Kamla Lal Hiranand (m.w.) v Lal Hiranand

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Choo Han Teck J
• Judgment Date: 08 August 2003
• Neutral Citation: [2003] SGHC 171
• Date: 08 August 2003
• Subject Matter: Whether originating summons suitable where material facts in dispute,Originating processes,Whether the plaintiff can rely on the liberty to apply clause to make an application by way of summons-in-chambers under an earlier originating process,Civil Procedure,Whether further applications may be made by way of summons-in-chambers where originating summons has been fully heard and finally disposed of or where there are material facts in dispute,"Liberty to apply" clause in the consent order,Summons in chambers,Consent order,Judgments and orders,Proper mode of application,Function of originating summons
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 1893 of
• Published date: 03 October 2003
• Defendant Counsel: Kenneth Tan SC with Siva Murugaiyan and Parveen Kaur Nagpal (Sant Singh Partnership)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Michael Hwang SC with Roslina Baba and Constance Tay (Ramdas & Wong)

1 The plaintiff in this originating summons is the wife of the defendant. There were two summons-in-chambers before me, one taken by the plaintiff (Summons-in-Chambers No 601562 of 2002), and the other by the defendant (Summons-in-Chambers No 600208 of 2003). The plaintiff was seeking by her application to compel the defendant to take an account of the ‘Trust Property’ defined in a document entitled ‘Last Will of Manghanmal Hiranand Ramchandani (‘MHR’) dated 22 November 1988 (the ‘1988 Will’). MHR is the father of the defendant and by the 1988 Will he purportedly bequeathed his estate in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent of 25% and the defendant 25%. The remaining portions were distributed in varying percentages to his grandchildren and the managers of his world-wide business. Padma Harilala and Ram Hiranand were named as the trustees and executors.

2 Originating Summons No 1893 of 1999 was filed on 7 December 1999, after the plaintiff had sued the two trustees and executors in Suit No 349 of 1999. The defendant in this originating summons was also named as the third defendant in Suit No 349 of 1999. The three defendants in the suit applied by way of O 14 r 12 for a final determination on a point of law, namely whether the 1988 Will was capable of creating a trust. The assistant registrar held that it could not. The plaintiff appealed and the High Court judge dismissed her appeal. She appealed to the Court of Appeal and her appeal there was also dismissed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is relevant to the present proceedings and I shall revert to it shortly.

3 It is essential at this point to note that the High Court judge dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal immediately after recording a consent order in respect of this originating summons. In short, on 8 December 1999 the plaintiff and defendant recorded a consent order before the High Court judge who, after recording the consent order, dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal in Suit No 349 of 1999, thus, affirming the assistant registrar’s finding that the 1988 Will was not capable of creating a trust. The said consent order which has now given rise to the fresh disputes in the form of the two summons-in-chambers before me is in the following terms:

‘1. This Court DOTH DECLARE that in respect of the estate of Manghanmal Hiranand Ramchandani @ Manghanamal Hiranand, deceased, the Defendant is bound by the trusts as set out in the document intituled the “Last Will of Manghanmal Hiranand Ramchandani” subscribed to by the said Manghanmal Hiranand Ramchandani @ Manghanmal Hiranand, deceased, on the 22^nd day of November 1988;

AND IT IS ORDERED THAT:-

2. The Defendant do all and such acts as is necessary to carry out the said trusts;

3 There be liberty to apply in respect of other reliefs not sought for in this Originating Summons arising from the Deed dated 28^th May 1999 made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant;

4. There be liberty to apply;

5. Costs be fixed at $2,000.00 to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff.’

4 Reverting now to the plaintiff’s summons-in-chambers, I am of the view that there is no merit in it at all. To begin with, a summons-in-chambers is the wrong procedure to seek relief of the sort that is being made here. Originating Summons No 1893 of 1999 is spent. Orders have been made disposing of the summons, save for two liberty to apply clauses, which for reasons that I now give, do not apply. Generally, a ‘liberty to apply’ clause is meant to enable the parties to work out the actual terms of the orders. See Christel v Christel [1951] 2 KB 725 and Koh Ewe Chee v Koh Hua Leong & Anor [2002] 3 SLR 643.

5 Mr Michael Hwang, SC appearing as counsel for the plaintiff made a spirited submission that the plaintiff was relying more on the ‘specific’ liberty to apply clause than the general one. But I am of the opinion that the so-called ‘specific’ liberty to apply clause also has no application. The...