Nadasan Chandra Secharan v Public Prosecutor

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeKarthigesu JA
Judgment Date13 January 1997
Neutral Citation[1997] SGCA 3
Docket NumberCriminal Appeal No 18 of 1996
Date13 January 1997
Published date19 September 2003
Year1997
Plaintiff CounselSubhas Anandan (MPD Nair & Co) and Amolat Singh (Amolat & Partners)
Citation[1997] SGCA 3
Defendant CounselOng Hian Sun (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
CourtCourt of Appeal (Singapore)
Subject MatterEvidence,Cumulative effect,Whether accused's guilt proved beyond reasonable doubt,Proof of evidence,Weight of evidence,Circumstantial evidence

(delivering the judgment of the court)

The charge

The appellant was charged and convicted in the High Court of having committed the offence of murder on 17 April 1995 between 12pm and 3pm at a vacant plot of land off Jalan Ulu Sembawang, Singapore by causing the death of Ramipiram Kannickaisparry (the deceased).


He is now appealing against his conviction before us.


The facts

The appellant was a mechanic with Seletar Country Club (the club) at the time of the offence.
The deceased was a production operator with Apple Computer. They were distant relatives by marriage.

It transpired that the appellant and the deceased were having an affair five or six years before the murder.
The deceased`s family found out about this and they confronted the appellant. There was no more contact between the parties for some time. But, after about five or six months, they resumed their relationship.

According to Parvathi d/o Somu (Parvathi) who is the telephone operator at the club, an Indian female caller used to make frequent telephone calls to the club in the morning asking for the appellant between the period of November 1994 and February 1995.
These calls, however, stopped in mid February 1995, only to resume in mid March 1995. Thereafter, there were no more calls until the morning of 17 April 1995. The appellant confirmed that the female caller who called him in November 1994 was the deceased.

On 17 April 1995, which was a Monday, there were two pager calls at 6.58am and 7.01am for the appellant made from the home of the deceased`s younger sister, Katsuri Bai d/o Ramapiram (Katsuri).
The deceased, who was separated from her husband in 1991, was living with Katsuri at that time. The appellant claimed he did not return the pager calls because he was unaware of them. He said that he had left his pager in the locker at the club and had switched off the memory mode which recorded the pager messages.

There was also a telephone call for the appellant at about 7.40am at the club.
Parvathi stated in her police statement that it was the voice of the usual female caller which she recognised from the previous telephone calls. This call was connected to the appellant`s extension, but he denied speaking to the deceased then.

The deceased apparently telephoned the appellant again during her tea-break at the club at about 9.20am that morning.
This telephone call was received by the appellant`s colleague, Karamjeet Singh, who called for the appellant. The appellant testified that no mention was made about the earlier pager calls during his conversation with the deceased who said she would call again at about noon. But, this latter call was never made. The appellant then left for lunch at about 12.15pm. He did not bother to contact the deceased because he claimed that there were many occasions that she said she would call but did not, so he did not find this unusual.

The deceased was last seen alive at about 12.15pm on 17 April 1995 at Apple Computer by one Anihiyati bte Abdul Majid who was her colleague.
Her body was first spotted by a jogger, one Soh Jin Chwee, at about 6pm the same evening. The injuries inflicted upon her indicated that she was murdered. There were 13 stab wounds to the face and head of the deceased, bruises and abrasions caused by blunt force trauma, multiple fractures in the jaw, ribs, right humerous and the pelvic region. There appeared to be no defensive injuries. The deceased died a painful death. The estimated time of death was between 5.25am and 11.25pm on 17 April 1995.

The appellant was arrested on 20 April 1995.
He denied having met the deceased on the day she was murdered. He claimed that he usually went home for lunch. On that day, he had left the club at about 12.15pm and was on his way home for lunch when his van broke down. He subsequently got out of his van to find and repair the fault. By the time he finished the repair, it was already 1.45pm, and he proceeded back to work instead. In fact, his supervisor Max Foo (Foo), had paged for him at 1.38pm that afternoon and it was undisputed that he returned the pager call. The appellant said that he had called from a telephone at the nearest HDB block and told Foo of his problem with his van. Foo then asked if the appellant needed help, but he declined and said he was able to do it himself. Foo confirmed what the appellant had said. After returning to the club, the appellant said that he made a telephone call from a nearby canteen to his wife just before 3pm to tell her why he did not go home for lunch.

