Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd v Ng Chan Teng

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chan Sek Keong CJ
• Judgment Date: 13 March 2008
• Neutral Citation: [2008] SGCA 12
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Year: 2008
• Published date: 17 March 2008
• Plaintiff Counsel: K Anparasan and Sharon Lin (KhattarWong)
• Defendant Counsel: N Srinivasan (Hoh Law Corporation)
• Subject Matter: Courts and Jurisdiction,District court,Jurisdiction in actions of contract and tort,Statutory limit for damages,Tortfeasor accepting 70% liability in consent interlocutory judgment,Whether victim could recover 70% of damages assessed capped at statutory limit or only 70% of statutory limit,Section 20 Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed),High court,Power to transfer proceedings from District Court to High Court,Whether assessment of damages proceedings could be transferred to High Court where interlocutory judgment had been entered in District Court,Section 54B Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed),Words and Phrases,"Balance of account","Otherwise","Sufficient reason"
• Citation: [2008] SGCA 12

13 March 2008

V K Rajah JA (delivering the grounds of decision of the court):

1 This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) in Ng Chan Teng v Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 633 (“the Judgment”), which held that a plaintiff was entitled to recover damages up to a District Court’s jurisdictional limit after taking into account any deduction for contributory negligence, if applicable. This means that a District Court may assess damages at a quantum greater than its jurisdictional limit, subject to the qualification that the final amount of damages ordered to be paid is within such limit. We agreed with the Judge’s decision and dismissed the appeal. We now give the reasons for our decision.

The facts

2 The respondent in this appeal (who was the plaintiff in the originating suit), Mr Ng Chan Teng (“the respondent”), is a former employee of the appellant (the defendant in the originating suit), Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd (“the appellant”). Sometime in November 2001, the respondent was involved in an industrial accident while working at the appellant’s premises. As a result of the accident, the respondent suffered severe injuries to his right arm.

3 The respondent then commenced proceedings in the District Court claiming that the appellant was liable in tort for negligence and/or breach of its statutory duties under the Factories Act (Cap 104, 1998 Rev Ed) (repealed on 1 March 2006). The reliefs sought were, inter alia, general damages and special damages quantified at $22,000.

4 On 7 May 2004, the parties agreed to enter a consent interlocutory judgment, wherein the appellant accepted 70% liability for the accident, with damages to be assessed. Thereafter, the respondent’s then solicitors began corresponding with the appellant’s solicitors with a view to amicably settling the quantum of damages. In a letter dated 9 November 2005, the respondent’s solicitors proposed quantifying the total damages at $923,790. This was not accepted by the appellant and an impasse was reached. On 25 May 2006, the respondent appointed his present solicitors.

5 Despite further exchanges, the parties could not agree on the maximum sum that a District Court could award on the basis of 70% liability. The respondent’s position was that the maximum sum ought to be the “District Court limit” as defined in s 2 of the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) (“the Act”), ie, $250,000. On the other hand, the appellant’s position was that the maximum amount that could be awarded was 70% of the District Court limit, ie, $175,000. It may be helpful at this juncture to reproduce s 20 of the Act, which reads as follows:

Jurisdiction in actions of contract and tort

20.—(1) A District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try any action founded on contract or tort where —

(a) the debt, demand or damage claimed does not exceed the District Court limit, whether on balance of account or otherwise; or

(b) there is no claim for money, and the remedy or relief sought in the action is in respect of a subject-matter the value of which does not exceed the District Court limit.

(2) A District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try any action where the debt or demand claimed consists of a balance not exceeding the District Court limit after a set-off of any debt or demand claimed or recoverable by the defendant from the plaintiff, being a set-off admitted by the plaintiff in the particulars of his claim or demand.

[emphasis added]

As the parties were unable to resolve the issue of whether the respondent could recover up to $250,000 or only up to $175,000 (“the preliminary issue”), the respondent’s solicitors referred the matter to the District Court for determination pursuant to O 14 r 12 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Rules of Court”).

6 As an aside, it bears mention that counsel for the respondent clarified that the reason why the above O 14 r 12 application had been filed was that the assessment of damages could no longer be transferred to the High Court in view of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ricky Charles s/o Gabriel Thanabalan v Chua Boon Yeow [2003] 1 SLR 511 (“Ricky Charles”). In that case, this court held that an assessment of damages could not be transferred to the High Court after interlocutory judgment had been entered in the District Court. Given the practical difficulties that this particular decision has engendered, we have decided to reappraise, in these grounds of decision, whether or not the courts ought to persevere in adhering to it.

