Low Tiang Hock (Low & Co) |
Subject Matter | Damages,Assessment |
Hearing Date | 30 August 2012,31 August 2012 |
On 31 July 2012, the Assistant Registrar (“the AR”) assessed damages in this action. He assessed the defendant’s loss and damage at $956,599.03. That comprised special damages of $301,048.91 and general damages of $655,550.12. The defendant had been adjudged liable for 75% of the plaintiff’s loss and damage. So the AR ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $717,449.27 – being 75% of the loss and damage assessed – plus interest and costs.
On 3 August 2012, the Defendant appealed against the whole of the AR’s order by way of RA 320 of 2012. On 7 August 2012, the plaintiff cross-appealed against parts of the AR’s order by way of RA 323 of 2012. On 10 August 2012, the plaintiff filed a second appeal by way of RA 333 of 2012 covering the same ground as RA 323 but going further by including a specific challenge on the AR’s award of interest.
All three appeals came up for hearing before me on 30 August 2012. At the outset, counsel for the plaintiff sought leave to withdraw RA 323 of 2012 with no order as to costs because it had been superseded by RA 333 of 2012. I granted leave by consent. I therefore need say no more about RA 323 of 2012.
I considered both parties’ oral and written submissions, the authorities cited and the evidential record. On 31 August 2012, I dismissed the defendant’s appeal in RA 320 of 2012 and allowed in part the plaintiff’s appeal in RA 333 of 2012. I allowed the plaintiff’s appeal in part on a point more of arithmetic than of principle. Both parties appealed against my decision. I now set out my reasons.
Background to the AppealsOn 29 June 2003, a lorry driven by the defendant collided into a motorcycle ridden by the plaintiff. As a result of that collision, the plaintiff sustained several injuries, including a degloving injury to his right foot, right frontotemporal subdural haemorrhage and a closed facture to his neck.
On 16 April 2004, the plaintiff commenced these proceedings to secure compensation for his injuries from the defendant. On 4 October 2004, the plaintiff obtained interlocutory judgment against the defendant by which the defendant was adjudicated liable for 75% of the plaintiff’s damage, with the damages to be assessed.
The Assistant Registrar’s decisionThe AR assessed the special damages amounting to $301,048.91 as follows:
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The AR assessed the general damages amounting to $655,550.12 as follows:
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The AR also awarded the Plaintiff interest at:
The AR also ordered costs to the plaintiff fixed at $45,000 including GST but excluding disbursements, which were to be agreed or taxed.
This Court’s DecisionAfter considering the parties’ submissions and the evidential record, I was not inclined to vary the AR’s decision either way save for a minor arithmetical point relating to the multiplicand used in the AR’s award for pre-trial and future loss of earnings. I shall deal with this point in more detail when I discuss these heads of damage below.
I shall now discuss the various heads of damages which were awarded in sequence, starting with special damages and then moving on to general damages.
Special damages Pre-trial medical expenses The AR awarded the plaintiff the sum of $118,554.39 for pre-trial medical expenses. This was based on the evidence presented of his medical bills. The defendant did not dispute the accuracy of these sums. Instead, the defendant raised a point of principle: the defendant contended that this large sum was incurred as a result of the plaintiff’s decision to seek medical treatment at a private hospital, namely, Raffles Hospital (“Raffles”), rather than at a restructured hospital. In support of his submission that medical care at a private hospital was not recoverable in principle, counsel for the defendant referred me to Harvey McGregor,
The plaintiff is entitled to damages for the medical expenses reasonably incurred by him as a result of the injury… The only condition is that they should be reasonable, a condition implied in the provision of section 2(4) of the
Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 [(UK)] stating, in its current form, that in personal injury claims “there shall be disregarded, in determining the reasonableness of any expenses, the possibility of avoiding those expenses or part of them by taking advantage of facilities available under the National Health Service Act 1977”.
Counsel for the defendant further relied on the decision of the House of Lords in
Unfortunately, counsel for the defendant was unable to point me to any local authority to support his submission. On the contrary, this argument was rejected by the High Court in
This holding was not disturbed on appeal to the Court of Appeal (seeThis suggests that a person gasping for air should go around shopping for the cheapest oxygen tank and that cannot be right. What the plaintiff (or the people making the decision for her then) decided in the very trying days before the transplant was completely reasonable.
Mr Low was also unable to point to any evidence showing that it was unreasonable for the plaintiff to have sought treatment from Raffles after sustaining the injuries he did as a result of the accident. Quite the contrary: I found the plaintiff’s reason for seeking treatment from Raffles rather than NUH entirely reasonable. After the accident, the plaintiff was first treated in NUH where he underwent a left
Although this is no criticism of NUH, the plaintiff’s experience with NUH involved several unsuccessful treatments leaving him in great pain and discomfort and cost the plaintiff a lot of time and money. By contrast, when the plaintiff was referred to Raffles, his treatment went well and looked promising. Further, the doctors at Raffles were of the view that the plaintiff’s foot could be salvaged, in contrast with the doctors at the NUH who recommended an amputation.
In the circumstances, I found it entirely reasonable for the plaintiff to have sought treatment from Raffles instead of NUH after the initial phase of treatment. Therefore, I affirmed the AR’s award of $118,554.39 for pre-trial medical expenses.
Pre-trial transport expensesThe AR awarded...
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