Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia.

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Author: Blaxland, John
• Date: 01 April 2018

Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia. Edited by Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2017. Softcover: 351pp.

Khaki Capital is a significant work that touches on a range of issues concerning civil-military relations and the linkage between economic, military and political power in developing states. It catalogues the enduring roles of the military across much of Southeast Asia. Interestingly, however, it does not have chapters on Brunei, Malaysia or Singapore, though perhaps this is not too surprising given that these three states emerged peacefully from British colonial rule and London transferred control to designated or elected successors. That different and less military-dominated experience left their respective militaries with a weaker position from which to exercise what the authors describe as military capital, or "khaki capital".

The book defines khaki capital as "a form of income generation whereby the military, as the state-legitimized and dominant custodian-of-violence, establishes a mode of production that enables it to (a) influence state budgets to extract open or covert financial allocations; (b) to extract, transfer and distribute financial resources; and (c) to create financial or career opportunities" (p. 7). This is a catchy and useful concept that helps explain how the militaries of many Southeast Asian countries have exercised power and influence since independence through to the present--although with application to other parts of the world as well, no doubt.

Khaki capital, they argue, is predatory in nature, possessing formal dimensions (budgetary allocations from government) and informal ones (semi-legal or illegal activities). The informal ones include "slush funds", investments in private enterprises, military-related commercial opportunities and even military collusion with criminal interests. The authors make a strong case that "the greater control which militaries have over economic resources, then the more insulated they tend to be from civilian political control" (p. 328). This economic dominance, they argue, leads to greater autonomy and to inertia for sustaining or expanding economic holdings. That wealth turns into political power, which "serves as a self-perpetuating mechanism" (p. 3).

The book begins with a chapter explaining the theoretical framework utilized by the authors, followed by country specific ones on Indonesia, the Philippines...