Law Society of Singapore v Ravi s/o Madasamy
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Judge | Sundaresh Menon CJ,Tay Yong Kwang JCA,Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA |
Judgment Date | 21 March 2023 |
Docket Number | Originating Summons No 2 of 2022 |
Court | High Court (Singapore) |
Sundaresh Menon CJ, Tay Yong Kwang JCA and Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA
Originating Summons No 2 of 2022
Court of Three Judges
Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings — Respondent solicitor guilty of making baseless allegations against Attorney-General, officers of Attorney-General's Chambers and Law Society — Whether due cause for disciplinary action established — Whether respondent's misconduct attested to character defects rendering respondent unfit to be member of legal profession — Whether respondent's misconduct caused grave dishonour to standing of legal profession — Whether respondent should be struck off roll or, if not, what appropriate sanction was
Held, allowing the application:
Due cause
(1) The key issue was whether Mr Ravi's misconduct was sufficiently serious to warrant the imposition of sanctions under s 83(1) of the LPA. A proper assessment of the seriousness of Mr Ravi's misconduct required a granular examination of the context in which Mr Ravi's various statements were made: at [52].
(2) There was due cause for disciplinary action against Mr Ravi. Beginning with the Second Charge, Mr Ravi's First Facebook Statement referred to the AG et al as “wrongdoers”. The term “wrongdoers”, had to be seen in light of the Interview Statements (made one day prior) and the statement of claim filed in Suit 1068. In particular, the statement of claim (which Mr Ravi had also posted on Facebook around two weeks after making the First Facebook Post) alleged that the AG et al had been “dishonest”, had engaged in “deplorable conduct”, and “had taken unfair advantage” of Gobi leading to the death sentence wrongfully imposed on him. Further, it was relevant to consider that the AG, who had the power to commence and conduct criminal prosecutions, is an essential pillar of the Singapore legal system. The First Facebook Statement was a direct attack toward the AG's execution of this core function, and therefore amounted to a serious accusation against the AG et al: at [78] to [85].
(3) Further, the allegation of “wrongdo[ing]” was made without a reasonable basis. In its Brief Grounds, the CA clarified that the parties did not have the benefit of the clarification in Adili at the time of trial, and that the Prosecution's case might have been formulated on the premise that the doctrine of wilful blindness was essentially the same as actual knowledge and therefore that the s 18(2) presumption could not be invoked. This was why the issue of the Prosecution's change of case was not raised in Gobi (Appeal) or in the initial submissions in Gobi (Review), but instead raised by the CA of its own motion. As such, while the CA held that the change of case had caused prejudice to Gobi, it did not conclude that the Prosecution had done this deliberately (unlike what Mr Ravi's statements suggested). The prejudice was a result of a confluence of unique circumstances, as well as the evolution and clarification of the legal position following Adili. Given his involvement in the review proceedings, Mr Ravi ought to have known that his allegations against the AG et al lacked any basis: at [88] and [89].
(4) The sense of unfairness and discourtesy shown by Mr Ravi toward the AG et al in his First and Second Facebook Statements was enhanced due to the potential public reach of those statements. The misconduct under the Second Charge was a serious breach of the solicitor's duty to treat other legal practitioners with fairness and courtesy under r 7(2) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (“PCR”): at [91] and [92].
(5) In relation to the Third Charge, Mr Ravi's Third Facebook Statement contained a baseless accusation that the Law Society, in “entertain[ing]” the DAG's Complaint, was participating in “harassment by [the] AG” against Mr Ravi in “doing [his] job” and thereby was failing to “protect lawyers and the independence of the profession”. This allegation lacked basis as the Law Society, upon the AG's request, was obliged to apply for a disciplinary tribunal to be appointed (see s 85(3)(b) of the LPA). The fact that Mr Ravi knew of this when he made the Third Facebook Statement, yet persisted in making the allegations that he did suggested that he had made the allegations at least with reckless disregard for the truth. The Third Facebook Statement amounted to an insinuation that the Law Society, by acting on the AG's request, would be abdicating its core purpose in the protection of lawyers and the independence of the profession. This was a serious breach of the solicitor's duty not to act in a manner contrary to his position as a member of an honourable profession under r 8(3)(b) of the PCR: at [102] to [107].
