MFH Marine Pte Ltd v Asmoniah bin Mohamad

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: S Rajendran J
• Judgment Date: 15 July 2000
• Neutral Citation: [2000] SGHC 141
• Citation: [2000] SGHC 141
• Date: 15 July 2000
• Year: 2000
• Plaintiff Counsel: MP Rai (Cooma & Rai)
• Docket Number: District Court Appeal No 46 of
• Defendant Counsel: Chong Yuen Hee, Subbiah Pillai and A Tiwary (Pillai & Pillai)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Published date: 19 September 2003

: The plaintiff/respondent (`respondent`) was an employee of the defendants/appellants (`appellants`). On 31 March 1995, whilst the respondent was at work, a stack of frozen fish fell on him and he suffered injuries. Shortly thereafter he made a claim for compensation under the Workmen`s Compensation Act (Cap 354). Slightly, more than a year later, on 28 June 1996, the Commissioner for Labour (`Commissioner`) wrote to the respondent rejecting the claim for compensation. On 21 July 1998 the respondent learnt from a friend that he could commence a civil action against the appellants. He consulted solicitors and on 21 January 1999 - a period of 3 years and 10 months after the accident - the writ in this action was filed.

Under s 24A(2) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163), an action such as this, has to be commenced either (a) within three years from the date the cause of action accrued or (b) within three years of the earliest date on which the respondent had the knowledge required to bring the action. The three-year period under (a) would have expired on 31 March 1998. The respondent sought, in his pleadings, to come within the provisions of (b). In para 7 of the statement of claim the respondent averred:

The material facts relating to the plaintiff`s cause of action herein were outside his knowledge actual or constructive before 21 July 1998 which is within three years before the date of the commencement of this action.

The fact that a claim for compensation under the Workmen`s Compensation Act had been made and that the Commissioner had, on 28 June 1996 rejected that claim was not referred to in the pleadings or in the affidavits of evidence-in-chief. Although that fact came to light in the course of oral testimony, no submission was made that time would only run as from the date the Commissioner rejected the claim for compensation.

Before the trial commenced the parties arrived at an agreement on liability and quantum. The defence of limitation, which had been pleaded by the appellants, was the only issue that the court had to consider. The learned district judge ( `DJ`) ruled that the claim was not barred by the Limitation Act and entered judgment for the respondent for the amount agreed. The appellants appealed against that decision.

Before the learned DJ, respondent`s counsel had argued, consistent with the pleaded case, that as the respondent did not, until July 1998, know that he could commence proceedings against the defendants in the civil courts, s 24A(2)(b) of the Limitation Act applied and the three-year time bar would begin to run only from July 1998. The learned DJ rejected that submission and in so doing said:

... ignorance about one`s right could not be an excuse and if any party wanted to utilise a statutory provision, they must adduce sufficient facts to the court to show they come within the requirements of the statute. [Emphasis added.]

In saying that, the learned DJ was, no doubt, referring to s 24A(4) of the Limitation Act which limits the meaning of the word `knowledge` in s 24A(2) to four specified categories. The respondent`s alleged lack of knowledge that he could sue his employer in the civil courts did not fall within any of the four categories specified in s 24A(4). Before me neither party sought to fault the learned DJ on this finding.

Having decided that ignorance about his right to commence civil proceedings did not entitle the respondent to rely on the extended limitation period available under s 24A(2)(b), the learned DJ went on to consider the question whether the time taken by the Commissioner (a period of slightly over one year) to reject the respondent`s claim should be taken into account in determining whether the civil claim was statute-barred. As noted above, this was an issue not pleaded and not dealt with in the submissions before the learned DJ. The first time the matter was raised was in the Grounds of Decision of the learned DJ. In raising the matter, the learned DJ noted that the pleadings in the case left much to be desired but took the view that poorly drafted pleadings should not deprive the respondent of his rights.

Section 33(2) of the Workmen`s Compensation Act precludes a workman from instituting any action for damages in a civil court if he has applied for compensation under the provisions of the Workmen`s Compensation Act. The learned DJ held that, in view of s 33(2), the respondent, even if he had wanted to, could not have commenced civil action against the appellants until the Commissioner had made his ruling on the claim. As the Commissioner had rejected the respondent`s claim on 28 June 1996, the learned DJ held that the three-year time bar would begin to run only from that date. His reasons were as follows:

It would appear that from s 33(2)(b) of the said Act that once the plaintiff filed a claim with the Department, he is precluded from commencing any action in court until the resolution of his claim by the Department. Defence counsel argued that notwithstanding this, the period of limitation still continued to run. That may well have been the case before the 1992 amendments to the Limitation Act. In my view, the intention of Parliament when the Limitation Act was amended in 1992 was to prevent hardship and injustice to the plaintiff by providing an alternative starting date for the limitation period where the plaintiff lacked knowledge. In this case, even if the plaintiff wanted to, he could not commence his action till the Department ruled on his claim. It is unfortunate that the Department took about a year to reject the plaintiff`s claim. Therefore, to my mind, the plaintiff only had knowledge that he could commence a civil claim on 28 June 1996, that is, the date of the Department`s reply to him. [Emphasis added.]

If the three-year limitation period was to run from 28 June 1996, the date the Commissioner rejected the compensation claim, the civil action would not be time-barred. The learned DJ therefore rejected the defence of limitation and entered judgment for the...