Lee Kuan Yew and Another v Vinocur and Others and another action

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 22 August 1995
• Date: 22 August 1995
• Docket Number: Suits Nos 1488 and 1490 of 1994
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Lee Kuan Yew and another

Plaintiff

and

Vinocur John and others and another suit

Defendant

[1995] SGHC 201

Goh Joon Seng J

Suits Nos 1488 and 1490 of 1994

High Court

Civil Procedure–Pleadings–Whether claim for aggravated damages for injury to feelings had to be specifically pleaded–Whether facts supporting claim for aggravated damages had to be specifically pleaded–Whether malice had to be pleaded–Order 18 rr 7, 12 and O 78 r 3 (3) Rules of the Supreme Court (Cap 322, R 5, 1990 Ed)–Civil Procedure–Witnesses–Oral evidence-in-chief–Whether deponent of affidavit admitted under O 38 r 2 (1) should be allowed to give oral evidence-in-chief–Whether evidence intended to be given arose after filing of affidavit–Order 38 rr 1 and 2 Rules of the Supreme Court (Cap 322, R 5, 1990 Ed)–Tort–Defamation–Damages–Factors to consider when awarding damages

The plaintiffs claimed damages for libel against the defendants. The plaintiffs were: (a) Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew; (b) the Deputy Prime Minister and first plaintiff's son Mr Lee Hsien Loong; and (c) the Prime Minister Mr Goh Chok Tong. The defendants were (a) Mr John Vincour, the executive editor of the International Herald Tribune (“IHT”); (b) Mr Philip Bowring, a freelance journalist; and (c) Mr Richard McClean, the chief executive and publisher of the International Herald Tribune.

On 2 August 1994, the IHT carried on its opinion page an article written by Mr Bowring. The plaintiffs considered the article defamatory and wrote to the IHT demanding an apology. On 31 August 1994 the IHT published an unreserved apology from all three defendants to the plaintiffs and undertook not to make further allegations of the same or similar nature.

In September 1994 the plaintiffs filed their claims for damages for libel and on 28 October 1994 they obtained interlocutory judgments against the defendants for damages, including aggravated damages, to be assessed. At the assessment proceedings the defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not pleaded injury to feelings and malice, so that no evidence on these points should be admitted. The defendants also objected to the plaintiffs giving oral evidence submitting that although the interlocutory order permitted the parties to call the plaintiffs as witnesses, that order had to be read subject to O 38 r 2 (3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court (Cap 322, R 5, 1990 Ed) (“RSC”) under which no deponent to an affidavit admitted under r 2 (1) was permitted to give evidence-in-chief of matters not contained in his affidavit except on matters which had arisen after the filing of the affidavit.

Held, dismissing the defendants' objections:

(1) It was clear that the purpose of O 38 was to achieve a fair and expeditious disposal of proceedings, save costs and eliminate any element of surprise as to the witnesses each party intended to call at the trial or as to the substance of their evidence. It was obvious that the oral evidence to be given by the plaintiffs would be an amplification of the evidence given on affidavits on the issue of malice and the hurt to the plaintiffs' feelings caused by publication of the article. The defendants therefore would not be taken by surprise. The plaintiffs would be allowed to give oral evidence under O 38 r 2 (4) or in the exercise of the court's inherent powers vide O 92 r 4 of the RSC, in the interest of justice: at [23].

(2) It was axiomatic that all claims for whatever causes of action had to be pleaded. A claim for aggravated damages need not be specifically pleaded but in any event, the claim for aggravated damages for injury to feelings would fall within the parameters of the plaintiffs' statements of claim of having been “gravely injured in [their/his] character, credit and reputation” and having been “brought into public scandal, odium and contempt”: at [29] and [37].

(3) The relevant rule on whether the facts supporting a claim for aggravated damages should be pleaded was O 18 r 7 (1) of the RSC. The principle underlying O 18 r 7 was that a party should be given the opportunity to know what his opponent's case was and should not be caught by surprise at the trial. In the present proceedings, injury to the feelings of the plaintiffs was the necessary and immediate consequence of the injury to their character, credit and reputation and their being brought into public scandal, odium and contempt. Further, in the plaintiffs' O 14 applications, judgments applied for were for damages including aggravated damages. The defendants therefore could not have been surprised or embarrassed by the claims for aggravated damages arising from injury to feelings: at [38], [44] and [47].

(4) With regard to malice, it was only when a defendant pleaded a defence of fair comment or qualified privilege that the plaintiff was then required to plead in reply express malice on the part of the defendant and the facts from which such malice was to be inferred to rebut such a defence. As no defence was filed in the present proceedings, the plaintiffs were not required to file a reply of facts supporting a claim for malice. It was anomalous to require malice to be specifically pleaded in the statement of claim when other aggravating factors need not be, the damages for defamation being at large: at [48], [50] and [53].

