Lim Heng How v Lim Meu Beo

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeAudrey Lim J
Judgment Date09 March 2020
Neutral Citation[2020] SGHC 49
Plaintiff CounselWong Soo Chih, Nicholas Roshan Rai and Koh Shin-E Mandy (Ho Wong Law Practice LLC)
Docket NumberSuit No 674 of 2018
Date09 March 2020
Hearing Date17 September 2019,26 December 2019,19 September 2019,20 September 2019,18 September 2019
Subject MatterMental incapacity,Delay,Restitution,Pleadings,Unjust enrichment,Revocation,Probate and Administration,Grant of probate,Duties,Distribution of assets,Administration of assets
Year2020
Defendant CounselYap Jie Han and Seah Yan De Bryan (Wong Tan & Molly Lim LLC)
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Citation[2020] SGHC 49
Published date13 March 2020
Audrey Lim J: Background

The plaintiff (“P”) and the defendant (“D”) are brother and sister respectively. The dispute (“the Suit”) relates to the estates of their late mother (“Mdm Yap”) and late sister (“Wendy”), and matters pertaining to their sister (“ML”) who has been incapable of managing her affairs from birth and whom P is her court-appointed deputy since 29 February 2016. Mdm Yap had four daughters and three sons. The Suit proceeded on both liability and damages.1

P brought various claims against D in three differing capacities. First, P, in his capacity as co-executor of Mdm Yap’s estate (“Executor”) claimed against D in her capacity as co-executor of the estate (“Executrix”). Second, P, as a beneficiary of Wendy’s estate, claimed against D as the administratrix of the estate. Third, P made claims against D on ML’s behalf as ML’s court-appointed deputy. In turn, D made various counterclaims against P, Mdm Yap’s estate and ML. Finally, both P and D sought a declaration that the other had breached his/her duties in relation to Mdm Yap’s estate and the removal of one another as Executor/Executrix of the estate. I will deal with each party’s claims in turn.

P’s claims against D for breach of duty as Executrix of Mdm Yap’s estate

Mdm Yap passed away on 22 February 1995 and probate was obtained on 26 July 1995. In her will, Mdm Yap bequeathed her assets as follows: a property in Malaysia (“KL Property”) to her four daughters D, ML, Wendy and Tracey in equal shares; a HDB flat (“Clementi Flat”) to be sold and the sale proceeds to be used to buy a 3-room HDB flat for ML, with the balance proceeds to be distributed equally to D, Wendy and Tracey; and her personal properties to be distributed to her seven children in stated proportions.2

P and D opened two estate accounts, an OCBC account (“Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account”) in 1996 and an RHB account in Johor, Malaysia (“Johor RHB Account”) in 2008/2009.3 P claimed that D insisted on solely managing Mdm Yap’s estate assets and monies, and P was kept in the dark regarding the KL Property and it was not until later that he discovered that it had been sold in 2009.4 D refused to provide P information on Mdm Yap’s estate, and when P asked D for bank statements relating to the estate, she produced only bank statements for Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account in September 2014. P also alleged that D then closed Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account and the Johor RHB Account without his knowledge or consent, and commingled Mdm Yap’s estate monies with her personal funds by transferring monies from the Johor RHB Account to D’s Standard Chartered Bank account (“D’s SCB Account”).5

The Clementi Flat was only sold in 2014. P claimed this was due to D’s delay and this led to a delay in purchasing a new flat for ML. In April 2013, D commenced Originating Summons No 311/2013 (“OS 311”) to seek sole conduct of the sale of the Clementi Flat. OS 311 was resolved by consent on 4 September 2014, with parties to cooperate in the sale of the flat for $831,000 and for its proceeds to be utilised to purchase a 3-room HDB flat for ML (“2014 Consent Order”). The Clementi Flat was subsequently sold on 12 November 2014. Meanwhile, D had purchased another flat (“West Coast Flat”) on 18 January 2008 in ML’s name,6 which P claimed he was unaware of until the recording of the 2014 Consent Order.7 Pursuant to the 2014 Consent Order, a cheque was issued for $400,000 (the amount set aside from the sale proceeds of the Clementi Flat) for D to sign for the purchase of a new flat for ML but P claimed that D refused to sign it. When the Suit commenced in July 2018, this issue remained outstanding but was subsequently resolved by consent on 14 November 2018 (“2018 Consent Order”). The 2018 Consent Order provided that the West Coast Flat would be sold and: (a) some $235,000 would be paid to D upon proof that she had incurred this amount relating to the purchase of that flat; (b) the balance sale proceeds would be distributed in accordance with Mdm Yap’s will; and (c) a new flat would be purchased for ML.8 The West Coast Flat was sold on 19 July 2019 and a new flat purchased for ML on 18 March 2019 (“ML’s New Flat”).9

Next, P claimed that D should return $12,396.53 to Mdm Yap’s estate as she had purportedly taken this sum from the estate to repay one Yap Ngan Thye (“YNT”) for a loan made to Mdm Yap (“YNT Loan”). P claimed that the YNT Loan had been repaid by Mdm Yap to YNT before her demise.

