Mohamed Shalleh bin Abdul Latiff v PP
| Jurisdiction | Singapore |
| Judge | Sundaresh Menon CJ,Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA,Judith Prakash JCA |
| Judgment Date | 14 March 2022 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Singapore) |
| Docket Number | Criminal Appeal No 9 of 2019 |
Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA and Judith Prakash JCA
Criminal Appeal No 9 of 2019
Court of Appeal
Criminal Law — Statutory offences — Misuse of Drugs Act — Accused person claiming he believed package found to contain drugs in fact contained contraband cigarettes as he trusted another person — Whether language of trust and suspicion remained relevant in assessing whether accused person had rebutted statutory presumption of knowledge as opposed to determining whether he had been wilfully blind — Section 18(2) Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed)
Held, dismissing the appeal:
(1) The Judge had ample basis to find that the three bundles were not inside the orange plastic bag by the time of arrest. The appellant's contention in the appeal that the three bundles could have been delivered in the orange plastic bag and could then have fallen out of the bag in the course of the arrest was somewhat contrary to the case he ran at trial, which was that the three bundles were inside the bag with the bag handles tied together, such that he could not see what the bag contained. Furthermore, as against his account, the CNB officer had testified that the orange plastic bag contained the methamphetamine while the three bundles were outside the bag, as reflected in his marking of the items. The case the appellant mounted in the appeal was also speculative in nature: at [26] to [30].
(2) The Judge had correctly found untenable the appellant's claim that he believed what Bai had allegedly told him because he trusted Bai. This went to the core of his defence, which was that he did not know that the three bundles contained diamorphine. It would rarely, if ever, be sufficient for an accused person to rebut the s 18(2) presumption by stating simply that he believed whatever he was told in relation to what was in his possession. Where such a claim was made, the court would have to consider whether it believed that bare claim and, in that regard, it would consider the entire factual matrix and context, including the relationship between the parties and all the surrounding circumstances. The fact that any relationship between the appellant and Bai was essentially transactional and superficial in nature undermined the appellant's ability to rebut the presumption, because it was implausible that he in fact believed whatever Bai told him, especially as he knew Bai was involved in various illegal activities: at [31] to [35].
(3) That implausibility was amplified by the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Once it was accepted that the three bundles were exposed on the floorboard at the material time, the appearance of the bundles became highly relevant. These were roughly palm-sized, rounded packages which could not possibly have been mistaken for or been thought to contain two and a half cartons of cigarettes. Further, as a smoker himself, the appellant knew that this was the equivalent of at least 25 packets of cigarettes. Additionally, the manner and circumstances in which the appellant collected the purported cigarettes could only be described as sinister, and it was bizarre that the appellant was engaged to act, in effect, as a middle-man between Khairul and Bai for the delivery of the $7,000; and then between Bai and an unknown recipient in Mei Ling Street for the intended delivery. It also beggared belief or explanation that the entire elaborate scheme was devised to arrange the delivery of a package worth less than $165. The appellant's claim was furthermore inconsistent with the fact that he had handed $7,000 to Khairul; and his claim that Bai told him that the amount was a gambling debt owed to Bai was nonsensical and made no sense in the context of explaining why Bai wanted him to deliver the money to someone else: at [35] to [39].
(4) The argument by the appellant's former counsel entailed constructing an argument and line of reasoning that had never been advanced by the Judge. The only issue in the present case was whether the s 18(2) presumption had been rebutted. In considering that question, the ultimate question the court was concerned with was whether it believed the accused person's story. The more incredible the story, the less likely it would be believed. Here, it was in the context of assessing whether the appellant in fact believed Bai, that the Judge had to assess his claim that he trusted Bai. Although the use of words like “trust” and “suspicion” might overlap with the language often used to establish wilful blindness in the extended sense, the latter presented quite different circumstances: at [44] to [46].
(5) Assertions of trusting someone or having suspicions about something might be relevant where one was considering whether the accused person had a targeted suspicion about something that he then deliberately turned a blind eye to. But they might also be relevant simply as part of an inquiry into whether an accused person was speaking the truth when he explained the basis for his belief as to what the drugs were. In the latter context, the inquiry was ultimately directed at the overall credibility of the narrative presented to the court, as was the case here: at [52] and [53].
