Low Heng Leon Andy v Low Kian Beng Lawrence (administrator of the estate of Tan Ah Kng, deceased)
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Judge | Quentin Loh J |
Judgment Date | 10 May 2013 |
Neutral Citation | [2013] SGHC 101 |
Court | High Court (Singapore) |
Hearing Date | 24 July 2012,27 March 2012,17 April 2012,28 October 2011 |
Docket Number | Suit No 252 of 2011 (Registrar’s Appeal No 227 of 2011/M) |
Plaintiff Counsel | Gopinath S/O Pillai and Aloysius Tan (Tan Jin Hwee LLC) |
Defendant Counsel | Tan Tian Luh (Chancery Law Corporation) |
Subject Matter | Civil Procedure,Striking Out,Equity,Estoppel,Proprietary Estoppel,Res Judicata,Issue Estoppel,Land,Housing Development Act |
Published date | 22 May 2013 |
This is an appeal against the decision of the learned assistant registrar below (“the Assistant Registrar”), dismissing the striking out application made by Low Kian Beng Lawrence, (“the Defendant”) pursuant to O 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Rules of Court”) against the claim by Low Heng Leon Andy (“the Plaintiff”).
The parties and brief factsThe Plaintiff and the Defendant are cousins. Their dispute involved a flat situated at Block 306 Hougang Avenue 5, #02-355 Singapore 530306 (“the Flat”). For the purposes of this appeal, the parties have submitted an agreed statement of facts, which I now summarise below.
The Flat was solely owned by their common grandmother, Tan Ah Kng (“the Deceased”), who passed away on 28 November 2008. The Flat was left behind as part of her estate. The Plaintiff was staying in the Flat with the Deceased and continued staying there after her passing. The Defendant is the administrator of the Deceased’s estate and was issued the Grant of Letter of Administration on 28 April 2009. Pursuant to the Intestate Succession Act (Cap 146, 1985 Rev Ed) (“ISA”), the beneficiaries of the estate were the five surviving children of the Deceased, and the Plaintiff was therefore not a beneficiary of the estate.
Sometime in or about early January 2009, the Defendant gave notice to the Plaintiff to vacate the Flat, after informing the Plaintiff that he had been granted Letters of Administration and the Deceased’s estate was the legal and beneficial owner of the assets of the Deceased. A letter of demand was also issued by the Defendant’s solicitors, Chancery Law Corporation, to the Plaintiff dated 25 May 2009, asserting that the Plaintiff had no legal right to stay in the flat.
The Defendant subsequently commenced Originating Summons No 213 of 2009 in the District Court (“the O 81 Application”), for immediate possession of the Flat as well as costs for the legal proceedings. From 13 July 2009, correspondence passed between the parties, negotiating the terms of a possible settlement. On or about 24 July 2009, the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into a consent order (“the Consent Order”). The terms of the Consent Order were as follows:
The Plaintiff is now claiming for the monies expended in taking care of the Deceased during her lifetime, as well as equitable “damages”, or more correctly equitable compensation, for loss of opportunity to reside in the Flat. In support of this claim, the Plaintiff submits the following facts which the Defendant is prepared to accept solely for the purposes of this appeal:
The Plaintiff commenced this action against the Defendant on 9 February 2010. The claim is based on proprietary estoppel, and the remedy sought by the Plaintiff is limited to monetary compensation. I also note that the Plaintiff was given leave to amend his statement of claim by the Assistant Registrar after the case was first heard in chambers.
The Defendant applied to strike out the claim, although the relevant grounds for the application were not made clear. This was the case despite two sets of written submissions being filed by the Defendant. I proceed on the basis that the application is based on the ground that the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action.
For the purposes of this appeal, the Defendant is prepared to accept that the Plaintiff is able to show that the elements of proprietary estoppel are satisfied. It is common ground that the Plaintiff is ineligible to own an HDB flat. The Defendant makes the following submissions in support of his application:
The standard which must be satisfied before pleadings can be struck out was clearly set out in the Court of Appeal case of
In general, it is only in plain and obvious cases that the power of striking out should be invoked. This was the view taken by Lindley MR in
Hubbuck & Sons v Wilkinson, Heywood and Clark [1899] 1 QB 86 at p 91. It should not be exercised by a minute and protracted examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see if the Plaintiff really has a cause of action. The practice of the courts has been that, where an application for striking out involves a lengthy and serious argument, the court should decline to proceed with the argument unless, not only does it have doubts as to the soundness of the pleading but, in addition, it is satisfied that striking out will obviate the necessity for a trial or reduce the burden of preparing for a trial.
In
… This is anchored on the judicial policy to afford a litigant the right to institute a bona fide claim before the courts and to prosecute it in the usual way. Whenever possible the courts will let the Plaintiff proceed with the action unless his case is wholly and clearly unarguable …
In the course of deciding whether the Plaintiff’s claim was a “plain and obvious” case which was “wholly and clearly unarguable”, the following issues have to be addressed:
Counsel for the Defendant submits that s 51(10) of the HDA prevents ineligible persons under the HDA from taking an interest in HDB flats. As such, a claim in proprietary estoppel, which is contingent on the Plaintiff having an interest in the flat, is precluded by s 51(10) of the HDA, which necessarily means that the application to strike out the claim must succeed.
This submission raises a number of issues which need to be examined carefully. The first, being the objective of s 51(10) of the HDA. The second, being how s 51(10) of the HDA operates to achieve this objective. The third, being whether the nature of a claim in proprietary estoppel means that it would be precluded by s 51(10) of the HDA in light of how the first two issues are decided.
The objective of s 51(10) of the HDASection 51(10) of the HDA reads:
This provision was amended to its current wording in 2010, with the words “or arising” being included at the end of the provision. The previous equivalent provision, which is s 51(6) of the then HDA, read:No person shall become entitled to any protected property (or any interest in such property) under any resulting trust or constructive trust whensoever created or arising.
No person shall become entitled to any such flat, house or other building under any resulting trust or constructive trust, whensoever created.
In
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Low Heng Leon Andy v Low Kian Beng Lawrence
...Heng Leon Andy Plaintiff and Low Kian Beng Lawrence (administrator of the estate of Tan Ah Kng, deceased) Defendant [2013] SGHC 101 Quentin Loh J Suit No 252 of 2011 (Registrar's Appeal No 227 of 2011) High Court Civil Procedure—Striking out—Whether claim in proprietary estoppel should be a......
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UAM v UAN and another
...would have been a possible remedy (see Low Heng Leon Andy v Low Kian Beng Lawrence (administrator of the estate of Tan Ah Kng, deceased) [2013] SGHC 101 at [30(d)]). Accordingly, the plaintiff did not at the material time have any inconsistent rights to elect between, as it were. In Oliver ......