The decisions below

7 The matter was first heard by a deputy registrar of the Subordinate Courts (“the Deputy Registrar”). At the hearing, the Deputy Registrar made no order on the respondent’s O 14 r 12 application as he was of the opinion that the law was clear and there was therefore no need to make a ruling. The Deputy Registrar was also of the view that the preliminary issue could well be moot as the quantum of damages eventually awarded following an assessment could very well fall below $175,000, thus making any determination of the preliminary issue premature. Further, he thought that the proper forum for the determination of this issue should be the court hearing the assessment of damages itself.

8 The appeal against the Deputy Registrar’s decision was heard by a district judge (“the DJ”). The DJ was of the view that a determination under O 14 r 12 of the Rules of Court would be appropriate, given that there was a consensus between the parties to determine the preliminary issue. The DJ then decided that the maximum sum awardable at 70% liability was $175,000. His reasoning, at [7] of his grounds of decision (Ng Chan Teng v Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd [2007] SGDC 213), was as follows:

After careful consideration, I found myself in broad agreement with the submissions of the Defendant [ie, the appellant]. Like the Deputy Registrar, I was of the view that the language of Section 20 [of the Act] is plain and obvious, and the answer is clear. As the District Court limit is set at $250,000, 70% of $250,000 must mean that the Plaintiff’s [ie, the respondent’s] claim is now limited to $175,000. In my view, to adopt the Plaintiff’s interpretation would lead to uncertainty as to whether such civil claims ought to be commenced in the High Court or [the] District Court. The issue of contributory negligence was something that could not be accurately determined at the outset. Adopting the Plaintiff’s interpretation would also mean potentially that claims of up to $25 million could well commence in the District Court assuming that the Court ultimately finds the Defendant to be 1% liable. In my view, this would not be logical.

9 Not satisfied with the DJ’s decision, the respondent then filed a further appeal to the High Court. The Judge applied the Northern Irish High Court decision of Artt v W G & T Greer [1954] NI 112 (“Artt”) and allowed the appeal, holding that the maximum sum awardable at 70% liability ought to be the District Court limit of $250,000. His reasoning is aptly summarised in the following extract (see the Judgment ([1] supra) at [6]):

The natural meaning of parties who say that they agree to interlocutory judgment based on 70% liability, with damages to be assessed, must … [be] that the defendant agrees to pay 70% of the damages assessed. That would be the meaning in such a judgment entered in the High Court. It cannot have a different meaning in the District Court. It is more rational and consistent to adopt the same meaning and, after which, look to s 20 of [the Act], read with s 2 of the same, to cap the amount that is eventually ordered.

The parties’ contentions

10 The arguments and the authorities relied on by the parties before this court were earlier considered in the court below. The appellant, on the one hand, relied substantially on Kelly v Stockport Corporation [1949] 1 All ER 893 (“Kelly”), while the respondent, on the other hand, relied on Artt.

Whether deduction for contributory negligence to be made from District Court limit or from actual damages assessed

The position in other jurisdictions

11 Kelly, an English Court of Appeal decision, prima facie favours the appellant’s contention that $175,000 is the maximum sum that could be awarded at 70% liability. In that case, the plaintiff and his mother (the co-plaintiff) brought a claim in respect of injuries suffered by the former. The claim contained particulars of special damages and a claim for loss of wages by the plaintiff’s mother, and it ended with the words “and the plaintiffs claim £200 in damages”. The matter was first heard by the Stockport County Court, which had a jurisdictional limit of £200. The judge held that the defendant was negligent, but apportioned one-third of the blame to the plaintiff. Damages were assessed at £300, and it was this figure which the judge reduced by one-third. The damages awarded to the plaintiffs were thus £200, which was the pecuniary limit of the county court.

12 The county court’s decision was unanimously reversed by the English Court of Appeal, which held that the maximum sum recoverable by the plaintiffs was one-third of £200 (ie, £133). In particular, Tucker LJ noted that under s 1(2) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (c 28) (UK), the court must record the total damages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault. In this regard, he was of the view that it would be an excess of jurisdiction if the county court were to record a sum that was higher than one it could award.

13 The central premise in Kelly was subsequently considered and doubted by the Northern Irish High Court in Artt ([9] supra). In the latter case, the jury had found the defendant negligent, but had, at the same time, also found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence. The county court’s jurisdictional limit in Northern Ireland at that time...