(5) Taking into account the standing and position of the plaintiffs, the gravity of the libellous allegations which were unprovoked and actuated by malice and the standing of IHT, the court awarded the first and second plaintiffs $300,000 each and the third plaintiff $350,000. In arriving at these awards, the court took into account the closing remarks of counsel for the defendants when he read out their apology in open court and reiterated that there was no truth in their allegations: at [66] and [67].

Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027 (folld)

Harris v Arnott (No 2) (1890) 26 LR Ir 69 (folld)

Lee Kuan Yew v Davies Derek Gwyn [1989] 2 SLR (R) 544; [1989] SLR 1063 (folld)

Lee Kuan Yew v Seow Khee Leng [1988] 2 SLR (R) 252; [1988] SLR 832 (refd)

Milligan v Jamieson (1902) 4 OLR 650 (distd)

Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105; 151 ER 340 (refd)

Perestrello E Companhia Limitada v United Paint Co Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 570; [1969] 3 All ER 479 (distd)

Philipps v Philipps (1878) 4 QBD 127 (refd)

Prince Ruspoli v Associated Newspapers plc (11 December 1992, CA) (UK) (distd)

Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 1 All ER 367 (refd)

Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 (refd)

Rules of the Supreme Court (Cap 322, R 5, 1990 Ed)O 18rr 7, 12, O 38rr 1, 2, O 78r 3 (3) (consd);O 14r 3, O 41r 6, O 92r 4

Tan Kok Quan and Anjali Mohan (Lee & Lee) for the plaintiffs in Suit No 1488/94

Harry Elias and Yap Teong Liang (Harry Elias & Pnrs) for the plaintiffs in Suit No 1490/94

Michael Hwang, K Shanmugam and Foo Maw Shen (Allen & Gledhill) for the defendants in Suits Nos 1488/94 and 1490/94.

Goh Joon Seng J

1 The plaintiffs in both suits claimed against the defendants damages for libel. At the end of the hearing I awarded the first and second plaintiffs in Suit No 1488/94 the sum of $300,000 each and the plaintiff in Suit No 1490/94 the sum of $350,000 with costs reserved for further argument. I now give my reasons.

The parties

2 The first plaintiff in Suit No 1488/94 (“the first plaintiff”) is currently the Senior Minister in the Prime Minister's Office. Before that he was the Prime Minister of Singapore from May 1959 to 27 November 1990. He was elected a Member of the Legislative Assembly in 1955 and has been a Member of Parliament since 1959. Currently he is a Member of Parliament for the Tanjong Pagar Group Representation Constituency. He is a member of the Central Executive Committee of the People's Action Party (“PAP”). Between 1954 and December 1992, he was the Secretary-General.

3 The second plaintiff in Suit No 1488/94 (“the second plaintiff”) is and has been the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore since 28 November 1990. He was appointed to this post by the plaintiff in Suit No 1490/90 (to be referred to herein as “the third plaintiff”). Between 2 January 1985 and 31 December 1986, the second plaintiff was the Minister of State in the Ministry of Trade and Industry and Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence, having been appointed to these posts by the then Prime Minister, the first plaintiff. On 1 January 1987, he was promoted to Minister for Trade and Industry and Second Minister for Defence (Services). He held these posts until 27 November 1990. He has been a Member of Parliament since 23 December 1984 and is currently a Member of Parliament for the Ang Mo Kio Group Representation Constituency. He is and has been the First Assistant Secretary-General of the PAP since 2 December 1992. Before that he was the Second Assistant Secretary-General. He is the son of the first plaintiff.

4 The third plaintiff has been the Prime Minister of Singapore since 28 November 1990. From January 1985 to 27 November 1990 he was the First Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore. He has been a Member of Parliament since December 1976 and is currently a Member of Parliament for the Marine Parade Group Representation Constituency. He is also the Secretary-General of the PAP, a position he has held since December 1992. Before that he was the First Assistant Secretary-General.

5 The first defendant is the executive editor of the International Herald Tribune (“IHT”). He has over 30 years of experience in the field of journalism in and outside the United States, mainly with the Associated Press and the New York Times. He was the Paris bureau chief and Bonn bureau chief of the New York Times and then its metropolitan editor before becoming the executive editor of the IHT seven years ago. He was conferred the George Polk Award in 1986 for his reporting work in Paraguay.

6 The second defendant is a freelance journalist contributing...