Lwee Kwi Ling Mary v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Yong Pung How CJ
• Judgment Date: 27 February 2003
• Neutral Citation: [2003] SGHC 39
• Date: 27 February 2003
• Subject Matter: Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) s 223,Sentencing,Criminal Procedure and Sentencing,Discretionary powers,Execution,Constitutional Law,Whether court has power to suspend sentence,Whether President has exclusive power to suspend execution of sentence,Offender serving sentence at time of hearing,President,Republic of Singapore Independence Act (1985 Rev Ed) s 8(1), Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) s 237(1)
• Docket Number: Criminal Motion No 4 of 2003
• Published date: 07 October 2003
• Defendant Counsel: Sia Aik Kor (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Edmond Pereira (Edmond Pereira & Partners)

Introduction

This was an application by Mary Lwee Kwi Ling (‘Mary’), pursuant to s 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68)(‘CPC’), for the sentence imposed on her by the High Court in MA 146/2002/01 to be suspended until such time as the President of the Republic of Singapore has determined her petition, pursuant to s 8 of the Republic of Singapore Independence Act (‘RSIA’), to have her sentence suspended.

Facts

2 Mary was convicted by the magistrate on a charge of criminal intimidation for uttering a death threat at one Quek Chin Huat (‘Quek’), while wielding a chopper at him, an offence punishable under s 506 of the Penal Code (Cap 224). She was sentenced to 10 weeks’ imprisonment. Being dissatisfied with her sentence, she appealed. On 28 January 2003, I dismissed her appeal and enhanced her sentence to three months’ imprisonment. I also granted an application by her counsel for her sentence to commence only after the Lunar New Year Holidays, ie 4 February 2003. Mary had already commenced serving her sentence by the time this motion was heard.

3 Mary took out the present application for her sentence to be suspended, pursuant to s 223 of the CPC, because she intended to petition to the President. The basis of her petition was her discovery, after her appeal was dismissed, that one of the prosecution’s witnesses, one Kulwant Singh, had given false evidence implicating her in the trial before the magistrate. Kulwant Singh had since signed a statutory declaration admitting that he had been bribed by Quek to say, inter alia, that he saw chopper marks made by Mary on a dining chair and on the door of her apartment, when in fact there were no such marks. The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau was investigating into the matter.

The issue

4 The issues before me were, first, whether the court had the power to suspend Mary’s sentence pursuant to s 223 of the CPC, and secondly, if the court had the requisite power, whether the power should be exercised in her favour.

The law

5 Section 223 of the CPC reads:

Subject to the provision of this Code and of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, every sentence of imprisonment to which section 221 or 222 apply shall take effect from the date on which it was passed, unless the court passing the sentence or when there has been an appeal the appellate court otherwise directs.

6 In my view, this section did not support Mary’s application for her sentence to be suspended after she has commenced serving it. The section provides that the court may direct that a sentence of imprisonment should commence on a date other than the date on which it was passed. In Lim Teck Leng Roland v Public Prosecutor [2001] 4 SLR 61, I ruled that a sentencing court could entertain an application under s 223 of the CPC for a deferment of the commencement of a sentence it passed even after a decision had been made previously on the commencement date of the sentence. The court was not functus officio in such a case and could alter its decision in respect of the commencement date of the sentence. This was because an order...