Law Society of Singapore v Yong Wei Kuen Paul

• Judge: Sundaresh Menon CJ
• Judgment Date: 01 April 2020
• Neutral Citation: [2020] SGHC 66
• Citation: [2020] SGHC 66
• Defendant Counsel: The respondent in person.
• Published date: 04 April 2020
• Hearing Date: 01 April 2020
• Plaintiff Counsel: Harish Kumar s/o Champaklal (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP)
• Date: 01 April 2020
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 12 of 2019
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Legal Profession,Professional conduct,Disciplinary proceedings,Breach

Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA (delivering the judgment of the court ex tempore): Preamble

The present proceedings arise out of two separate complaints dealt with by same Disciplinary Tribunal in two sets of disciplinary hearings (DT/3/2019 and DT/10/2018). The respondent did not appear before either Disciplinary Tribunal; he did not lead evidence or make submissions; and unsurprisingly was convicted of all the charges. He appears before us today claiming that he was ignorant of all that had transpired before the Disciplinary Tribunal and seeks an adjournment purportedly to seek legal advice and representation. He claims that he had purely fortuitously heard of these proceedings last night when another lawyer asked him about it.

We have no hesitation in dismissing this request which we regard as having been made in bad faith. Ms Angela Chopard of the Disciplinary Tribunal Secretariat (“the Secretariat”) has sworn two Affidavits giving details of all the efforts made to serve the papers on the respondent and to contact him. The respondent claims all these documents never reached him. It is impossible to accept that when some of these documents were delivered by courier and/or sent by email.

But beyond that, as noted in the two Disciplinary Tribunal reports, the respondent was plainly aware of these proceedings: He filed a long written reply by way of a letter dated 9 June 2018 in respect of the complaint in DT/3/2019; After the conclusion of that hearing, he contacted the Secretariat and sent an email on 13 June 2019 to say that he had only learnt of these proceedings on the day before when his mother handed him a package; He confirmed in that conversation that the package in question had been sent to his registered address but he claimed that was his parents’ residence and that he had never volunteered an alternative address; He also claimed in that conversation that emails sent by the Secretariat and by counsel for the Law Society had gone to his spam folder. If true, this means that he knew they were there, and perhaps did not want to or bother to look at them. He also claimed that he wanted to make submissions. The Secretariat informed him by letter dated 26 June 2019 that he should furnish any submission by 12 July 2019, but nothing further was heard from him. In relation to DT/10/2018, he called the Secretariat on 12 November 2018 to ask for an extension of time to file his defence. His number was recorded by the Secretariat and he was asked to make his request by email. He did that and the request was duly granted though he did not subsequently file his defence or respond to emails sent to the address from which he had emailed the Secretariat asking for the extension or respond to calls made to the number from which he had called the Secretariat.

These matters are all recorded in the two reports of the Disciplinary Tribunal and the only inference to be drawn from this is that he was doing all he could to evade service in order to mount a claim of ignorance. We will not stand for such reprehensible conduct by one who claims the privilege of being an officer of the court. We therefore deny the request for an adjournment.

Background to the present application

The respondent is an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of some 20 years’ standing. He last practised as the Managing Partner of Thames Law LLP (“the Firm”). His conduct arising out of each of the two independent sets of disciplinary proceedings against him constitutes an egregious departure from the standards and values which are an integral part of the legal profession in general and the practice of law in particular. Foremost amongst those values are honour, integrity and honesty, which are the lifeblood of any respectable justice system. As the court observed in Law Society of Singapore v Rasif David [2008] 2 SLR(R) 955 (at [52]):

Such values are an integral part not only of life in general, but also of the legal profession in particular. No profession – not least the legal profession – can exist (let alone thrive) without them. Indeed, no life worth living can be lived without adhering to these values. … Devoid of the integral values outlined above, the legal profession would be no more than an empty shell, shorn of moral fibre. Its legitimacy and standing in the eyes of the public would be diminished and, beyond a certain point, would even be forfeit. This would be a tragedy in the light of the ideals which the legal profession embodies – the chief of which are to ensure that justice is achieved in each individual case by the objective application of general rules and principles (which are themselves, by definition, also objective), and (wherever possible) to lay down general principles that would aid in the resolution of future cases as well.

In the first set of proceedings brought before us, ie, DT/3/2019, six charges were brought against the respondent for orchestrating an illegal moneylending transaction which led one of his former clients to advance a substantial sum of money meant for a third party, none of which has been recovered. In the second set of proceedings, ie, DT/10/2018, the respondent faced four charges for not only failing to deliver the work he promised to a client, but also engaging in improper conduct in breach of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules (Cap 161, 1999 Rev Ed) (“SAR”) and the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap 161, 2015 Rev Ed) (“PCR”).

As already explained, while the respondent was absent and unrepresented in the disciplinary proceedings below, we are satisfied that he was furnished with the requisite details of the two complaints and proceedings against him. In the circumstances, the respondent’s conduct was far beyond the pale and falls squarely within ss 83(2)(b) and 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“LPA”). We also find that his conduct established due cause for striking off under s 83(1)(a) of the LPA (see Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju [2017] 4 SLR 1369 (“Udeh Kumar”) at [30]).

DT/3/2019

In DT/3/2019, the respondent approached his former client, Ms Oh, with what was, in substance, an illegal moneylending scheme disguised as a purported investment opportunity. Initially, false representations were made that if she were to advance $20,000 to the respondent’s friend for about two weeks, she would receive $40,000 in return. As it turned out, the friend is one Cyndi, who was an undischarged bankrupt.

In total, $49,500 was transferred as a result of the...