Kok Hoong Tan Dennis and Others v Public Prosecutor

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeYong Pung How CJ
Judgment Date06 November 1996
Neutral Citation[1996] SGHC 254
Docket NumberMagistrate's Appeal No 376 of 1995
Date06 November 1996
Year1996
Published date19 September 2003
Plaintiff CounselWilliam Glen How QC and S Magintharan (Netto Tan & S Magin)
Citation[1996] SGHC 254
Defendant CounselBala Reddy (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Subject MatterFundamental liberties,Constitutional Law,art 15(1), 15 (3) & 15 (4) Constitution of the Republic of Singapore,Criminal Law,art 12(1), 12 (2) & 12 (3)Constitution of the Republic of Singapore,Whether ministerial order deregistering a religious organisation was invalid or unconstitutional,Whether holding private meeting for prayer and bible study unlawful,Statutory offences,Extent of right,Freedom of religion,Whether general law which apply to only one group of citizens discriminatory and a violation of the Constitution,Societies Act,Unlawful society,ss 2, 14(1),14 (3), 24(1) & 24 (3) Societies Act (Cap 311)
The charge

The appellants are adherents of the Singapore Congregation of Jehovah`s Witnesses. They were jointly tried and convicted under s 14(3) of the Societies Act (the Act) (Cap 311) for attending a meeting of an unlawful society, namely, the Jehovah`s Witnesses, on 24 February 1995 at 9pm at Block 10-H Bradell Hill, #21-31. The first and third appellants were also convicted of an offence each, under s 15(1) of the Act for knowingly allowing their premises to be used for the meeting of an unlawful society.

The trial judge fined each appellant $2,000, and in default ordered them to serve two weeks` imprisonment for each charge on which they were convicted.
The first and third appellants paid their fines and the rest elected to serve their default sentences instead.

The facts in brief

The facts were largely not in dispute. The Singapore Congregation of Jehovah`s Witnesses (SCJW) was deregistered by the Minister for Home Affairs by Gazette Notification No 179 dated 14 January 1972 (hereinafter known as Order 179) in exercise of his powers under s 24(1) of the Societies Act.

On 24 February 1995, a team of police from the Secret Societies Branch of the CID led by ASP Florence Chua raided the first and third appellants` premises.
At the material time, all the appellants were engaged in a worship and bible study meeting with two French nationals who were also adherents of the Jehovah`s Witnesses. They were all professed members of Congregation No 4 of the SCJW and had been attending meetings regularly at the first and third appellants` home. During the raid, a number of prohibited publications was also seized.

It was not disputed by any of the appellants that they were all members of Congregation No 4.
This was one of the many congregations which fell under the umbrella of the SCJW, and which had operated underground since the dissolution of the SCJW. These congregations held regular meetings such as `book study sessions`, `service meetings` and `theocratic ministry school discussions`.

The first appellant also admitted that he offered his home for the committee members of the SCJW to meet and discuss the legal consequences of the deregistration of the SCJW.
According to the first appellant, the only difference between the organisational set up of the Jehovah`s Witnesses before 1972 and after its dissolution was that it was no longer possible for them to worship in the Kingdom Hall which they had established at Exeter Road.

The second appellant was baptised as a Jehovah`s Witness member in 1992.
He was appointed as a `regular pioneer`, whose duties involved inviting interested inquirers to be Jehovah`s Witnesses. The third appellant, who was the wife of the first appellant, was a member of the Farrer Park Congregation of Jehovah`s Witnesses prior to the dissolution of the SCJW. After its dissolution, she continued to worship in another group, and in 1988 she joined Congregation No 4. The fourth appellant, like the second appellant, was also a regular pioneer. As for the fifth appellant, he had been a Jehovah`s Witness for five years.

The trial judge`s decision

At the hearing below, counsel for the appellants raised several constitutional issues and urged the court to exercise its discretion under s 56A of the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321) to refer these issues to the High Court for its decision. Firstly, it was contended that art 15(1) of the Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion to every person including persons adhering to religious minorities. Such constitutional protection of religious minorities was fundamental to all free and democratic societies.

Next, the appellants contended that the Societies Act must be applied consistently with arts 15(1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.
The definition of `society` under the Act permits the individual to worship by prayer and bible study privately without having the need to register and such acts were thus not contrary to public order. After all, freedom of religion was not confined to the right to believe but includes the right to practise one`s belief.

The third issue raised was that the prosecution of the appellants constituted a discrimination on the ground only of religion and deprived the appellants the equal rights guaranteed under art 12(1) and (2) of the Constitution.
The prosecution`s application of the Societies Act in this instance targeted only the Jehovah`s Witnesses and this violated art 12(2) of the Constitution.

