Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Caleb Charles James

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chao Hick Tin JA
• Judgment Date: 23 February 2004
• Neutral Citation: [2004] SGHC 35
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 1575 of
• Date: 23 February 2004
• Published date: 04 May 2004
• Year: 2004
• Plaintiff Counsel: M P Rai (Cooma and Rai)
• Citation: [2004] SGHC 35
• Defendant Counsel: Chelva Rajah SC (Tan Rajah and Cheah)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Show cause action,Appropriate order to be made,Legal Profession,Section 83(1) Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2001 Rev Ed), s 406 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed),Weight to be given to mitigating factors,Advocate and solicitor convicted of criminal breach of trust

23 February 2004

Yong Pung How CJ (delivering the judgment of the court):

1 This was an application by the Law Society of Singapore (“the Law Society”) pursuant to s 98(5) Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2001 Rev Ed) (“the LPA”) to make absolute an order to show cause. We granted the application and ordered the respondent, Caleb Charles James Ezekiel, to be struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors. We now give our reasons.

Facts

2 The facts of this case were undisputed. The respondent was a senior lawyer of 20 years’ standing, having been called to the Bar in 1984. At all material times, he was an equity partner at M/s Khattar Wong & Partners (“the firm”). In his capacity as equity partner, the respondent was entrusted with funds held in both the firm’s office account as well as the omnibus clients’ account.

3 In or about May 1996, the firm was engaged by Jerneh Insurance Berhad (“Jerneh”) to act on their behalf in relation to an insurance claim arising from a fatal road traffic accident. The defendant in the suit was insured with Jerneh. The case came under the charge of the respondent, who had authorisation from Jerneh to settle the suit up to a sum of $50,000. On 29 September 1998, the respondent settled the civil suit in excess of the mandate from Jerneh. Final judgment was entered against Jerneh and damages of $130,000 and costs of $15,000 plus disbursements were assessed to be paid to the claimants via the Public Trustee.

4 Between May 1999 and April 2000, the respondent made several withdrawals amounting to a total of $128,000 from the firm’s omnibus clients’ account without permission, and paid the moneys over to the Public Trustee, in settlement of the claim. He subsequently made several repayments between 7 May 1999 and 7 April 2000 into the clients’ account. By 23 September 2002, the respondent had made full restitution of the moneys taken.

5 The managing partner of the firm made a police report when these unauthorised withdrawals came to his attention. Notwithstanding the fact that the respondent had restored the moneys, it was clear that the initial taking was unauthorised. Accordingly, the respondent was charged with four counts of criminal breach of trust under s 406 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed). On 18 September 2003, the respondent pleaded guilty to one charge, and three others were taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. On 26 September 2003, he was sentenced to two weeks’ imprisonment.

The show cause proceedings

6 The Law Society relied on the conviction and contended that due cause had been shown under s 83(2)(a) LPA which states:

Such due cause may be show by proof that an advocate and solicitor has been convicted of a criminal offence, implying a defect of character which makes him unfit for his profession

Before the court, counsel for the respondent acknowledged that the court could not look behind the conviction and conceded that due cause had been shown. As such, the only issue was the appropriate order to be made under s 83(1) LPA.

Appropriate order under s 83 LPA

7 Counsel for the respondent acknowledged that it was the practice of the courts to order a striking off where a solicitor had been convicted of an offence involving an element of dishonesty. Whilst he conceded that the offence here was clearly one involving dishonesty, he submitted that there were mitigating factors which merited consideration and argued that a mere censure or suspension would have been adequate in the present case.

8 First, counsel argued that the respondent never stood to gain from taking the...