Lee Bee Eng (formerly trading as AFCO East Development) v Cheng William
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Judge | Lee Seiu Kin J |
Judgment Date | 01 October 2020 |
Neutral Citation | [2020] SGHC 207 |
Court | High Court (Singapore) |
Docket Number | Suit No 437 of 2017 (Registrar’s Appeal Nos 82 and 363 of 2019) |
Year | 2020 |
Published date | 07 October 2020 |
Hearing Date | 08 October 2019,12 September 2019,08 April 2019,13 February 2020,25 November 2019 |
Plaintiff Counsel | John Lim Kwang Meng, Sia Dewei, Alvin and Ng Kai Ling (LIMN Law Corporation) |
Defendant Counsel | Goh Wei Wei and Ling Jia Yu (WongPartnership LLP) |
Subject Matter | Civil Procedure,Parties,Joinder,Substitution,Rules of court,Striking out |
Citation | [2020] SGHC 207 |
These appeals arise out of the decision of the assistant registrar (the “
The matter had been adjourned a number of times, initially at the behest of the defendant for him to apply to be legally aided, then on the application of the plaintiff to file further evidence, and again at the defendant’s request on account of recently appointed solicitors. The hearing was finally completed on 25 November 2019 and I adjourned it to a later date to announce my decision. On 13 February 2020, I set aside the AR’s decision and ordered a substitution of the original plaintiff for Ms Lee pursuant to O 15 r 6 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“
Ms Lee is a director of AFCO East Development Pte Ltd1, a private limited company that undertakes general contracting work, and “other specialised construction and related activities”.2 AFCO East Development Pte Ltd (“
The defendant is Mr William Cheng.
Background to the dispute On 15 May 2006, the plaintiff registered a sole proprietorship with the Accounting and Regulatory Authority of Singapore under the name and style of “AFCO East Development” (the “
In early 2012, the defendant approached the Sole Proprietorship to replace a prior contractor who had been engaged to construct a single storey terrace house at 210 Yio Chu Kang Road (the “
Disputes subsequently arose between the parties. From 23 April 2012 to 31 October 2016, five progress payment invoices totalling the contract sum of $460,000 were issued to the defendant for works done for the Project.8 The defendant only paid $322,000 in satisfaction of the first three invoices and part of the fourth invoice.9 AFCO commenced Suit 437/2017 against the defendant on 12 May 2017, claiming the outstanding progress payments totalling $138,000 (“the
In his defence filed on 18 January 2018, the defendant’s main argument was that AFCO had no standing to bring the suit. The contract was between him and the Sole Proprietorship11, not AFCO. This was evinced by the Letter of Award (which had been issued to the Sole Proprietorship12) and the Form of Quotation (which had been signed by the Sole Proprietorship’s project manager).
SUM 4037 & SUM 4360 The defendant then filed Summons No 4037 of 2018 (“
Both summonses were heard before the AR. On 13 December 2018, the AR made the following orders:13
During a further hearing on 26 December 2018, the AR declined to grant the defendant’s application for security for costs.15 The AR determined that the pre-requisite conditions under O 23 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“Rules of Court”) had not been satisfied and that consequentially, there was no discretion to make such orders.
RA 82/2019On 7 March 2019, the defendant commenced RA 82/2019, appealing against the AR’s decision to (i) add the Sole Proprietor as Ms Lee; and (ii) decline his application for security for costs. Ms Lee did not appeal against the AR’s decision.
RA 82/2019 was heard before me on 12 September, 8 October and 25 November 2019. On 12 September 2019, I dismissed the defendant’s appeal against the AR’s decision not to grant security for costs. I observed that such orders are usually made in situations involving foreign plaintiffs or companies. This was not such a case. Considering all the circumstances, there was no reason to order security for costs. The hearing on 8 October 2019 was adjourned upon the defendant’s application and resumed on 25 November 2019. For reasons that shall be explained later in this judgment at [21], Counsel for Ms Lee, Mr Sia Dewei, Alvin (“
Counsel for the defendant, Ms Goh Wei Wei (“
Firstly, it was argued that O 15 r 4 was not the proper provision for adding the Sole Proprietor as a plaintiff. The effective outcome of the AR’s decision – to strike out AFCO’s claims and add the Sole Proprietor – was a
Secondly, Ms Goh argued that the AR did not have the power to add the Sole Proprietor under O 15 r 6 as proceedings had already concluded. Citing the Court of Appeal in
Ms Goh submitted that a court should not exercise its power of joinder where the pleaded case is plainly unsustainable (
Similarly, Ms Lee was not entitled to the Variation Payments. The defendant contended that there were neither directions from him to carry out such works nor was there an agreement that the defendant would make additional payment for the same. In support of his contention, the defendant referred to (i) the last page of the Form of Quotation (which states, “price is lump sum @ $460k — any variation would be lower and not higher than the said sum of $460k”)17 and (ii) AFCO/Ms Lee’s failure to produce any invoices for variation works18. Collectively these suggested that Ms Lee had no basis to claim for the Variation Payments and that her pleaded case was therefore unsustainable. Accordingly, the Court should not exercise its power of joinder.
Were Ms Lee’s claims time-barred? With regard to Ms Lee’s claims for the Progress Payments, the defendant submitted that the cause of action accrued when the contractual relationship was created,
As a preliminary point, Mr Sia did not dispute that the defendant’s contract had been with the Sole Proprietorship rather than AFCO.
Mr Sia advanced two arguments. Firstly, he contended that Ms Goh’s arguments about the applicability of O 15 r 6 (as opposed to O 15 r 4) were excessively technical. Secondly, he submitted that the AR’s power of joinder still subsisted since the AR made the order for the Sole Proprietor to be added as a plaintiff
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