Lo Kok Jong v Eng Beng

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Sundaresh Menon CJ
• Judgment Date: 08 August 2024
• Neutral Citation: [2024] SGCA 28
• Hearing Date: 27 June 2024
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 4 of 2024
• Citation: [2024] SGCA 28
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Year: 2024
• Published date: 08 August 2024

[LawNet Admin Note: The following judgment is displayed as received from source]

Steven Chong JCA (delivering the grounds of decision of the court):Introduction

A claim arising from a road accident would typically comprise general damages for pain and suffering and special damages for medical and other expenses. In Singapore, various subsidies and grants are made available by the government to its citizens to defray some medical expenses. However, such subsidies and grants are payable, subject to certain criteria, upon the incurrence of the medical expenses and not only in the context of injuries occasioned by accidents.

Quite often, in suits brought by victims of road accidents against the tortfeasors, the claims would include such subsidies and grants which were not paid for by the victims. Given that damages in tort claims are compensatory in nature, on its face, such claims would offend the rule against double recovery. While the law has developed exceptions to that rule, it appears from some decisions that there is a general tendency to analogise the government payouts with the exceptions to the rule against double recovery in the court’s intuitive quest to ensure that the tortfeasor does not benefit from such payouts. In our view, such efforts may obfuscate the true factors that should properly guide the exercise in ascertaining the intention behind the subsidies and grants.

We heard and allowed this appeal on 27 June 2024. It was clear to us that the judge of the General Division of the High Court below (the “Judge”), in holding that the government subsidies and grants totalling $39,515.08 (the “Subsidies and Grants”) should not be deducted from the claim, failed to apply his mind to the relevant test as regards the applicability of the exceptions, ie, whether the respondent was intended to enjoy the Subsidies and Grants over and above what she might recover against the appellant. In the absence of such intention, the default rule against double recovery should apply.

In our Grounds of Decision, we take the opportunity to explain the test and objective indicia which should guide the court in its determination as to whether the disputed payouts fall within the exceptions to the rule against double recovery.

Facts

On 9 January 2020, the respondent was crossing a road when she was hit by a vehicle driven by the appellant. The respondent sustained personal injuries as a result, including a closed trimalleolar fracture of her right ankle.

The respondent filed a negligence suit against the appellant, seeking general and special damages. By consent, interlocutory judgment was entered in the respondent’s favour at 85% against the appellant with damages to be assessed.

Procedural backgroundProceedings in the State Courts

The Deputy Registrar (the “DR”) awarded damages totalling $36,348.64, comprising (a) general damages for pain and suffering caused to the respondent; and (b) special damages for medical and transport expenses paid by the respondent in cash or through Medisave/MediShield. However, the DR declined to award the sum of $39,515.08 (the “Disputed Sum”) claimed by the respondent in special damages for the medical expenses which were paid for by the Subsidies and Grants. The Subsidies and Grants comprised:generic government subsidies of $19,211.57 (the “Generic Government Subsidies”);Pioneer Generation subsidies of $148.88 (the “PG Subsidies”); andgovernment grants for Community Hospital Services and medical drugs (the “Community Grants”) of $20,155.16.

The DR held that the Subsidies and Grants did not fall under either of the established exceptions to the rule against double recovery: (a) the insurance exception (the “Insurance Exception”) and (b) the benevolence exception (the “Benevolence Exception”). First, unlike insurance payouts, government subsidies could hardly be considered the “fruits” of a citizen’s “thrift and foresight”, which was the underlying rationale for the Insurance Exception. Second, the DR considered that the key criterion for falling within the Benevolence Exception was that the moneys were “intended for [the plaintiff’s] enjoyment, and not provided in relief of any liability in others fully to compensate him”. In the absence of clear parliamentary indication that the Subsidies and Grants were intended as such, there was no material to suggest that Parliament intended to depart from the general rule against double recovery. Hence, the DR declined to award the Disputed Sum. On appeal, the District Judge (the “DJ”) affirmed the DR’s decision.

