Markpoint Engineering Pte Ltd v Decon Construction & Engineering Pte Ltd

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeLoo Ngan Chor
Judgment Date24 June 2020
Neutral Citation[2020] SGDC 142
CourtDistrict Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberDC Suit No. 4085 of 2016
Year2020
Published date02 July 2020
Hearing Date25 July 2019,26 July 2019,15 October 2019,08 October 2019
Plaintiff CounselMr. Goh Jian Qing Alywin, Mr. Joel Tan, & Ms. Sylvia Koh [Continental Law LLP] -
Defendant CounselMr. Dhanaraj James Selvaraj [James Selvaraj LLC] -
Subject MatterCivil procedure,costs,principles
Citation[2020] SGDC 142
District Judge Loo Ngan Chor:

This decision on costs is supplementary to my decision of 15th April 2020, reported at [2020] SGDC 98, by which I dismissed both the claim and the counter-claim, with costs to be fixed by me, if necessary, after I had the benefit of parties’ submissions on costs.

There has been no appeal against the principal decision.

The plaintiff submits that I should make no order as to costs. Its argument is that the counter-claim raised a point distinct from the defence, in the form of “the issue of the plaintiff’s failure to make payment for the construction works done by the defendant up till sometime on or around April 2014… Accordingly, the breach of the plaintiff’s obligation to make payment to the defendant is the separate and substantial question raised by the defendant”.

The plaintiff relies on the Court of Appeal decision in Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd and anr [2018] 2 SLR 239 at [76]-[80]. In calling for parties’ submissions on costs, at [78] of the Benzline decision, the Court of Appeal said this: For the parties’ guidance, we observe that this is a case where both the plaintiffs’ claim and the defendant’s counterclaim should have been (and have now been) dismissed. The applicable principles as to costs in such an outcome are accurately summarised in the headnote to Mok Kwong Yue v Ding Leng Kong [2012] 1 SLR 737 as follows: … in a situation where both a claim and the counterclaim failed and were dismissed with costs and where there was a separate and substantial question raised by the counterclaim, there had to be substantial costs paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in relation to the counterclaim, and an apportionment of the costs. But where the subject matter of the counterclaim was identical to the defence or part of the defence, no apportionment should be ordered, but rather the plaintiff should be allowed only the extra costs incurred by reason of the counterclaim.

The context of this issue is set out in the earlier part of the headnote of Mok Kwong Yue, which bears setting out for my purpose:

In 2004, Mok Kwong Yue (“the plaintiff”) sued Ding Leng Kong (“the defendant”) to recover monies allegedly paid under mistake of law. The defendant resisted the claim and mounted a counterclaim. The judge dismissed both the claim and the counterclaim with costs (see [2008] SGHC 65).

In November 2010, the plaintiff presented his bill of costs for the work done in respect of the counterclaim for taxation. The defendant only filed the defendant’s bill of costs for the work done in resisting the claim on 28 September 2011. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, $80,000 in respect of getting up for the counterclaim. The assistant registrar (“the AR”) awarded the plaintiff $7,000, applying the principle in Medway Oil and Storage Company, Limited v Continental Contractors, Limited [1929] 1 AC 88 (“Medway”) that where the counterclaim arose from the defence to the main claim, no apportionment would be ordered but rather extra costs arising from the counterclaim could be allowed. The defendant appealed and argued that the principles in Christie v Platt [1921] 2 KB 17 (“Christie v Platt”) were applicable: namely that costs should be apportioned between the plaintiff and defendant where each had been successful (ie, on the claim and counterclaim respectively) in accordance with a consideration of how much of each item of costs had been incurred in relation to either the claim or counterclaim.

Mok Kwong Yue was a decision of Judith Prakash J, as her Honour then was, in which she upheld the learned assistant registrar’s taxation. Her Honour reviewed the authorities pertaining to costs where both claim and counter-claim had been dismissed, each with costs, and espoused the principles laid down by the House of Lords in Medway Oil and Storage Company, Limited v Continental Contractors, Limited [1929] AC 88. Mok Kwong Yue at [7] reads: The first case in the series of authorities that was cited to me was Saner v Bilton (1879) 11 Ch D 416, the decision of a very well respected judge, Fry J. That case had a result that was similar to the one here in that the plaintiff’s claim was...

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