Munshi Rasal v Enlighten Furniture Decoration Company Pte Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Steven Chong JCA,Belinda Ang Saw Ean JAD,Quentin Loh JAD
• Judgment Date: 10 March 2021
• Neutral Citation: [2021] SGCA 23
• Year: 2021
• Published date: 16 March 2021
• Hearing Date: 03 March 2021
• Plaintiff Counsel: Pillai Subbiah (Tan & Pillai)
• Defendant Counsel: Appoo Ramesh and Vinodhan Gunasekaran (Just Law LLC)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Citation: [2021] SGCA 23
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 75 of 2020

Steven Chong JCA (delivering the grounds of decision of the court):

This appeal arose from a workplace accident suffered by the appellant, a male Bangladeshi worker. He was employed as a general worker by the respondent at the material time, and his job was to feed pieces of plywood through a wood laminating machine (“the machine”). We dismissed the appeal and now furnish our grounds of decision.

Background to the appeal

On 28 June 2015, the appellant and his co-worker were instructed to remove dried glue from the connecting rollers of the machine. While doing so, the appellant’s hand got caught in between the moving rollers. His thumb and two of his fingers were fractured as a result.

The Workmen’s Compensation Board awarded the appellant $43,464.88 in compensation. Dissatisfied, the appellant sued the respondent for negligence and alleged that the respondent had breached its common law duty of care to take reasonable steps to ensure his workplace safety. He also alleged that the respondent had breached its statutory duties under ss 11 and 12 of the Workplace Safety and Health Act (Cap 354A, 2009 Rev Ed). The appellant originally commenced proceedings against the respondent in the High Court, but the case was transferred to the District Court, ostensibly because the value of his claim was less than $250,000.

In Munshi Rasal v Enlighten Furniture Decoration Co Pte Ltd [2019] SGDC 172 (“the District Judge’s decision”), the District Judge held that the respondent did not act negligently towards the appellant. The District Judge found that the appellant’s injuries were not caused by any negligence on the respondent’s part, but by the appellant’s own ill-advised actions in using his hand to remove waste material from the moving rollers while the machine was switched on. The District Judge also rejected the appellant’s claims that the respondent had failed to provide a safe system of work or adequate supervision and training.

The appellant’s appeal against the District Judge’s decision was dismissed by the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) in Munshi Rasal v Enlighten Furniture Decoration Co Pte Ltd[2020] SGHC 69. The appellant then filed the present appeal against the Judge’s decision.

Our decision

Before delving into the merits of this appeal, we deal first with the issue of whether the appellant should have sought leave to appeal to this court. The answer to this question is a categorical “yes”. Under s 34(2)(a) of the version of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”) that was in force when the notice of appeal was filed (“the 2020 SCJA”), leave is required before an appeal may be brought to the Court of Appeal where the amount in dispute at the hearing before the High Court (excluding interest and costs) does not exceed $250,000. Based on the appellant’s Statement of Claim, his claim was for a total sum of roughly $190,000. The transfer of the case from the High Court to the District Court underscored the fact that the value of the appellant’s claim did not exceed $250,000. It should have been obvious to any reasonably competent lawyer that leave to appeal to this court was required.

The appellant’s failure to obtain leave was even more inexcusable given that he was alerted to this very issue at a case management conference. At that case management conference, the appellant’s counsel, Mr Subbiah Pillai (“Mr Pillai”), asserted that “[t]he [a]ppellant takes the position that the [a]ppellant can appeal as of right”. Mr Pillai did not cite any authority for this somewhat astounding proposition. He also claimed that “… the value of the suit is more than $250,000”. A cursory glance of the record of appeal and record of proceedings revealed that Mr Pillai’s claim was baseless. As mentioned at [6] above, it appeared from the Statement of Claim that the value of the appellant’s claim was about $190,000. Moreover, it was unfathomable that Mr Pillai could have asserted that the value of the appellant’s claim exceeded $250,000, in light of Mr Pillai’s own oral submissions before the Judge:

Court:	Now, you are---how much are you claiming in this case?
…
Pillai:	Roughly, we would have been claiming about 180,000.
Court:	And what do you think is the assessment, I mean, the contribution?
Pillai:	In my view, the contribution on [the] part of the appellant should be about 20%.
Court:	Sorry, you are claiming 150?
Pillai:	180.
Court:	180,000?
Pillai:	Yes.
[emphasis added]

Mr Pillai had informed the Judge that the appellant’s claim was for a sum of $180,000, which was more or less consistent with what had been pleaded in the Statement of Claim (see [6] above). The figure of $180,000 was, however, a far cry from the threshold of $250,000 set out in s 34(2)(a) of the 2020 SCJA, and there was as such no factual basis at all for Mr Pillai to assert that this threshold had been met. At the hearing before us, he continued to suggest that the value of the appellant’s claim exceeded $250,000, yet he adduced no evidence to support such a quantification. When he was reminded of his own submission before the Judge, he then changed tack and asserted that he had merely informed the Judge that the appellant’s claim for general damages amounted to $180,000, ie, that the $180,000 figure was not inclusive of special damages claimed. This assertion did not stand up to scrutiny in light of his unambiguous submission to the Judge that “… [the appellant] would have been claiming about [$]180,000”.

At the same case management conference referred to at [7] above, Mr Pillai appeared to suggest that the appellant was entitled to appeal as of right as the action was originally commenced in the High Court. We found this to be another astonishing argument. The matter was heard in the District Court, and the appellant did not protest when the matter was transferred from the High Court to the District Court, ostensibly because the value of his claim did not exceed $250,000.

Mr Pillai’s unfounded assertion also ignores the plain language of s 34(2)(a) of the 2020 SCJA, which stipulates that leave is required to bring an appeal to the Court of Appeal “where the amount in dispute, or the value of the subject-matter, at the hearing before the High Court (excluding interest and costs) does not exceed $250,000 or such other amount as may be specified by an order made under subsection (3)” [emphasis added]. It is evident from the express wording of s 34(2)(a) that what is relevant, for jurisdictional purposes, is the amount in dispute at the hearing before the High Court, regardless of the court in which the suit was originally commenced. Any doubt in this regard was dispelled by this court in Fong Khim Ling (administrator of the estate of Fong Ching Pau Lloyd, deceased) v Tan Teck Ann[2014] 2 SLR 659. In that case, it was held (at [30]) that when a claim originates in the District Court and is subsequently heard by the High Court in its appellate capacity, the relevant amount for the purposes of s 34(2)(a) of the SCJA is quantified by reference to the value of the subject matter of the appeal when it was heard by the High Court. Contrary to Mr Pillai’s assertion, whether the appellant’s action was originally commenced in the High Court or in the District Court was immaterial. We add that this should have been plain and obvious to Mr Pillai....