Decision below

The respondent appealed to the General Division of the High Court. The Judge allowed the appeal, finding that the Subsidies and Grants fell within the Benevolence Exception as they were meant to assist the respondent with her medical bills in view of her financial needs, and were not designed to relieve any potential tortfeasor from his liability to fully compensate the victim for the injuries arising from any tortious wrong. The Judge therefore found that there was nothing wrong with the respondent effectively being allowed to “encash” the Subsidies and Grants. Nevertheless, in light of the respondent’s willingness to return the Subsidies and Grants to the relevant authority, the Judge directed the respondent to return the Disputed Sum to the Ministry of Health (the “MOH”) (the “Repayment Order”) for the MOH to take any action it deemed fit, including whether to allow the respondent to retain the Subsidies and Grants. The Judge noted that the Repayment Order would address concerns that the respondent would enjoy double recovery if the Disputed Sum were to be paid directly to her.

The parties’ cases

The appellant appealed to the Appellate Division of the High Court. On this court’s motion, the appeal was transferred to this court since it involved a novel point of law of significance to personal injury cases and the wider insurance industry in Singapore.

The appellant submitted that in the absence of clear parliamentary intent that the Subsidies and Grants were meant to be enjoyed by the respondent over and above the damages payable by the appellant, the rule against double recovery should apply. The appellant also submitted that the Judge erred in making the Repayment Order as it contradicted his finding that the Subsidies and Grants were exempt from the rule against double recovery. In any event, the MOH did not have the power to receive repayment of the Subsidies and Grants.

The respondent submitted that the Subsidies and Grants were specifically intended to benefit her and not to lessen a tortfeasor’s liability towards a victim. Therefore, the Subsidies and Grants (and government subsidies in general) were exempt from the rule against double recovery. The respondent argued that the Repayment Order sufficiently addressed concerns over double recovery and noted that the MOH was agreeable to the respondent repaying the Subsidies and Grants via a donation to the Rare Diseases Fund.

Issues to be determined

There were two issues before this court: (a) whether the Subsidies and Grants should be exempt from the rule against double recovery; and (b) whether the court should order repayment of the Subsidies and Grants to the MOH.

Our decisionThe exceptions to the rule against double recovery

Damages are generally compensatory in nature. Whether in contract or tort law, an award of damages generally goes toward compensating a plaintiff for the actual loss he or she has suffered, and no further: see Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd and others v Yeo Boong Hua and others and another appeal[2018] 2 SLR 655 (“Turf Club”) at [1]. The logic underpinning this principle is self-evident – the aim of an award of damages is to place the plaintiff in the same position, as far as it is possible, as if the breach of contract or tort had not occurred: see ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily (trading as Access International Services)[2013] 4 SLR 1317 at [14].

There are, of course, other types of damages, such as punitive or restitutionary damages (the latter has yet to be decisively recognised in Singapore): see ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd and others[2017] 1 SLR 918 (“ACB”) at [153]–[206] and Turf Club at [250]–[255]. However, as the underlying rationale for these types of damages is different to that for compensatory damages, it is unsurprising that punitive or restitutionary damages may be available only in very limited circumstances: ACB at [176] and Turf Club at [254]. Importantly, these types of damages were not claimed in the present case.

One consequence of the general compensatory principle in damages is that any gain received by the plaintiff, which he or she would not have but for the injury, will prima facie be taken into account in calculating the damages to be awarded. In other words, such gains – commonly referred to as “collateral benefits” – will be deductible from the damages payable by the tortfeasor. This is one facet of the rule against double recovery, which stems from the principle that a plaintiff should be compensated only for his or her actual loss.

However, common sense comes in to ameliorate the rigid operation of the rule against double recovery in respect of certain collateral benefits. First, where a plaintiff receives an insurance payout for which he or she has paid the premiums, the law has long regarded such payouts not to be deductible from the damages payable: Bradburn v Great Western Railway Co [1874–80] All ER Rep 195 (“Bradburn”). This is known as the “Insurance Exception” to the rule against double recovery. Second, where a plaintiff receives money from the benevolence of third parties prompted by sympathy for his or her misfortune, as in the case of a beneficiary from a disaster fund, the money received is similarly not deductible from the damages payable: Redpath v Belfast and County Down Railway[1947] NI...