(6) In relation to the Fourth Charge, the contents of Mr Ravi's Reply Letter strengthened the court's interpretation of Mr Ravi's conduct as one that persistently insinuated or alleged impropriety on the part of the AG et al and buttressed the finding that due cause was made out: at [109].
Sanction
(7) Mr Ravi's misconduct was seriously harmful to public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. The imposition of censure or a monetary penalty would be insufficient; instead, the relevant question was whether Mr Ravi's misconduct warranted a period of suspension or the ultimate sanction of being struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors: at [116].
(8) Mr Ravi's misconduct exhibited a fundamental lack of respect and a blatant disregard for the integrity of Singapore's key legal institutions. Mr Ravi's views were not only not rooted in fact but also seemed to be stubbornly held and acted upon, revealing a defect of character. Mr Ravi's history of related past disciplinary cases and his unsatisfactory conduct at the hearing before the Court of Three Judges pointed to this ingrained attitude: at [122] to [126].
(9) Mr Ravi's utter disregard for the AG and the Law Society, both of which are key institutions of the Singapore legal system, had brought dishonour to the standing of the legal profession: at [127].
(10) The relevant aggravating factors include: Mr Ravi's status as a senior lawyer of close to 20 years' standing at the material time; his disciplinary cases of a similar nature over the past 15 years; and his lack of remorse. While Mr Ravi claimed to be remorseful about his misconduct, he had not only failed to apologise for his misconduct but had doubled down on his allegations against the AG et al and the Law Society during the hearing, going as far to suggest that the court too had abdicated its duties: at [130] to [135].
(11) Mr Ravi's involvement in the Gobi proceedings might in theory be considered mitigating. However, the mitigating effect of Mr Ravi's involvement was limited by the fact that it was the CA that first raised the matter of the Prosecution's change of case. Indeed, after the CA raised the issue and invited submissions from the parties on this point, Mr Ravi's own position was that it was not thought to be prejudicial to his client. Further, the nature of Mr Ravi's accusations against the AG et al and the Law Society, coupled with his disciplinary history and lack of remorse, made it untenable to accord any significant mitigating weight to his conduct: at [138].
(12) The appropriate sanction was a suspension of the maximum term of five years. It was noted in Mr Ravi's favour that he had not posted the statement of claim in Suit 1068 at the same time that he made the Facebook Statements, and thus that some of those who read the Facebook Statements at the time they were published might not have appreciated the full extent of his attack on the legal system. Further, the Interview Statements were not considered in determining the appropriate sentence: at [74], [120] and [136].
(13) No solicitor could be permitted to recklessly and baselessly undermine the very pillars of the legal system in which he operated and to permit this would cause grave injury to public confidence in the legal profession: at [143].
[Observation: While the First Charge was not in issue, it was helpful to revisit the DT's analysis because it not only shed light on why the DT saw fit to dismiss the First Charge, but also because a correct understanding of the Interview Statements was key to understanding the true gravity of Mr Ravi's misconduct: at [50], [52] and [74].
The DT had erred in its analysis on the First Charge. While the DT took into account the CA's observation in the Brief Grounds that Gobi had been “prejudiced” by the Prosecution's change of case, it had not considered the CA's qualification in the Brief Grounds that the Prosecution could not have anticipated that it had changed its case due to the existing law at the time. This qualification was made in light of the fact that Adili was only released after the conclusion of the proceedings in Gobi (Appeal). Therefore, the clarification in Adili regarding the distinction between the legal concept of wilful blindness to a fact and actual knowledge of that fact and consequently the availability of the presumption of fact in s 18(1) of the MDA in the former context was not available to the Prosecution during the proceedings in Gobi (Appeal): at [58] to [60].
The CA's finding in Gobi (Review) that Gobi had been “prejudiced” also had to be understood in light of the requirements for the exercise of the CA's power to review earlier decisions of an appellate court. The review power, which Gobi sought to invoke in CM 3, could only be exercised where it was shown not only that there was, for instance, a change of the law, but also that this change could have a material bearing on the outcome of the case. Therefore, the CA's finding in Gobi (Review) that Gobi had been “prejudiced” was directed at whether the Prosecution's change of case could be material to the outcome of the case, and did not suggest the Prosecution had conducted the proceedings against Gobi unfairly...
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