A further issue of contention was that Order 179 dissolving the SCJW was void as it violated arts 12(1) and (2) and 15(1) and (3) of the Constitution.
It was argued that Order 179 was arbitrary and unreasonable in that it was disproportionate to any claim of State interest.

Lastly, it was contended that this court was not bound by the High Court`s decision in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR 662.
Counsel for the appellants explained that the comments made by me in that case were obiter dicta as they did not decide the effect of Order 179 or the Societies Act on individuals who are Jehovah`s Witnesses and associate together for bible study and prayer in a private home.

The trial judge was of the view, in respect of the arguments that were advanced above, that it was not shown that there were new and difficult points of law in the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution which had not already been dealt with previously by the High Court.
As such, the trial judge rejected the request for any reference of the issues to the High Court, pursuant to s 56A of the Subordinate Courts Act.

As for the charges which the appellants faced, the trial judge noted that there was no serious defence mounted against them.
It was not in dispute that the appellants were attending a meeting of Jehovah`s Witnesses at the material time, at the premises of the first and third appellants, with their permission.

It was also clear that the appellants were all members of Congregation No 4, which derived its origin from the banned SCJW.
In any event, Congregation No 4 was not registered under the Societies Act. As such, the trial judge had no difficulty in finding the appellants guilty of the charges. The appellants, being dissatisfied with the decision, appealed.

The issues on appeal

The issues on appeal were essentially the same as those raised in the court below. In gist, the appellants again raised the issues which they had urged the court to refer to the High Court under s 56A of the Subordinate Courts Act. Next, they contended that the trial judge had erred in finding the appellants guilty of the charges, in particular, in holding that a private meeting for prayer and bible study by the appellants violated the Societies Act.

I thought it best to deal first with the constitutional issues raised.
I agreed with the trial judge that they were not of sufficient importance to merit a reference to the High Court under s 56A of the Subordinate Courts Act. It was clear that these arguments, although phrased differently, had been dealt with before, both in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal. As the trial judge noted, the questions raised essentially related to the validity and effect of Order 179 of 1972.

First, counsel contended that art 15(1) of the Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion to every person including those adhering to religious minorities.
In particular, counsel drew my attention to art 4 which provides:

This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of Singapore and any law enacted by the Legislature after the commencement of this Constitution which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.



When read together with art 15(1) which enshrines a person`s right to profess, practice and propagate his religion, counsel for the appellants argued that any law which sought to restrict or restrain this right, was inconsistent with the Constitution and according to art 4, would be null and void.


It seems to me that counsel has chosen, time and again, to deliberately ignore the wording of art 15(4), the proviso to art 15(1), which states that `this article does not authorise any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, public health or morality`.
As had been reiterated in the previous cases and in the recent decisions of Chan Cheow Khiang v PP [1996] 3 SLR 271 and in Liong Kok Keng v PP [1996] 3 SLR 263 the right to freedom of religion is subject to inherent limitations and is not an absolute and unqualified right.

As far as this case is concerned, the inherent limitations are presently found in Order 179 and the Societies Act.
Since the validity of Order 179 and the Societies Act has never been in doubt, they fall within the ambit of art 15(4) of the Constitution. As such, Order 179 and the Societies Act are not inconsistent with the Constitution as they were specifically provided for under art 15(4).

The next issue raised following from the first was that the Societies Act must be applied consistently with art 15(1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.
In particular, art 15(3) provides that:

Every religious group has the right -

(a) to manage its own religious affairs;

(b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes; and

(c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law.



As counsel contended,
...

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14 cases
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    • High Court (Singapore)
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    ...as the court must be concerned that statutes be properly enacted and do not contravene the Constitution. 78 In Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v PP [1997] 1 SLR 123, Yong Pung How CJ adopted the test laid down by the Supreme Court of India in Budhan Choudhry v State of Bihar AIR (42) 1955 SC 191 at 19......
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    ...to be achieved by the law in question. The test has been applied locally numerous times: see, for example, Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v. PP [1997] 1 SLR 123. 71. The appellant attacked the legislative judgment behind the 15g differentia. It was said that the equal protection guarantee under Art 1......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Administrative and Constitutional Law
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2004, December 2004
    • 1 December 2004
    ...to the legislative object. The ‘rational nexus’ test has been consistently applied in Singapore in cases like Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v PP[1997] 1 SLR 123, and was affirmed by the court in Nguyen which applied it. The Court of Appeal in Nguyen accepted it would be wrong to decide the issue of ......

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