P alleged that D had thus breached her duties as Executrix of Mdm Yap’s estate.10 D had unilaterally closed Mdm Yap’s estate accounts; delayed the sale of the Clementi Flat, resulting in a delay in purchasing a flat for ML; failed to inform all the siblings in 2008 that she had purchased the West Coast Flat for ML and misled the court in OS 311. D had also misappropriated Mdm Yap’s estate money by claiming to use the money to repay the YNT Loan; commingled Mdm Yap’s estate monies with D’s monies and Wendy’s estate monies; and refused to produce bank statements pertaining to Mdm Yap’s estate and of D’s bank accounts where her monies were commingled with Mdm Yap’s estate monies. Finally, P claimed that he was prevented from administering Mdm Yap’s estate. I will deal with each of P’s claims in turn.

Unilaterally closing Mdm Yap’s estate accounts

P claimed that Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account and Johor RHB Account were unilaterally closed by D without his knowledge or consent, and without rendering any proper accounts to P or the beneficiaries.11

I find that P has failed to show that Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account was closed without his knowledge or consent. The account was opened on 30 May 1996 and closed on 25 September 1998. D explained that the account was closed with “two signatures” and the balance of $1,403.87 was withdrawn by both P and D who signed the withdrawal slip and P had agreed that the money would be used to reimburse D for the administration of Mdm Yap’s estate.12 I preferred D’s evidence to P’s. P and D agreed that two signatories (ie, both P and D) were required to withdraw money from the account or to close the account.13 As P’s authority would have been required to close Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account, I disbelieve that P did not know about or consent to the closure of the account and the withdrawal of the balance sum to reimburse D for estate expenses. P’s assertion that “it goes without saying that [P’s] signature would have to have been forged by [D] in order for her to have unilaterally closed the account”14 (emphasis mine), is but a bare assertion. The onus is on P to prove his claim. He was a signatory of the account and could have obtained the necessary documents to support his claim, but he did not.

As for P’s claim that Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account was closed without rendering proper accounts, P did not explain how this was so. On the contrary, P agreed that there was no irregularity in the handling of the account monies and that the monies had been fully and properly accounted for. P accepted that the monies withdrawn from Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account when the account was live was used only to pay the mortgage of the Clementi Flat and approved by both D and him.15

That said, D did not dispute that when Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account was closed, she had taken the balance of $1,403.87. She claimed that this was to reimburse her expenses relating to Mdm Yap’s estate. D tendered a table of expenses that she had prepared in 2012 in relation to the estate (“Table of Expenses”). These expenses amounted to $3,078.84 of which she used the $1,403.87 to partially reimburse herself.16 I find that when Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account was closed on 25 September 1998, D did not have any basis for keeping the entire sum of $1,403.87. The Table of Expenses (and supporting documents) showed that only seven of 13 items (items 1 to 6 and 12) were incurred before 25 September 1998 and totalled $1,142.60 and which was less than the $1,403.87 that D had taken.17 It is unclear when the “running expenses” for item 13 were incurred, although P did not dispute that D made the payments.18

Nevertheless, D had produced supporting documents for items 7 to 11 of the Table of Expenses incurred after September 1998 totalling $1,436.24.19 I accept that D had paid for all the above items and which related to Mdm Yap’s estate. Even by P’s claim, D had administered the estate and paid for items 7 to 11 and 13.20 P also conceded that the $1,403.87 withdrawn from Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account had been fully and properly accounted for.21 However this did not excuse D’s actions in failing to properly account for the $1,403.87 at the time Mdm Yap’s OCBC Account was closed. The question is whether, by this, I should remove D as Executrix – an issue which I will deal with later.

As for the Johor RHB Account, I find that P has failed to prove that D had closed the account without his knowledge or consent. This account was opened around end 2008, and D claimed that it was closed in late 2009. The monies in that account could be withdrawn by P or D and did not require the parties’ joint consent.22 P agreed that he opened the Johor RHB Account with D, and was able to obtain bank statements from the bank pertaining to the account. He also accepted that the sale proceeds from the KL Property, which were deposited into the Johor RHB Account, has been distributed to the beneficiaries and that the monies in the Johor RHB Account have been accounted for.23 However, P did not provide any details for his assertion that the account was closed without his knowledge or consent. There was no evidence adduced as to whether both P and D must authorise or consent to the closure of the Johor RHB Account, or whether authority from either of them would suffice. As P and D were joint account holders, I infer that the bank would require both their consent/authorisation to close the account.

Delay in sale of Clementi Flat

P claimed that D had delayed the sale of the Clementi Flat...

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1 books & journal articles
  • Restitution
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2020, December 2020
    • 1 December 2020
    ...to the first plaintiff even after the conclusion of the current proceedings. 57 See para 25.8 above. 58 See paras 25.2–25.4 above. 59 [2020] 4 SLR 1217. 60 This decision appears to go against recent Singapore judgments in which the court refused to assist the plaintiff by inferring a claim ......

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