With a little help from my friends: maritime capacity-building measures in the Straits of Malacca.
Author | Khalid, Nazery |
Position | Report |
Sandwiched between the east coast of Sumatra, Indonesia and the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, lies the 500-mile (800 km) Straits of Malacca, one of the world's most pivotal waterways. The sea lane, (2) the world's longest and busiest used for international navigation, hosts over 70,000 vessel movements annually, (3) and provides a crucial trade link between the East and the West. A staggering 15 million barrels of crude oil--a third of the world's oil trade--passed through the Straits in 2006, (4) while an estimated 30 per cent of world trade is shipped through the waterway each year. (5)
What is known geographically as the Straits of Malacca is in fact more than just the southern part of the waterway where the territorial seas of the littoral states overlap. The Straits of Malacca is defined as the area lying between the west coast of Thailand and Malaysia in the northeast, and the coast of Sumatra in the southwest. (6) The frequent use of the term "littoral states" in the discourse of the Straits may suggest uniformity of views among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. To the contrary, however, there exist differing interests and perceptions among the three nations. Indonesia takes a strong stand on protecting its sovereign rights in the Straits which it deems crucial to the country's territorial integrity and national defence, and is conscious that the Sumatran side of the waterway is not as well developed as the Malaysian and Singapore sides. Malaysia views the Straits as an important facilitator of trade and a provider of resources and recreation. Meanwhile, Singapore, whose economy depends on the continued free flow of maritime trade, views the waterway as an economic lifeline and is more concerned with the security and safety of the southern part of the waterway that juts into the Straits of Singapore.
One position the littorals indisputably have in common is that the Straits of Malacca holds tremendous socio-economic and strategic value. This view is core to the cooperation that has been forged among the littoral states over the years to collectively maintain order in the Straits and to ensure that it remains open to shipping, while at the same time ensuring their own national interests are protected.
The United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) accords the Straits the status of an international strait in which freedom of passage for all users is guaranteed. However, UNCLOS also affirms the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the coastal states over the waterway. (7) Although the management of the Straits is the responsibility of the littoral states, issues and problems concerning the waterway attract international attention on account of its vital importance to global trade and its strategic value to the international community.
However, there exists a notable divergence in the way the stakeholders of the Straits view this strategic sea line of communication (SLOC). The Straits is perceived by external powers in "hard" terms as a shipping lane that should be kept open at all times and as a pivotal SLOC of immense strategic value to the regional maritime balance of power. The economic powerhouses of northeast Asia--Japan, China and South Korea--depend on the Straits for trade and energy imports and persistently emphasize the need to secure ships passing the waterway. A rising India, meanwhile, considers its navy as a stabilizing force in the Indian Ocean, and thus pays close attention to the Straits of Malacca.
The littoral states, on the other hand, tend to perceive the Straits in "soft" terms: as a sea lane facilitating interregional trade, as a key source of food for their populations, a source of recreation and revenue from tourism, and as a sensitive marine ecosystem that needs to be protected from environmental degradation. Differing views between the user states and the littoral states often leads to contention in the use of the Straits and over how it should be properly managed. Understandably, the littoral states do not take too kindly to suggestions that they fall short in their capacity to protect the waterway, and are sometimes suspicious of offers of assistance by external powers that may enhance their role in maintaining security in the Straits.
Differences in perceptions and interests in the Straits of Malacca are most notable when it comes to addressing security threats. Users of the Straits often cite their right of passage through the Straits to justify their involvement in matters pertaining to strait security. In sharp contrast to this position, the littoral states have always reiterated that responsibility for securing the Straits is theirs alone, while never denying users the right of passage. (8) On numerous occasions, the littoral states have had to reiterate their unwavering position that security initiatives in the Straits should not impinge on their sovereignty and sovereign rights. (9) Although supportive of collaborative efforts to maintain the Straits, the littoral states are mindful of the tendency of external powers to include the Straits in their strategic calculations and are wary of initiatives that may pose a challenge to their sovereignty.
This article examines the various maritime capacity-building measures that have been implemented to improve the littoral states' ability to meet security challenges in the Straits and improve management of the waterway. The article argues that while the littoral states welcome international assistance to enhance security, navigational safety and environmental protection in the Straits they are wary of any initiatives that would impinge on their sovereignty and sovereign rights.
Dire Straits? The Threats Facing the Straits of Malacca
The threats facing the Straits are multidimensional. Although in recent years the international media has given extensive coverage to piracy and sea robbery, there are many other threats facing this key artery of world trade. (10)
As the economies of East Asia grow and trade with the rest of the world increases, there is growing concern over the rising volume of traffic in the Straits and the risk of accidents and environmental pollution. Such incidents could result in the disruption of shipping through the passageway which could potentially have an adverse impact on global trade, the bulk of which is carried by sea. One study projects that annual traffic in the Straits will increase to well above 100,000 vessels by 2020, while another forecasts even faster growth. (11) Such an increase in traffic intensifies the concerns of the littoral states that they will have to devote ever increasing resources to enhance traffic management systems and prepare for the environmental fallout from shipping accidents. Concerns exist that it might not be too long before the Straits reaches its maximum carrying capacity and would no longer be safe for navigation beyond this threshold level. (12) This worry is compounded by the fact that the funnel-shaped Straits contains several narrow passages and sandbanks, shoals and shallow areas which pose navigational challenges to large ships.
Although user states have contributed financial and technical aid towards the maintenance of safety and security in the Straits, the littoral states view such assistance as disproportionate to the frequency and intensity of their use. The littoral states--which include developing nations with many socio-economic priorities--certainly would like to see more aid rendered to help relieve them of the huge financial burden of financing the upkeep of the congested waterway. The cost of putting in place navigational safety equipment and undertaking environmental protection measures is already burdensome to the littoral states and will no doubt rise further as traffic increases. (13)
The environmental impacts arising from pollution and unsustainable development in the Straits of Malacca could negatively impact economic activities in and along the sea lane. Increased pollution in the Straits could be especially damaging to the coastal zones and to the fisheries and tourism industries of the littoral states. Many of the vital economic activities in the areas bordering the Straits require pollution free waters. There would be a high socio-economic and even a political price to pay for serious environmental degradation in the Straits that could affect the interests of the littoral states and the international community.
These threats are complex, asymmetrical, multidimensional and transnational, and hence can only be realistically and efficiently addressed through multilateral approaches. As global trade volume grows, and nations begin to flex their naval capabilities, the strategic importance of SLOCs such as the Straits of Malacca becomes more pronounced. The Straits has not only emerged as one of the world's most critical maritime trade paths but is also a chessboard on which strategic calculations are played out by major powers. With growing global attention and rising international stakes in this key waterway, new challenges have emerged that require the littoral states to manage them in a way that satisfies the multiple, and at times conflicting, interests of various stakeholders. The littoral states cannot be realistically expected to manage the Straits by themselves without help from more prosperous and technically advanced nations that use the waterway intensively and accrue enormous benefits from it.
Piracy in the Straits of Malacca has garnered much attention since the early 2000s, though it is an old problem. The majority of attacks are carried out by armed sea robbers preying on small merchant vessels, although there have also been cases of attacks against larger vessels. In 2004, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) (14) reported a total of thirty-eight cases of piratical attacks in the Straits, which prompted Lloyd's Market Association of London to designate the sea lane as a "war risk zone". (15) There was immense...
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