MV Balakrishnan v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 08 July 1998
• Date: 08 July 1998
• Docket Number: Criminal Motion No 9 of 1998
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

M V Balakrishnan

Plaintiff

and

Public Prosecutor

Defendant

[1998] SGHC 231

Yong Pung How CJ

Criminal Motion No 9 of 1998

High Court

Courts and Jurisdiction–Court of Appeal–Reference to Court of Criminal Appeal–Whether conflict of authority that necessitated reference–Discretion to refer to be exercised sparingly–Road Traffic–Offences–Permitting employee to drive Class 4 vehicle without valid driving licence and while no insurance coverage against third-party risks in force–Disqualified from holding all classes of licence for 12 months–Whether circumstances particular to offender constituting special reasons to dispense with mandatory disqualification stipulated by statute–Sections 3 (1) and 3 (2) Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 1985 Rev Ed)–Words and Phrases–“Special reasons”–Section 3 (2) Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 1985 Rev Ed)

The appellant, M V Balakrishnan, was convicted of permitting his employee to use a Class 4 motor vehicle without a valid driving licence and while there was no insurance coverage against third-party risks in force, offences under s 35 (1) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1994 Rev Ed) (“RTA”) and s 3 (1) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 1985 Rev Ed) (“MVA”) respectively. The appellant was fined $1,800 and disqualified from holding all classes of licence for 12 months. On appeal, the fines were upheld and the court found no special reasons within the meaning of s 3 (2) of the MVA to excuse the appellant from the statutory disqualification. Pursuant to s 60 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed, 1993 Reprint) (“SCJA”), the appellant sought to refer to the Court of Criminal Appeal the question of whether circumstances particular to the offender could constitute “special reasons” within the meaning of s 3 (2) of the MVA to dispense with the mandatory disqualification stipulated by statute.

Held, dismissing the motion:

(1) As held in Whittall v Kirby [1947] 1 KB 194, a special reason within the exception was one which was special to the facts of the particular case, that was, special to the facts which constituted the offence. A circumstance peculiar to the offender as distinguished from the offence was not a “special reason” within the exception: at [6].

(2) To construe special reasons as being those connected with the offence and not the offender would be the clearest means of giving effect to Parliament's intention. Parliament could not have intended an offender to be excused from the mandatory punishment by virtue of circumstances unique to his situation but irrelevant to the commission of the offence. The mandatory punishment was designed to take away the right that was abused in committing the offence: at [9].

(3) In the interest of maintaining finality in proceedings, the discretion to refer questions to the Court of Appeal should be exercised sparingly so that the references are not used as an indirect way of appealing against matters that under the law had been finally determined by the High Court. The court considered that this application was a veiled appeal. The position laid down in Whittall had been consistently applied by the courts here and, in the circumstances, there was no conflict of authority. As such, the question was not so exceptional as to require reference: at [11].

Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1995] 1 SLR (R) 388; [1995] 1 SLR 687 (folld)

Chapman v O'Hagan [1949] 2 All ER 690 (folld)

Roland Joseph George John v PP [1995] 3 SLR (R) 562; [1996] 1 SLR 179 (folld)

Kanapathipillai, Re [1960] MLJ 243 (folld)

King (Magill), The v Crossan [1939] NI 106 (folld)

Mah Kah Yew v PP [1968-1970] SLR (R) 851; [1969-1971] SLR 441 (folld)

PP v Akhtar Hussain Mann [1991] 1 SLR (R) 872; [1992] 1 SLR 266 (refd)

PP v Balasubramaniam [1992] 1 SLR (R) 88; [1992] 1 SLR 822 (folld)

PP v Bridges Christopher [1997] 1 SLR (R) 681; [1997] 2 SLR 217 (folld)

PP v Lim Niah Liang [1996] 3 SLR (R) 702; [1997] 1 SLR 534 (refd)

Public Prosecutor v Hiew Chin Fong [1988] 1 MLJ 467 (refd)

Public Prosecutor v M Karthiah [1953] MLJ 52 (folld)

Public Prosecutor v Mohd Isa [1963] MLJ 135 (folld)

Public Prosecutor v Teo Kok Keng [1989] 1 MLJ 198 (refd)

R v Lim Kian Soo [1950] MLJ 181 (not folld)

Whittall v Kirby [1947] 1 KB 194 (folld)

Wong Hong Toy v PP [1985-1986] SLR (R) 656; [1986] SLR 86 (folld)

Wong Hong Toy v PP [1987] SLR (R) 213; [1994] 2 SLR 396 (folld)

Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] 1 KB 718; [1944] 2 All ER 293 (refd)

Environmental Public Health Act (Cap 95, 1988 Rev Ed)s 21A (1)

Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 1985 Rev Ed)ss 3 (1), 3 (2) (consd)

Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1994 Rev Ed)s 35 (1)

Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed,1993 Reprint)s 60

Michael Hwang SC and Andrew Chan (Allen & Gledhill) for the applicant

Kow Keng Siong (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the respondent.

Yong Pung How CJ

Background

1 This was a motion arising out of my decision in MA 198/97 dismissing the appellant's appeal against sentence and conviction. The detailed facts are set out in my grounds of decision dated 18 May 1998 [see M V Balakrishnan v PP [1998] SGHC 416]. Briefly, the appellant was charged with permitting his employee to use a Class 4 motor vehicle without a valid driving licence and while there was no insurance coverage against third-party risks in force, offences under s 35 (1) Road Traffic Act (Cap 276) (“the RTA”) and s 3 (1) Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risks Compensation) Act (Cap 189) (“the MVA”) respectively.

2 In the court below, the appellant's defence was that he had relied on the seller's...