Adili Chibuike Ejike v PP [2019] 2 SLR 254 (refd)
Gobi a/l Avedian v PP [2021] 1 SLR 180 (refd)
Harven a/l Segar v PP [2017] 1 SLR 771 (refd)
Khor Soon Lee v PP [2011] 3 SLR 201 (refd)
Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad v PP [2017] 1 SLR 257 (refd)
Mohamed Shalleh bin Abdul Latiff v PP [2020] SGHC 283 (refd)
Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v PP [2020] 1 SLR 984 (refd)
Obeng Comfort v PP [2017] 1 SLR 633 (refd)
PP v Khor Chong Seng [2018] SGHC 219 (refd)
On 11 August 2016, the appellant drove a rental car to meet a person who was later identified as Khairul Nizam bin Ramthan (“Khairul”). Khairul entered the appellant's car and placed, on the floorboard of the car's front passenger area: (a) one orange plastic bag, containing one “Lexus” box which contained two packets of crystalline substances; and (b) three “ziplock” bags containing one bundle each wrapped in brown paper (“the three bundles”). There was some dispute between parties as to whether the three bundles were inside the orange plastic bag at the time of the appellant's arrest.
The appellant also handed Khairul an envelope containing $7,000, which had been left in the appellant's letter box the day before. Khairul then left the appellant's car. The appellant drove to another location, where he was to wait for a call with further instructions as to whom he should deliver the three bundles. He was arrested there. The three bundles were found to contain not less than 54.04g of diamorphine. This formed the substance of the charge on which the appellant was convicted. The crystalline substance in the two packets was found to contain methamphetamine.
The appellant did not dispute that the three bundles were in his possession at the material time or that he intended to deliver the three bundles to a third party. His sole defence was that he did not know that the three bundles contained diamorphine. He claimed that he agreed to undertake a delivery for one “Bai”, who told him that this would be of two and a half cartons of uncustomed cigarettes and, pursuant to that, he was just following the instructions of Bai. He claimed to have known Bai since 2008, and that they interacted subsequently from time to time.
The trial judge (“the Judge”) found that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge as to the nature of the drug under s 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) for three broad reasons: (a) the appellant did not have a particularly close relationship with Bai and, given the suspicious circumstances surrounding the entire episode, it was difficult to accept the high level of trust he claimed to have placed in Bai to the point of believing whatever Bai told him; (b) the appellant omitted to mention important aspects of his defence in the statements he gave in the course of investigations; and (c) part of the appellant's account was contradicted by the evidence of an officer from the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”) who testified that, following the arrest, he found the orange plastic bag beside the three bundles on the floorboard of the car's front passenger area. The CNB officer's testimony was also corroborated by the manner in which the items were labelled. As the three bundles were left exposed, the appellant would have caught sight of their appearance. Given their round and irregular shape, he could not have thought that they were cartons of cigarettes.
The appellant appealed against his conviction and sentence. He argued that: (a) his account of what he knew of Bai had been consistent and the Judge had erred in finding that the appellant had no basis to trust Bai; (b) it was entirely conceivable that a lay person such as himself could fail to list each and every aspect of his defence when questioned by the CNB; and (c) it was entirely possible that the three bundles were outside the orange plastic bag by the time they were found by the CNB officer, even if they might have been inside the plastic bag as claimed by the appellant when the bag was delivered to him.
The appellant's former counsel had additionally submitted that although the Judge did not expressly use the term “wilful blindness” in her grounds of decision, she effectively analysed the case as one involving wilful blindness when assessing whether the s 18(2) presumption had been rebutted. It was submitted that the Judge had improperly conflated the concepts of actual knowledge and wilful blindness, as such evidence of suspicious circumstances would only be sufficient to prevent an accused person from rebutting the s 18(2) presumption if they amounted to wilful blindness in the evidential, but not extended sense. The former was, as this court held in...
To continue reading
Request your trial