That same evening, the appellant said that he went to the Balasubramaniam temple (the temple) at Canberra Road after work at 5pm.
He explained that, although his working hours were between 6am and 3pm, he had to work overtime practically everyday. The appellant had a make-shift garage at the temple, and he claimed that he went there because he wanted to check his van once more. After he had tuned up his engine and changed a new filter, he proceeded to wash his van there because it was oily and dirty due to the repairs earlier that afternoon. He sprayed water on the whole van and wiped the exterior and driver`s cabin with a piece of cloth. He proceeded home at about 6.50 pm, after having coffee and chatting with the priests and musicians at the temple.

The prosecution`s case

The prosecution`s case was that, on 17 April 1995, the appellant had left the club at about 12pm to meet the deceased at her workplace in Ang Mo Kio.
He then fetched her from her workplace to the scene of the crime at Jalan Ulu Sembawang where he ran his van over her body whilst she was lying on the grass patch. Having murdered her, he returned to the club. After work, he went to the temple where he had a make-shift garage, and he attempted to wash his van clean of any incriminating evidence.

In reaching such a conclusion, the prosecution relied on four crucial pieces of evidence.
First, the prosecution expert testified that the tyre skid marks found on a cement patch at the scene of the crime matched the tyres of the appellant`s van. Second, another prosecution expert testified that, from her DNA analysis, the tooth fragment found in the van originated from the deceased. Third, pieces of jewellery which were allegedly worn by the deceased on the day of the murder were recovered from the van. They were an ear stud, a small gold link and a three-piece glass ornament embedded in a gold matrix. The last item was lost by the police soon after it was found in the van, and the prosecution was unable to produce it in court. Fourth, the prosecution contended that the appellant could not have taken more than an hour to trace and rectify the problem with his van. They relied on expert evidence to show that a Grade 1 mechanic would have taken about 10 to 20 minutes to trace and repair the fault.

The prosecution was, however, unable to adduce any other incriminating evidence from the van or its tyres, the appellant`s clothes and his tools.


The defence`s case

The defence was essentially one of alibi.
Counsel for the appellant relied on expert opinion to dispute the match with regard to the tyre skid marks. Another defence expert was called to testify that the DNA analysis of the tooth fragment was unsatisfactory and not conclusive. Furthermore, the appellant also testified that the deceased had the habit of opening bottle caps with her teeth. The tooth fragment could thus possibly have broken off on some previous occasion when they were having food and drinks in the goods compartment of the van.

As for the jewellery items recovered from the appellant`s van, counsel for the defence contended that they had not been sent for forensic analysis or metallurgical tests.
They were also commonly found in other jewellery. Since the appellant had previously used his van to transport people and jewellery to the temple for wedding ceremonies and other occasions, it was unsafe to match them with the jewellery items recovered from the deceased`s body. Besides, the deceased also wore jewellery during her meetings with the appellant in the back of the van. Such jewellery items could thus have been dropped in the van on any of these occasions.

The defence also contended that, since the appellant had not been independently proven to be a Grade 1 mechanic, it was therefore not incredible that he had taken more than an hour to find and rectify the fault with his van.
Further, the van had stalled along a main road and it was raining that day. Moreover, it was also lunch time and the appellant was not working under time pressure.

The decision below

The learned judge was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the tooth fragment found in the van was the fragment of a recent fracture of the deceased`s mandibular right first permanent molar.
He also accepted the prosecution expert evidence that the tooth fragment originated from the deceased. The appellant`s suggestion that the fragment could have broken off when the deceased used her teeth to open bottled drinks was disbelieved and dismissed as an afterthought.

As regards the jewellery, the learned judge was convinced that they belonged to the deceased.
From a visual inspection of one of the jewellery items, he observed that the backing of the ear stud was bent and concluded that it had been detached from the ear stud.

The learned judge was completely satisfied that the tyre marks found at the crime scene came from the appellant`s van.
He accepted the expert evidence of the prosecution and rejected that of the defence.

Finally, the learned judge did not believe that the appellant`s van had broken down at all.
He found that the appellant had in fact driven from the club to fetch the deceased at her workplace, and they proceeded on to the scene of the crime where he committed the murder before returning to the club at 2pm. The learned judge was also convinced that the appellant drove his van to the make-shift garage at the temple immediately after work where he washed his van.

...

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